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Musketry training has defined the role and purpose of Infantry on the battlefield since the 
Seventeenth Century. This thesis examines the musketry training of the British Army from an 
educational perspective during the thirty year period prior to World War One. In doing so, it 
attempts to bridge the gaps between three distinct areas of historiography: military, social, 
and firearms history. The main sources used have been the Musketry Regulations, any 
interim amendments to these, and the Annual Reports of the School of Musketry’s 
Commandant. Together they form the basis for an assessment of how the Army conducted 
rifle training, as well as a discussion of the opinions of the officers responsible for its creation 
and refinement, particularly their contemporary assessment of successes and failures. 
The discussion examines the Individual training of the Infantry specifically, as distinct 
from the Cavalry and support arms, being the only group equipped with the rifle throughout 
this period. The Infantry’s standards of marksmanship training were consistently the most 
rigorous of any arm of service, and their Individual training formed the universal foundations 
upon which all further training and tactics were built. These were the factors determining the 
point at which soldiers were considered ‘trained men’ in the eyes of the Army, and ready for 
combat service.  
 The period chosen includes changes and innovations made after both Boer Wars 
(1880-81, and 1899-1902), as well as the transition from single-shot rifles to magazine-fed 
designs. Many of these developments directly influenced the tactics and arms used at the 
beginning of World War One, and primary research has been conducted on specialist 
training, particularly the ‘Mad Minute’. This was also the period when senior First World 
War officers were trained, and so can provide another perspective on training and combat 
later in their careers. Service histories for certain influential figures relevant to this study are 
included as an appendix, to demonstrate their personal career paths in relation to the areas 
covered in this thesis. 
 This study concludes that, when viewed over a thirty-year period, changes in training 
were generally evolutionary, and relied heavily upon existing training mechanisms and 
equipment. It demonstrates that the British Army was attempting to incorporate greater 
realism into Individual training in the 1880s, but using the existing educational framework. 
This approach changed with the introduction of the Lee-Metford rifle in 1891, and the 
perceived benefits of this new arm. This came full circle after 1902, with a far greater focus 
upon realistic and progressive Individual training, and with assessment separated from 
instruction for the first time. This became the blueprint for training over the course of the 
Twentieth century. This thesis therefore adds to our understanding of both the battle 
procedures of the Late Victorian and Edwardian Army, and the formation of what we could 
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Musketry Training in the British Army, 1884-1914 
How did the British Army’s approach to the marksmanship training of its soldiers evolve to 
meet changes in both tactics and technology over the course of the thirty years prior to the 
First World War? 
Introduction 
The British Expeditionary Force (B.E.F.) that went to war in 1914 was the smallest 
European army to enter that conflict, but it was also the only wholly volunteer force. This 
was due to two factors: the reliance of the British Empire upon its naval power as its primary 
defence, and the consequent lack of investment in its Army; and an inherent distrust of the 
compulsory service required to build a large standing army. Their description by Kaiser 
Wilhelm II as a ‘contemptible little army’,2 which formed the source of so much pride for 
those who became known as the ‘Old Contemptibles’, has often been the basis for 
discussions as to whether that description was justified or not. The soldiers of the B.E.F. had 
all served for at least two years, and were led by officers who had experience of combat in 
Africa or on the North-West Frontier of India. This relatively long service allowed for 
training to be conducted throughout the year, rather than concentrated into a short period 
during the summer as conscript armies were often forced to do. This was particularly of 
benefit when it came to rifle training, allowing the Army to build the mechanical skill and 
muscle memory behind the training that the British felt necessary for the modern battlefield. 
                                                 
1
 ‘If you want peace, prepare for war’. The statement is adapted from one made by the Roman author Vegetius, 
in the preface to Book 3 of his work De Re Militari [‘Concerning Military Matters’], written in the 5th Century 
AD. 
2
 This was based upon the translation of an Army Order, supposedly issued by Wilhelm on 19 August 1914 and 
captured during the Battle of the Marne (6-12 September 1914), the translation of which was included in the 
British Orders of the Day on 24 September. However, despite repeated efforts in the immediate post -war period, 
the original telegram was never found, and it has been suggested that it was purely the creation of the British 
propaganda machine. See Spencer Jones, ‘Was the Kaiser’s ‘Old Contemptibles’ telegram a fabrication?’ (25 
August 2013). Retrieved from http://blog.helion.co.uk/spencer-jones-was-the-kaisers-old-contemptibles-
telegram-a-fabrication/, 2 September 2017. 
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But the training process needed more than just time, as had been demonstrated in two 
conflicts with the Boer settlers in Southern Africa. The First Boer War (1880-81) 
demonstrated the Afrikaners’ superior marksmanship skills, and had actually ended in defeat 
of the British forces, leading to the creation of a committee in 1881 to examine musketry 
training.3 Despite their work and seven subsequent issues of Musketry Regulations, when the 
British and Boer forces met again eighteen years later in the South African War (1899-1902), 
the Boer farmers still outshot professional British soldiers. The campaign, which many in 
Britain felt should have been over in a matter of months, became a three year conflict, and 
tied up a disproportionate amount of men and material. Although the British Army eventually 
emerged victorious, the campaign was an embarrassment, and was the catalyst for a 
reassessment of the Army as whole, conducted both internally by the senior commanders and 
externally by political committees. A large amount of work was required to improve their 
skills and reputation by the outbreak of the First World War. 
 
The purposes of this study are threefold: 
1. To examine how musketry training evolved between 1884 (the first manual issued 
after the First Boer War) and 22nd November 1914 (the end of the First Battle of 
Ypres, the last action of the First World War where significant numbers of pre-war 
Regular troops took part). 
2. To examine how tactical and technological changes influenced that evolution, both at 
theoretical and practical levels. 
3. To determine what other factors may have influenced training beyond the experiences 
of the Army itself. 
 
                                                 
3
 See HMSO, Report of the Committee on Musketry Instruction in the Army, &c.; Together with Minu tes of 
Evidence and Appendix, 1881 , (London, Harrison and Sons, 1881). Preserved in The National Archives (UK) 
[Hereafter cited as TNA], WO 33/37. 
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Justification for the Study Parameters:  
The evolution of the British Army’s musketry skills and tactics allows for a study of 
both the human and mechanical aspects of individual training, as well as a greater 
understanding of the motivation behind changes, in response to either tactical and/or 
technological pressures. The first rifle training manuals for the Army as a whole had 
appeared in the early 1850s, alongside the general introduction of rifle-muskets. These were 
eventually converted to breech-loaders in the early 1860s using the Snider breech design, 
although this was only intended as a stop-gap measure. The Martini-Henry which replaced 
them was the first purpose-built breech-loader in the British Army, but it was chambered for 
the relatively large .577/.450 cartridge, which used black powder as the propellant. Whilst it 
was comparable to most of its contemporaries, it represented a type of rifle which was 
quickly rendered obsolescent on the battlefield by faster loading magazine-fed designs. That 
the Martini-Henry remained in service for as long as it did was due to the rapidity with which 
further developments occurred in firearms and ammunition technology. Although the British 
originally intended to adopt a modification of the Martini action, designed around a smaller 
.402-inch cartridge, it quickly became clear that technology had moved past that design. The 
experiments that followed eventually led to the introduction of the Lee action and the .303-
inch cartridge, a combination which was to serve both British and Imperial forces into the 
1950s.  
This is one of the three factors in choosing the period between 1884 and 1914. As 
referred to above, 1884 was the first manual issued after the First Boer War, and so allows for 
comparison to be made between the lessons learnt in the 1880s, and those gained nearly 
twenty years later. The mid-1880s were also formative years for many of those officers who 
occupied senior positions in both the South African and First World Wars, as it was the 
period where they either joined the Army or exercised their first commands. The experiences 
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gained during that period would continue to affect their approach to battle in later life, and so 
may offer a different insight into their perception of combat. 
When developing training, the manuals had to maintain pace with changes in 
technology and its usage on the battlefield, both in the hands of the individual soldier and as 
part of a larger unit. The initial training focussed on individual skill, particularly 
marksmanship, as this was the foundation of the training that followed. Soldiers who passed 
then moved onto Sectional training, where they fired as part of their unit. This was where 
they practised the manoeuvres and drills they would need to operate together on the 
battlefield, a section being the smallest unit considered to be effective on the battlefield. 
However, the exact form that this sectional training took depended heavily upon the available 
training areas, which were severely limited in Britain, as well as the inclinations of the area 
commanders. Due to this variation, the primary focus of this thesis is the individual 
marksmanship training, as this was both relatively standardised and was also formally 
assessed.  
The end date has been based upon the historical works of David Ascoli and Robin 
Neillands,4 both of whom focussed on the original B.E.F., and whose studies ended with the 
close of the First Battle of Ypres on 22nd November 1914. After that date, what remained of 
the pre-war Regular Army was withdrawn from the front line, and the training system in use 
by the British Army had to be adapted to cope with a need to supply many more trained 
soldiers in as short a time as possible. The training which had developed in response to the 
small colonial wars was found impossible to sustain in the face of the demands of 
industrialised warfare. At the same time, from the beginning of 1915, there was a move away 
from an infantry based solely around the rifle, with the introduction of hand grenades and 
light machine guns to create an early form of combined-arms tactics. With these new 
                                                 
4
 D. Ascoli, The Mons Star; The British Expeditionary Force, 1914 , (London, Harrap, 1981); Robin Neillands, 
The Old Contemptibles, (London, John Murray, 2004). 
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weapons introduced to the battlefield, the firepower of a unit could be supplemented by 
methods other than musketry efficiency, and the rifle was no longer the sole battlefield arm of 
the Infantry. The major changes that this required means that November 1914 represents a 
logical end date for the study, and the final manual to be considered is the amended 1909 
Regulations issued in January 1914. 
This thirty-year period has been divided across four chapters: 
 
Chapter 1: 1884 – 1891 
Chapter 1 examines the period from the first manual issued after the First Boer War, through 
to the introduction of the Magazine Rifle (later referred to as the Lee-Metford). Whilst the 
first of these were issued at the end of 1889, the musketry training that was issued for them 
was initially adapted from that used for the Martini-Henry, and they were taught in the same 
way until such time as the majority of units were in possession of them. 
 
Chapter 2: 1892 – 1900 
Chapter 2 covers the period between the first full manual for the Lee-Metford being issued, in 
1892, until the end of the first full year of the South African War in 1900. During this period, 
manuals were issued every other year, and the four manuals form a distinct group in their 
own right, demonstrating the British Army’s evolving understanding of the new rifle’s 
capabilities, and how they wished to use them on the battlefield, as well as the introduction of 
‘smokeless’ cartridges and the Lee-Enfield rifle to handle them. This period created the 








Chapter 3: 1901 – 1908 
Chapter 3 considers the aftermath of the South Africa War, with the introduction of the 
‘Short’ Lee-Enfield and the training overlap between the old and the new rifle. There were 
also lessons from both the South African War and the Tirah Campaign on the North-West 
Frontier, particularly in the level of independence entrusted to soldiers. This produced three 
completely distinct sets of provisional musketry classification tables between 1902 and 1904, 
before finally being superseded by the Musketry Regulations of 1905. This was the first set of 
regulations to utilise a truly progressive approach to training, with assessment conducted in a 
discrete series of tests at the end of training, rather than training and assessment being 
combined. This formed the pattern which would guide future manuals. 
 
Chapter 4: 1909 – 1914 
Chapter 4 looks at the Musketry Regulations of 1909, which built upon the foundations of 
those issued in 1905, and were perhaps the most successful of any included in this study. Not 
only did these regulations remain in service until 1924, but they were flexible enough to be 
adapted to the changing demands of training in wartime. This period also covers the 
expanding role of the machine gun, and contemporary debates as to the relative supremacy of 
the rifle or bayonet on the battlefield. These had an impact upon training, as whichever view 
won ultimately decided the direction of training, to best support the tactics it created. 
 
Due to the nature of the subject, with several forces leading to the creation of the 
training manuals, both thematic and chronological approaches were considered. Given the 
nature of the manuals, it was felt that the themes that could be discussed were so inter-
connected that it would be far more difficult and confusing to attempt to separate them and 
pursue them individually. A chronological approach allows for a better demonstration of how 
both theories and techniques evolved throughout the period. This has been complemented by 
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relying primarily upon contemporary sources when assessing data, as far as possible. This 
ensures a fairer evaluation of the information collected, rather than examining with hindsight, 
which could influence analysis of the knowledge and equipment of contemporaries.  
 
Review of Sources:  
Primary Sources – This research focusses primarily on practical training as its initial 
reference point, and is based upon a combination of training manuals and interim 
amendments, issued between 1884 and 1914. Nine distinct manuals were issued during the 
period under consideration. These were not issued on a fixed cycle, but as and when major 
changes to the training syllabus were required.5 Whilst any of these were in force, 
amendments might be introduced, altering as little as the wording in a particular paragraph, or 
include completely new tables or paragraphs. These were promulgated through Army Orders, 
the method by which the Army Council announced developments to regiments, and 
depending upon its success an amendment might itself be amended or absorbed into 
subsequent training.  
In order to assess contemporary opinion as to the state of training, the work and 
reports of the School of Musketry have also been examined. Based at Hythe in Kent, the 
School was founded in 1853, and incorporated both educational and experimental aspects. 
From an educational stand-point, its function was two-fold. The first was to train selected 
officers and non-commissioned officers (N.C.O.s) as instructors. These men would then 
return to their units as musketry instructors, and so needed to be properly equipped to train 
their men to the desired standard using current techniques. Its second role was to write the 
musketry manuals, and develop any amendments required to keep the system up to date and 
functioning as efficiently as possible. The fluctuating pace of change is reflected by the 
                                                 
5
 The Musketry Regulations examined in this thesis were issued in 1884, 1887, 1892, 1894, 1896, 1898, 1903, 
1905, and 1909. The 1909 Regulations were reissued, incorporating interim amendments, in 1912 and 1914. 
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number of manuals issued over a given period.6 Where possible, the School preferred for a 
manual to be in use for two years before any changes were made, as only then was it felt that 
the training was properly understood. In those cases, amendments could be issued instead. 
However, particularly after wars, there was a surge in the production of new manuals over a 
shorter period, as the Establishment responded to any lessons learnt. Alongside this work, the 
School’s experimental role made it responsible for testing any new equipment and developing 
new training. This meant that the School’s instructors were not only amongst the best 
marksmen in the British Army, but often experts in the weapon systems of other nations as 
well as their own, so well placed to develop their own ideas as to how training should evolve. 
The School’s Commandant produced an Annual Report, in which he reviewed both the 
courses and experiments completed at Hythe, as well as analysing the musketry reports 
submitted by every battalion in the Army. These reports provide contemporary evidence on 
the perceived effectiveness of training for most of the years under discussion, allowing a 
greater understanding of both the Army’s intentions and its own assessment and 
understanding of its efficiency. 
Other contemporary sources have been used to provide wider context for changes, as 
well as contemporary opinions. The Victorian public took a strong interest in the Army, both 
in terms of technology and its efficiency. This is reflected in published works, newspaper 
articles, and questions in Parliament, often incorporating a high degree of technical detail. 
The most notable is the work of a young officer, Ian Hamilton, in 1885. His book, entitled 
The Fighting of the Future,7 was a radical departure from contemporary training and drew 
heavily upon his experiences in both India and South Africa. Whilst not taken up in Britain, 
Hamilton was placed in charge of the musketry training of the Native Army in India, 
allowing him to demonstrate the potential of his ideas. This made him a counterpoint to what 
                                                 
6
 As seen in the previous footnote, four complete set of Regulations were issued in the 1890s, whereas from 
1903 to 1914 only three were issued. 
7
 Captain I. Hamilton, The Fighting of the Future, (London, Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1885). 
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some perceived as inaction on the part of the School of Musketry. He later went on to be 
Commandant at Hythe, as well as serving in both the South African and First World Wars. 
His papers, including scrap books of contemporary articles on musketry training, have been 
used to demonstrate the opinions of some of Hamilton’s contemporaries as expressed in the 
public domain during the early part of this study.  
Other officers also produced both articles and lectures discussing changes in tactics, 
training and equipment, often through organisations such as the Aldershot Military Society, 
the Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, and the Army Review. Where possible, 
these have been included to further expand both official and personal perspectives on 
particular matters.8 The work of Colonel C.E. Callwell is noticeable in the scale of his work, 
providing a “tactical textbook” for soldiers faced with the varied conditions and demands of 
the numerous ‘small wars’ the British Army faced throughout this period.9 Another notable 
writer in the latter part of this thesis is Norman McMahon, who developed ideas regarding 
both musketry tactics and the potential future of the machine gun whilst serving as Chief 
Instructor at the School. His work highlights the arguments surrounding the development of 
both arms and tactics in the years immediately prior to World War One.10 
 
Secondary Sources – Historiography of the British Army in the late Victorian period can 
most readily be grouped into either campaign history, or as having a social or political focus. 
In terms of the former, a tendency to focus on the big campaigns has often meant that what 
happened in the period before is viewed with knowledge of its flaws, rather than from a 
contemporary perspective, a point noted by Nicholas Jones.11 In terms of the larger conflicts 
                                                 
8
 Whilst copies of both the Journal of the Royal United Services Institute and the Army Review have been found, 
survival of copies of lectures given to the Aldershot Military Society appear to be rare in public collections, and 
so occasionally these have been referred to via other writers. 
9
 Colonel C.E. Callwell, Small Wars, (reprint, London, Greenhill Books, 1990). 
10
 See Lt-Col. N.R. McMahon, ‘Fire-Fighting’, Aldershot Military Society, XCV, (London, Hugh Rees, 1908). 
11
 Nicholas Jones, From Drill to Doctrine. Forging the British Army’s Tactics 1897 – 1909, (unpublished PhD 
thesis, King’s College London, 2007), p. 7. 
15 
 
of this period, notable studies include the work of Joseph Lehmann and Thomas Packenham 
on the two Boer Wars,12 as well as that of John Terraine and Barbara Tuchman on the 
opening battles of the First World War,13 alongside those of Ascoli and Neilmann already 
cited above. In terms of the smaller conflicts, there are the works of John Fortescue, Byron 
Farwell, and Donald Featherstone, although these tend to be limited to simple campaign 
histories due to the sheer number of conflicts they cover.14  
Studies of the South African War in particular have generally focussed upon one or 
more of three main areas: the overall campaign; the changing tactics during the three major 
phases of the war; or upon the commanders. This last area has allowed a direct comparison 
between the tactics of Redvers Buller and Frederick Roberts,15 generals who came from two 
competing schools of theory and with vastly different experiences of war. However, few of 
these works continue beyond the end of the war. This leaves discussion of the changes that 
were enacted to address perceived failings of both equipment and tactics to those writing 
about the First World War, or larger tactical surveys such as that by Martin Samuels.16 A 
similar statement is true of many of the histories of the First World War, in that they often 
restrict themselves to the confines of the war itself. Discussions of the B.E.F. have 
traditionally been focussed on either the period following the Haldane Reforms of 1908,17 or 
based around the experiences of individual regiments or formations.18 Whilst 1908 was the 
point at which the British Army was reorganised into the body which mobilised in 1914, the 
                                                 
12
 Joseph Lehmann, The First Boer War, (London, Buchan & Enright, 1985); Thomas Packenham, The Boer 
War, (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1979). 
13
 John Terraine, Mons, (London, B.T. Batsford, 1960); Barbara Tuchman, August 1914, (London, MacMillan, 
1962). 
14
 John Fortescue, The Empire and the Army, (London, Cassell and Company, 1928); Byron Farwell, Queen 
Victoria’s Little Wars, (London, Allen Lane, 1973); Donald Featherstone, Colonial Small Wars, 1837-1901, 
(Newton Abbott, David & Charles, 1973). 
15
 Julian Symons, Buller’s Campaign, (London, White Lion Publishers, 1974); Rodney Atwood, Roberts & 
Kitchener in South Africa, 1900-1902, (Barnsley, Pen & Sword Military, 2011). 
16
 M. Samuels, Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 
1888-1918. (London, Frank Cass, 2003). 
17
 Richard Holmes, Tommy; The British Soldier on the Western Front, 1914-1918, (London, Harper Collins, 
2004). 
18
 For example, J.M. Craster (ed.), ‘Fifteen Rounds a Minute’ – The Grenadiers at War, August to December 
1914, (London, Macmillan London, 1976. 
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Army was comprised of men whose range of experience often stretched back to the Victorian 
period. This was particularly true of those in higher ranks, and their experiences of the 
Second Boer War, twinned with opinions based upon observations of the Russo-Japanese 
War (1904-5), continued to exert an influence upon the approach of senior British officers to 
the issues they faced. The work of Robin Neillands is notable in this area, as his work on the 
‘Old Contemptibles’ covers the period from 1870 to 1914, to better demonstrate the European 
political setting that dictated how the B.E.F. was deployed.19 By contrast, the primary focus 
of recent work by Peter Hart is on the first five months of the war, from August to December 
1914.20 There have also been parallel discussions examining the command structure of the 
Army, focussing on particular officers,21 or campaigns.22 Again, there are outliers from these 
conventions, with historians such as Spencer Jones and Tim Travers examining changing 
tactical practices, both during campaigns and in peace time,23 or technological evolution in 
this period.24  
In terms of the army’s relationship with society, its composition, recruitment and 
training has been examined in the work of Alan Ramsay Skelley, Edward Spiers, and 
Timothy Bowman and Mark Connelly,25 as well as Richard Holmes’ Tommy.26 Whilst all 
include discussions on musketry training, they are limited by the scope of their respective 
works to discussing the debates over tactics rather than analysis of its development. Edward 
Spiers has also examined the role and work of the politician Richard Haldane, the Secretary 
                                                 
19
 Neillands Op Cit 
20
 P. Hart, Fire and Movement, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015). 
21
 J. Lee, A Soldier's Life: General Sir Ian Hamilton, 1853-1947 (2nd ed.), (London, Pan Books , 2001); B. Bond 
& N. Cave (ed.), Haig: A Reappraisal 70 Years On , (Barnsley, Leo Cooper, 1999). 
22
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of State for War responsible for many of the organisational changes and reforms which the 
B.E.F. was to utilise in 1914.27 These have all served to illustrate the difficulties associated 
with recruitment in peace time, particularly in terms of maintaining the required numbers for 
overseas detachments, often at the detriment of those battalions based at home. There is also 
a political dimension, as there was a drive from government to restrict expenditure on the 
army, something which Haldane was keenly aware of when laying out his reforms. These 
restrictions had a negative impact on training, as the low wages restricted the standard of 
recruit, and therefore the level of education they could reasonably be assumed to possess, and 
the demand for training to be completed as quickly as possible so that drafts could be sent out 
and numbers maintained. Whilst these discussions have included elements of musketry 
training, its inclusion as one element of a wider picture has meant that it has been given 
relatively little attention, beyond the changes in technology that occurred in the second half 
of the nineteenth century. As such, there has been little practical examination of how one of 
the most important parts of a soldier’s training was carried out, and what impact the 
challenges referred to above had upon the design and application of training. 
The drawback of many of these studies from a training perspective is that firearms 
were generally developed in peacetime, rather than for or during a particular war, and the 
relevant debates over procurement and training were subject to particular political pressures. 
There has also been a tendency, particularly in the drive to see soldiers as men rather than 
simply figures, to separate them from the weapons which formed their main battlefield 
implement. In the case of the Regular infantryman, who unlike his Continental counterparts 
had not been conscripted but had volunteered, a rifle was as much a part of his identity as any 
other element of his equipment. To consider him without it is to remove his primary role on 
the battlefield. Other writers have gone in a different direction, focussing on the development 
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and evolution of a particular weapons system from a technical and political perspective. In 
the period covered by this thesis, the most notable works were produced by two men: E.G.B. 
Reynolds and Ian Skennerton.28 These both provide a history of the invention and 
development of the Lee rifle in British service, together with technical information, across all 
of its various iterations. However, this allows very little space for consideration of how those 
rifles were used, save where it had a direct impact upon the form of the design. Similar works 
exist relating to the machine-gun, some of which were written by officers who served in 
World War One, and so occasionally include references to contemporary rifle training. These 
include the works of F.V. Longstaff and A.H. Atteridge, G.S. Hutchison,29 and R.V.K. 
Applin’s autobiography.30 There is also John Ellis’ work on the social history of the machine-
gun, and Paul Cornish’s wider history of the usage of machine-guns in World War One.31 
However, these works also include discussions of training and usage, whereas similar works 
do not exist for the rifle. This leaves a gap in the historiography between the factory and the 
battlefield; the point where a recruit was issued the rifle he was to wield in the service of his 
country, and carry for the rest of his service career. Although writers such as Skelley have 
discussed the educational level of recruits in the Victorian period, this is normally in the 
context of eligibility for promotion, rather than its impact upon the merits and usage of verbal 
or written instruction during this period. Education writers such as Eric Midwinter, whilst 
writing about the history of education, do so from the development of the education system, 
and do not look at its impact once pupils had left school.32 Although contemporary education 
handbooks do exist, these were often written by soldiers to assist in the training of Territorial 
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or cadet units, and focus on the subject matter rather than training methods.33 As such, whilst 
there are works which touch on aspects of this area, either directly or indirectly, this work 
seeks to combine elements of military history, firearms history, and military education within 
a single work. 
 
Key Research Questions:  
The training practices of the Victorian and Edwardian Army can be assessed by their 
approach both to what soldiers were taught, and the methods of instruction used. Historically, 
the classic training method of the army was rote instruction: carefully choreographed 
movements, taught as ‘drills’, which would be followed as an automatic reaction to orders 
given by a commander. The intention was that every soldier’s reaction would be the same, 
and that in battle these drills would ensure that soldiers continued to perform their roles. This 
form of training, whilst effective in training conscript armies, carried with it a massive risk. 
Should the commander be wounded or killed, the soldiers would lose direction, having no 
understanding of when to act without those commands. Whilst at close quarters they would 
continue to fight, at longer ranges they would not necessarily be able to direct their fire 
effectively. By the 1880s, a form of reflective practice had been introduced, which is best 
described under a phrase still used by the military today: ‘test and adjust’. This allowed an 
individual to choose the best position and sight alignment to meet the parameters of the fire 
order given by his commander. This was relatively low-level though, and battlefield tactics 
continued to assume the presence of a commander to direct a unit’s fire. Whilst some form of 
control was always required to maintain discipline, there was a major change in how that was 
exercised around the turn of the century. The effects of accurate long-range fire, experienced 
both in South Africa and on the North West Frontier, led some officers to look at Light 
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Infantry tactics developed during the Peninsular War. These had allowed individual soldiers a 
greater independence of operation, within a framework of objectives dictated by the larger 
plan. It was this approach which came to be the cornerstone of British training during the 
years prior to World War One. 
The following four questions have been framed to ensure that reflective practice, 
repetitive instruction, and the level of independence in action assigned on the battlefield, are 
examined when analysing the training material throughout this study: 
 
1. What teaching methods are being used, particularly rote learning or written
  teaching? 
2. Are soldiers being taught to react automatically to orders or to have autonomy
  on the battlefield? 
3. What impact do wider tactical and technological changes have upon teaching
  methods and priorities? 
4. How do key personalities and events affect the direction of training? 
 
These questions have been influenced by the work of Randall Wakelam of the Royal 
Military College of Canada,34 whose analysis of Western military education frameworks 
suggests that civilian concepts of lifelong learning are integral to military training. He has 
also pointed out the need for a reactive branch of the military, particularly in wartime, to 
ensure that intelligence and experience are assimilated in a form of ‘best practice’ and 
incorporated into the training of new recruits. This was particularly critical to the British 
Army, whose training throughout this period was kept deliberately non-specific, providing a 
broad framework so as to allow for rapid adaptation to specific circumstances. This was due 
to the unique challenges posed by the British Empire, where the Army might be deployed to 
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fight in almost any part of the world at relatively short notice, and against vastly different 
opponents. It was these conflicts, both the small-scale colonial actions which occurred 
throughout the 1890s and the larger wars which Britain either participated in or observed, that 
were the proving ground for all training, including musketry, as well as being used as 
evidence for how training could be improved. This reactive approach can also be seen when 
new weapons systems, such as the machine gun or aeroplane, were deployed in combat for 
the first time. As experience was gained, and the deficiencies of the theoretical models of 
peacetime exposed, that knowledge had to be assimilated to ensure that every asset was used 
as effectively as possible. What is most interesting about the First World War is that pre-war 
theories relating to the machine gun, which had been more or less dismissed by the 
Establishment, were eventually accepted and assimilated, leading to the creation of the 
Machine Gun Corps in October 1915 and a wholly different approach to using their firepower 
in aid of assaults. 
The question of teaching practices is fairly complex, although the methods themselves 
are deceptively simple at first. Whilst the process by which the Army advanced its tactics and 
training is best described as reflective practice, there does not appear to have been a particular 
educational theory to guide the conscious assessment and evaluation of training techniques. 
Indeed, contemporary studies of the Army tended to view its evolution as a continuous 
process from the creation of the Cromwellian New Model Army.35 Attempts at reform in the 
late Victorian period, such as those suggested by Ian Hamilton in The Fighting of the Future, 
focussed upon changing the skills being taught by making the exercises more ‘practical’ in 
nature, rather than the underlying methods of instruction. The only major change during this 
period was the move away from rote instruction, both of the soldiers and of the officers when 
training as instructors. The latter had formed one of the major complaints against Hythe, 
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where a perfect memorisation of the training materials was valued above an understanding of 
their implications.36 This move can be seen as part of wider changes in society at that time. 
The late Nineteenth Century saw the improvement of the basic literacy and numeracy of the 
population after the implementation of the 1870 and 1880 Education Acts. This became a 
factor in the training of new recruits, who would have potentially been capable of a greater 
understanding of instructional material, and which may have affected the way the Army 
approached instruction in general. The Army had already made inroads in this area with the 
formation of the Corps of Army Schoolmasters in 1845, and the introduction of the Army 
Certificate of Education in 1861, which had three ‘classes’. This carried a level of incentive, 
as obtaining each certificate allowed a soldier to be considered for promotion. After the South 
African War, a definite attempt appears to have been made to change the way soldiers were 
taught musketry, reflecting the wider interest in Light Infantry methods of training. At the 
same time, the approach to monitoring musketry standards changed, from a system which 
combined instruction and classification to one where the two elements were separated. The 
training also became consciously ‘progressive’, where each practice either expanded a 
previous teaching point, or introduced a new element. It was this approach to training, 
referred to be some contemporaries as ‘Monro Doctrine’, which was seen as crucial in the 
instruction of the pre-war Army. 
That description of a type of training as ‘Monro Doctrine’ also raises the 
consideration of the officers responsible for producing the training material. Whilst officers 
were drawn from the middle and upper classes, and generally educated to a better standard 
than the soldiery, it may only have been their desire to progress through the ranks that caused 
them to attend a course of instruction at the School of Musketry, as a condition of their 
holding the post of Adjutant. The instructors of the School were drawn from those who had 
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previously attended a course, although the qualifications for being an instructor varied over 
time. Whilst the junior instructors often returned to the School within five years of their own 
course of instruction, there was often a far longer gap for those who held the senior posts of 
Commandant or Chief Instructor. From 1890 the roles of officer instructors also appear to 
have become fixed-term postings of four years, creating a continual turnover of experience 
and interests in the command, on top of a relatively stable foundation of long-serving 
N.C.O.s.37 In the period between 1902 and 1914 the effect of this can be seen in the variation 
of opinions expressed by successive officers, particularly with regard to the potential 
applications of machine guns. Perhaps more worrying is that the eponymous Monro actually 
considered himself to be unqualified for the post of Chief Instructor when appointed in 
1902.38 Yet, in the course of his six year tenure at Hythe, he assisted in the creation of all of 
the musketry training issued from 1903 to 1905, which was the basis for training through the 
First World War and beyond. Although this is the only known case of an officer being 
recognised for his work in that way, it demonstrates that a particular officer could have a 
sizeable impact upon his field. In light of this, primary research has been conducted into 
several officers who feature in the history of the School during this period, including: 
 
 John Hopton (Captain-Instructor, 1886-1890, Chief Instructor, 1896-1900) 
 Jesse Wallingford (Sergeant-Instructor, 1894-1911) 
 Ian Hamilton (Commandant, 1898-1899) 
 Charles Etches (Instructor, 1899 & 1901-1905) 
 Charles Monro (Chief Instructor, 1901-1903, Commandant, 1903-1907) 
                                                 
37
 Although N.C.O.s are rarely recorded, two pre-war instructors, Jesse Wallingford and C.W. Churcher, can 
both be seen in competition records to have served for much longer periods. Wallingford specifically is known 
to have served for seventeen years, which does not appear to have been unusual at the School.  
38
 See Gen. Sir G. Barrow, The Life of General Sir Charles Carmichael Monro, Bt. G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., 
(London, Hutchinson & Co., 1931), p. 31. His biographer also comments that the reason behind his selection for 
the post of Chief Instructor was ‘not evident’. 
24 
 
 Norman McMahon (Chief Instructor, 1905-1909) 
 
This has provided the basis for three peer-reviewed articles,39 published during the 
course of this research, and a fourth which is due to be published in 2018.40 These have 
included discussions of the British approach to the design and experimentation with firearms 
during the pre-war period, and a commentary on McMahon’s 1907 lecture on fire tactics, 
described by one contemporary as ‘…a most important historical study…’.41 These, together 
with a presentation to the Historical Breechloading Smallarms Association upon McMahon’s 
life and career, have allowed for greater impact to be gained, particularly as they relate to the 
opening stages of the First World War, and thus tie in with the current commemorations of 
the centenary.  
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Chapter 1: 1884-1891 – The Transition to Small-Bore 
The training promulgated during the 1880s was largely influenced by two major events. The 
first was a combination of the lessons learnt from two colonial wars: the Anglo-Zulu War 
(1879), and the First Boer War (1880-81). Both had seen serious defeats for the British Army, 
the latter being so embarrassing that Punch had published a cartoon commenting on the 
superior shooting of the Boers.42 The aftermath saw the formation of a committee to examine 
musketry instruction, which delivered its response on 22 September 1881.43 Their report 
made thirty recommendations, with the greatest number (thirteen) specifically relating to the 
training of the Infantry. These included an increase in ammunition for both recruits and 
trained soldiers, adding practical elements to the annual course, and a reorganisation of the 
responsibilities of training. They also recommended revising the regulations to simplify the 
theoretical section, and supported the adoption of a new rifle for the infantry, as well as 
raising the question of replacing the carbine with the rifle in cavalry service. Whilst the last 
point was not to become a reality until the introduction of the ‘Short’ rifle (an intermediate 
length between the full-length rifle and the carbine) in 1902, and the increase of ammunition 
allowance was never enacted, other suggestions, such as the inclusion of a practical element 
of training and the reassignment of duties and responsibilities, were taken up. 
Whilst those changes were being made, the introduction of the new rifle for the 
infantry, which the committee had referred to, required further work before it was ready to 
issue. Although the testing of potential options had begun in 1879, the Army was forced to 
revise its requirements  
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Figure 1: Punch’s satire of the failures of the British Army during the First Boer War. The 
Duke of Cambridge, Commander-in-Chief of the British Army, examines theories of 
musketry, with papers on his desk where the School of Musketry and its teachings lie in a pile 




to keep pace with the innovations of Continental armies, and consequently spent almost a 
decade evaluating and refining various designs before a replacement was selected.44 The final 
decision was also influenced by issues experienced with the existing Martini-Henry service 
rifle during the Egyptian campaign in 1885,45 but that meant that, up until the beginning of 
the 1890s, the majority of the Army were still using the Martini-Henry. The combination of a 
Swiss-designed action (Friedrich von Martini) and the rifling profile of a Scottish gunmaker 
(Alexander Henry), the rifle had entered service in the 1870s. It was chambered for a bottle-
necked cartridge that had become legendary for its punishing recoil,46 and utilised the same 
propellant which had been used since the introduction of firearms: black powder. This was 
far from ideal for military purposes as it was hygroscopic, and could be rendered ineffective 
through storage in damp conditions. It also created large amounts of white smoke, which both 
obscured the aim of the individual firer and signalled his position, and in battle created a 
literal ‘fog of war’.  
Under these conditions, the concepts of camouflage and concealment in the modern 
sense were redundant, and uniforms retained their traditional bright colours for identification 
purposes. That is not to say that the ludicrous nature of watching soldiers attempting to 
conceal themselves during field exercises whilst wearing “red coats and huge busbies” was 
lost on any observers.47 Yet despite these anachronisms, this period is crucial to 
understanding later developments, as it was during this period that men joined the Army who 
were later to influence the evolution of training between the South African War and World 
War One. It was the instruction and experiences received during this period that provided the 
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basis for their later careers. This was particularly true for Ian Hamilton, whose participation 
at the Battle of Majuba Hill (1881) left him physically scarred for the rest of his life, and with 
a passion for musketry that would influence the course of his career. 
 
Regulations for Musketry Instruction (Issued Provisionally), 188448 
As with all military regulations, Regulations for Musketry Instruction, 1884, was designed to 
serve two primary functions:  
 
1. To delineate the administrative framework by which all training of this type
  was governed, ensuring (as far as possible) consistency in instruction 
  throughout an army that was spread around the world, and faced with variable
  access to training facilities, particularly firing ranges. 
2. To provide a primary reference point for instructors and students, explaining
  the training and the reasoning that lay behind it. 
 
It is necessary to consider them in that order to understand the system that a new 
recruit would enter upon enlistment, progressing through the various assessments until he 
was a “Trained Soldier”, and considered ready for active service. During this period, 
recruitment was undertaken by individual regiments. Each regiment had two battalions, one 
of which was based in Britain at their depot, where new recruits were mustered and trained.49 
Musketry training began with the “Recruit Course”, which was conducted by the 
administrative staff of the Battalion, and upon successful completion of which a soldier 
would be listed as a “Trained Recruit”. They were then assigned to one of the battalion’s four 
companies, which were responsible for conducting the second cycle of training, the “Trained 
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Soldier Course”. It was only upon completion of this second course that a soldier was 
considered ready for active service.  
In each battalion, with the nominal strength of thirty offices and nine hundred and 
seventy-seven men, five officers and six N.C.O.s were required to have undergone a course 
of instruction at Hythe. As officers were rotated through postings, the actual number of 
qualified personnel available fluctuated, a problem that was exacerbated by the unpopularity 
of musketry as a subject. This was noted by contemporary commentators, who felt that 
interest in training often failed to spread beyond those specifically charged with its 
execution.50 The desire to address this may have driven a change noted by the Commandant 
of Hythe in his annual report on musketry for 1883; “The appointment of Officer Instructor in 
all corps has been abolished, as has also that of Sergeant Instructor in Corps not training 
recruits”.51 This meant that, rather than a single appointment of each per Corps, every 
“Company of a Corps [should] possess a duly qualified Officer and Sergeant to conduct its 
instruction in musketry”.52 The hierarchy of those entrusted with implementing recruit 
training, as laid out in the Regulations, was a three-tier system: 
 
Recruit Course  
(conducted at battalion level): 
 
Battalion Adjutant (Q) 
↓ 
Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM) (Q) 
↓ 




[‘Q’ - post that required a formal musketry qualification] 
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Of these three men, the adjutant was required to not only have passed the Hythe 
course, but to have achieved the higher ‘Extra’ standard. An officer who did not have this 
certificate could hold the post temporarily under special circumstances, but with the caveat 
that he should attend Hythe at the earliest opportunity to qualify, although this was not 
always adhered to.53 This higher requirement was necessary because the adjutant was 
responsible for overseeing the training of the whole battalion, as well as maintaining and 
ensuring the accuracy of the battalion musketry records, which were prepared by the 
Sergeant-Instructor of Musketry (SIM). The SIM was also responsible for the practical 
training of recruits, as well as assisting the Quartermaster in maintaining the range 
equipment. The Regimental Sergeant Major was not formally allocated any specific role, 
suggesting that he was only intended to be able to assist in the programme where necessary, 
in addition to his other duties. 
The musketry year within Britain ran from January to December, but if a recruit 
joined towards the end of the year, or completed his first course of instruction after 31 
October, he would be held over to start at the beginning of the next cycle, as no range 
practices took place during the winter months. The Recruit course took eighteen days to 
complete, and incorporated a greater theoretical element than that for Trained Soldiers, to 
provide the foundations for future training. The first eight days were each taken up with six 
half-hour lessons: 
 Aiming Drill (first six days) / Blank Firing Drill (last two days) 
 Position Drill (two classes per day) 
 Judging Distance Drill 
 Theoretical Principles 
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 Care of Arms and Ammunition 
 
The Aiming Drill was intended to ensure that the recruit could achieve the correct alignment 
of the rifle’s sights with a target, and was so crucial that two rows of small targets were 
painted onto the wall of the recruits’ barracks to allow for further practise.54 The Blank Firing 
Drill built on this by acclimatising recruits to the noise of firing, in an effort to reduce any 
tendency to flinch later on. The Theoretical Principles covered aspects of ballistics, in terms 
of the rifling and the bullet’s trajectory, as well as the external factors acting on it such as 
wind and gravity. Although the details may have exceeded the educational level of the 
average recruit, every soldier required an understanding of the practical implications of these 
principles to ensure that they could allow for those effects by adjusting their aim accordingly. 
The pattern of evaluation and adjustment; with the soldier allowing for these factors, firing, 
evaluating the fall of shot, and adjusting his aim as necessary, formed a rudimentary Kolb 
Cycle. This approach was (and is) a cornerstone of basic marksmanship principles, and so 
had to be fully comprehended before the recruit could progress. 
Having demonstrated their proficiency to a satisfactory standard, the recruits would 
then progress onto the next stage: ten days of live firing, for which one hundred rounds was 
issued per man, along with additional testing of their ability to judge distances. Range usage 
was divided into two periods – Sunrise to Midday, and 1pm to Sunset – with trained 
companies receiving priority for usage. As such, a practice ‘day’ described a period of 
between four and six hours, which was felt to be the maximum that soldiers could endure the 
Martini-Henry’s recoil and remain focussed. As a later commentator noted: 
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Figure 2: “How We Learn Now”, printed in Punch in 1879, satirised the poor understanding 
of musketry on the part of soldiers by making reference to the aiming marks painted on the 
barrack walls, ‘objects’ that remained a part of training in MR 1884. 
 
…the main defect of the Martini was its excessive recoil. Black powder is usually 
relatively gentle in operation but the Martini kicked like the proverbial mule and was the 
terror of recruits for this reason.55 
 
The table for training laid out the basic requirements for each day’s firing. The first 
six days were very basic, firing at bull’s-eye targets from different distances. Whilst critics 
felt that these were the worst targets for soldiers to learn with, they did allow instructors to 
accurately assess how much of the theoretical training the recruits had learnt. Day seven  
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Table 1: Regulations for Musketry Instruction (Issued Provisionally), 1884. Table “A”  
D
ay
 TARGET  PRACTICE 
Class of Target. 
Distances and 
number of Rounds. 
Dress Position Sights 
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13 400 ” 
Lying down 
14 “First” 500 ” 






“Independent” six targets 300     ” Cavalry, single rank kneeling 
“Volley”               ” 300 ” Infantry, front rank kneeling 
17 “Volley” 
Six targets 400 ” 
Lying down in extended order 








stands out as unique, as it was designed to demonstrate a very specific principle in a practical 
manner. As the Regulations described it: 
 
The object of this practice is to train the soldier to fire with rapidity and effect at 
varying distances under 250 yards with the rifle, 235 yards with the carbine, using one sight 
only, when there is no time to adjust the back-sight for each shot.56  
 
To make the practice slightly more realistic, a “figure” target was to be used – an iron 
panel, six feet high and two feet wide, painted with the rudimentary silhouette of a soldier in 
black on a white background. Each recruit started at 250 yards, his sights set to ‘point blank’ 
(the lowest possible elevation), advancing in ten short rushes to 140 yards and firing at each 
pause. The targets were only marked at the end of the practice, and ricochet hits were given a 
value, again both unique in the individual course. There was also no comparable practice 
within the trained soldier’s course, most likely as it would have been incorporated into the 
more practical Field Firing scenarios.  
                                                 
56
 MR 1884, p. 110. 
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The next two days involved both ‘Independent’ and ‘Volley’ practices, all of which 
were fired by the section as a whole, rather than individually. ‘Independent’ did not, in the 
military sense, mean the same thing as ‘individual’ – the soldier would fire as part of his unit 
at a target defined by his commander, but in his own time, rather than all firing 
simultaneously in volley. Whilst these two practices may seem anachronous by modern 
standards, they served a variety of purposes. Despite presenting a large target for accurate 
rifle or artillery fire, a close formation allowed a unit to maximise its effectiveness at greater 
distances, and remained the best defensive arrangement against a cavalry attack whilst 
utilising its ‘shock’ value against a massed charge, particularly through the use of the volley. 
Before the era of machine gun warfare, mass rifle fire was also the only method of gaining 
fire superiority during the final phase of an assault. Extended order was utilised in the 
preliminary stages of an assault to reduce the potential impact of artillery fire, hence the 
practice being fired from a greater distance. Yet the best spacing between firers was a source 
of fierce debate, with concerns of how commanders would retain fire control in the noise of 
battle, and remained a point of discussion up to the First World War. 
The final day involved a practice entitled ‘Skirmishing’, a practice combining fire 
with movement and in which any firing position could be used. Skirmishers had traditionally 
provided mobile advance and rear guards to the main force, and had been a feature of light 
infantry tactics during the Peninsular War. It was a style of fighting which devolved 
responsibility onto the individual soldier, allowing him to select both his targets and fire 
position, whilst operating as part of a wider effort to achieve a specific objective. However, 
this reliance on a soldier’s self-discipline was not popular amongst some senior officers, who 
believed in the need for the close proximity of a fire commander to ensure the most effective 





Figure 3: Drawing showing the method of scoring from bullet marks on an iron target of the 
period, as depicted in MR 1887, p. 114.  
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If a Recruit had a bad practice on any day, they were to repeat that practice once 
before continuing, rather than until the required standard had been achieved. Upon 
completing these ten days, each recruit was classified according to his scores from the 
individual practices. The score from the figure target practice was separated, possibly to 
gauge the effectiveness of the new practice. The required marks were: 
Classification Range Practice Figure Target (ex 30) 
1st Class 100 and higher 15 and higher 
2nd Class 75 to 99 12 to 14 
3rd Class Less than 75 Less than 12 
 
Once these classifications had been made, the trained recruit would join a company, 
which would take him through the Annual Course. Depending upon when he completed his 
Recruit training, he could shoot with another unit as a ‘casual’ if doing so would ensure he 
completed the course before the end of the year, and his marks would then be sent back to his 
unit on a ‘Transfer Return’. It was this course which was used to determine every soldier’s 
military value, providing an annual assessment of the Army’s marksmanship skills. The 
Regulations listed a number of awards and monetary prizes for the best shots, as incentives to 
practise throughout the year. Each company was responsible for its own training, conducted 
under a similar hierarchy to that used for recruits, but expanded to allow for the greater 
number of men to be trained:57 
Trained Soldier Course  
(conducted by individual companies): 
 










                                                 
57
 A company’s nominal full strength was two hundred and twenty -seven, although this would often only be 
reached immediately prior to deployment. This was then sub-divided into four platoons, and each platoon into 
four sections. However, the company was the main unit described in the regulations, and within which training 
was conducted and administrated. 
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Each company’s commanding officer was required to ensure that at least one of his 
eight sergeants had qualified at Hythe, earning the same certificate as was required for the 
position of Sergeant-Instructor of Musketry. He was also to ensure that every new lance-
corporal was properly instructed by the Sergeant-Instructor of Musketry in ‘communicating’ 
the firing exercise and position drill. Once the Adjutant had certified to the Commandant that 
the lance-corporal was proficient, the lance-corporal was issued a Form of Drill certificate, 
and would then be able to assist in instructing soldiers. 
The first two days were remedial, and covered the basic principles. Each day 
incorporated: 
 
 Aiming Drill (one drill, about one hour) 
 Position Drill (two drills, half an hour each) 
 Judging Distance Drill (one drill, about an hour and a half) 
 Theoretical Principles  and Care of Arms and Ammunition (half an hour) 
 
This was followed by eleven days of range practices, with one hundred and sixty 
rounds allocated per soldier. The range practices were designed to be adaptable to local 
facilities, which could not always accommodate the complete course as set out. Some stations 
had no ranges in their vicinity, and not all ranges could accommodate the practices as 
intended, so alternatives were included to ensure that as many practices as possible could still 
be run. This was particularly true of Field practices, which called for unmeasured ground, and 
so could only be conducted in a limited number of locations. 
The first eight days were arranged in a similar pattern to that for recruits, but covering 
a greater range of distances. The final three days of sectional practices could be compressed 
down to two or even one day at the field officer’s discretion. They were also conducted with 




Table 2: Regulations for Musketry Instruction (Issued Provisionally), 1884. Table “B 
PRELIMINARY DRILLS 








One drill, about 
one hour 
Two drills, of 
half an hour 
each 
One drill, about one and 
a half hours 
Half an hour 
*By an Officer of the 
Troop or Company from 
the Lectures, Chapter 
III., Section 1. 2 Ditto Ditto Ditto Ditto 
Day 
RANGE PRACTICE 
The several Practices are to take place in the following order.  
Class of Target 
a. Distances and 
number of Rounds 
Dress Position Sights 
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10 800 ” 
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helmets and valises 
Cavalry, single rank kneeling 
Infantry, front rank kneeling 
400 ” 
Drill order 
Any military position in extended 
order 12 









helmets and valises 
Cavalry, single rank kneeling 
Infantry, front rank kneeling 
 
 
combat. Any soldier with a particularly bad score was required to shoot that practice again, 
with the ammunition drawn from the remainder of his personal allotment, before moving onto 
the ‘Field’ practices. 
At the end of the ‘Range’ section, each soldier had fifty rounds remaining, provided 
he had not repeated any practices. Of these, twenty were allocated to two individual practices: 
a head and shoulders target (practice “b”), and a figure target (practice “c”). These were 
painted onto the standard issue steel target, but no further details were given as to how the 
practices were to be conducted or over what distances. It appears that those details were left 
to the discretion of the commanding officer, in order that they would best suit the available 
ground. Two further individual practices were included, to be conducted where the facilities 
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were available: a moving target and a vanishing target (practices “d” and “e” respectively).  58 
The manual acknowledged that the equipment required for them was not yet universally 
available, but their inclusion demonstrates an attempt to provide soldiers with more realistic 
practices.59 The final three practices were:  
 
 Skirmishing, at unknown distances if possible, and with each soldier adjusting 
his sights independently and choosing when to fire (practice “f”);  
 Volley firing at extreme ranges as if at massed groups of infantry or cavalry 
(practice “g”);  
 Field firing (practice “h”).  
 
The details of this last practice were left almost entirely to the discretion of the 
commander, but with the stipulations that the ground was to be unmeasured, and the targets 
made from condemned stores and dummies to give as realistic as possible simulation of 
combat. It was also crucial that proper battle procedures were followed, with the section 
working as a unit and ammunition expenditure controlled. The attack was then conducted in 
stages, allowing for the examination and evaluation of the targets. This was a key battle 
practice, and had to be conducted wherever possible, with an additional allowance of 
ammunition available to those units who were able to conduct the full range of practices. 
However, it remained a running complaint of the Commandant at Hythe that they were not 
always carried out where possible, or conducted properly when they were. 
                                                 
58
 Ian Hamilton suggested that, in the Madras Presidency at least, such ranges were created through private or 
local means rather than central funds. See Captain I. Hamilton, The Fighting of the Future, (London, Kegan 
Paul, Trench & Co., 1885), p. 26, footnote. 
59
 For a list of where the targets had been fitted, together with details of the practices, see H.M.S.O., Annual 
Report on the Instruction Carried on at the School of Musketry, Hythe, and of the Progress of Musketry 
Instruction in the Army, During the Year ending 31st March, 1885 , (London, H.M.S.O., 1886), pp. 4-5. 
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At the end of these practices the scores were collated, and ‘Figures of Merit’ were 
calculated for both the individual soldiers and for the unit as a whole on the following 
system: 
 
 The figure of merit of an individual used an aggregate of the “individual”
  range practices plus “b” and “c” of the “field” practices. 
 The figure of merit of a troop, company or section was based on the 
  aggregate of the averages of all “individual” and “section” practices in both
  parts, with the exception of section “a”, “g” and “h”.60 
 
Those practices that were omitted were those which were intended to simulate 
battlefield conditions, and as such were too reliant upon the local facilities to provide a 
consistent basis for analysis. Prizes were then awarded based on the figures of merit, 
consisting of both badges and monetary rewards in most cases. The accolade of ‘marksman’ 
was the most general reward, awarded to a maximum of 10% of the N.C.O.s and men in each 
company, with each man receiving £1 and (if not a prize winner) a badge of crossed rifles in 
worsted to be worn on the lower left sleeve. In cases where more than the quota had achieved 
the necessary scores, they were allowed to wear the badge but did not receive any money. 
The highest scoring private in the regiment received £5, together with a gold badge of crossed 
rifles beneath a crown which was worn on the lower left sleeve. Prizes were also awarded for 
the second best shot (£3), best corporal (£3), and the best shot in each company (£2 10s or £2 
depending on the size of the company). No individual could win more than one prize in any 
one year, and all winners had to have classified as marksmen to be eligible. These all appear 
                                                 
60
 MR 1884, p. 23. 
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to be one-off payments, but represented a significant supplement to the average soldier’s 
wage of 7s per week.61 
The value of awards also represented a potential weakness of the system at an 
administrative level. References made in the Annual Reports from Hythe show that the 
School attempted to address the issue by adjusting the classification bands to ensure that no 
more than 10% of those firing classified as marksmen.62 There are also occasional reports of 
results being ‘fixed’ by various methods, leading to tighter guidelines on marking to ensure 
that the abuses could not be repeated.63 There were also more practical issues, most obviously 
with the reliance upon the black bull’s-eye target, clearly contrasted on a white background. 
This gave an unrealistically clear aiming mark, useful for basic instruction but not in training 
soldiers for combat. Even the silhouette targets for battle practices, whilst attempting to 
introduce humanoid targetry, used the same colour scheme. This was partially due to the 
reliance upon a standardised method of target construction: an iron sheet, six feet high and 
two feet wide, designed to be linked together to create the target size required, and then 
painted accordingly. The Martini’s hardened lead bullet would flatten on impact, marking the 
paintwork without producing splinters that could endanger the marker. The usage of such 
unrealistic colour schemes would remain an issue into the 1890s.  
Whilst the training scheme introduced in 1884 included a number of small 
innovations, some contemporary officers felt that they did not go far enough.64 The inability 
to implement the training uniformly created minor flaws, which were then exacerbated by the 
tendency to use musketry as a demonstration of a soldier’s abilities with his rifle, rather than 
                                                 
61
 [Anon.], The British Almanac and Companion for the Year of our Lord 1894 , (London, The Stationers' 
Company, 1894), p. 75. However, stoppages and other deductions often meant that soldiers received a fraction 
of their nominal pay, despite attempts to remedy this. See Alan Ramsay Skelley, The Victorian Army at Home, 
(London, Croom Helm, 1977), pp. 181-195. 
62
 H.M.S.O., Annual Report…1884, p. 17. 
63
 An untitled article, preserved amongst Ian Hamilton’s papers, refers to a court -martial recently held at a 
station, “…to warn non-commissioned officers against attempting to cook returns of shooting at the ranges”. 
There are also references to other methods which were used to ensure favourable conditions. Preserved in HAM 
17/4, KCL Liddell Hart. 
64
 Browne, On The Instruction of our Soldiers, p. 1272. 
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a unit’s training for battle. Almost all of the practices were over measured ground, and 
against highly visible targets, whilst those intended to simulate combat more closely were left 
at the discretion of the commanding officer. These could well have been men trained prior to 
the introduction of the breech-loading rifle,65 with variable opinions of the value of musketry 
instruction on the battlefield. Perhaps one of the more extreme examples of this was a letter 
sent by a Rifle Brigade officer in 1890 to Ian Hamilton, whilst the latter was serving as 
Assistant Adjutant-General of Musketry in India. The writer advocates a focus on the 
standing position, to allow units to advance and fire continuously, maintaining constant 
suppressing fire.66 Whilst he is undoubtedly well-intentioned, he seems naïve and out of 
touch with lessons learnt both in British campaigns and through observation of wars in 
Europe. 
 
General Order 38 of 1885 
The reports and concerns mentioned above led to a small committee being formed to assess 
both the reports of General Officers and the training itself, to see what improvements could 
be made.67 Their report was delivered on 25 October 1884, listing out the comments made in 
the reports and then making recommendations as to whether they should be proceeded with 
or not. Some of their recommendations were incorporated during that same year, with the 
removal of the scoring divisions on the figure targets, whilst the score for that practice was 
combined into the overall classification score.68 The more drastic changes recommended by 
the Committee, and that were accepted by the Army, were promulgated in General Order 
                                                 
65
 According to an article in a later military periodical, the last classes at Hythe to use muzzle-loaders were 
taught in 1867. See [Anon.], ‘Old Hythe’, The Navy and Army Illustrated , 6 September 1902, p. 616. 
66
 Preserved in HAM 17/3/2, KCL Liddell Hart. Indications in the letter suggest that the officer had been trained 
at Hythe in about 1869. 
67
 See HMSO, Report of the Committee on the Musketry Instruction of the Army , (London, Harrison and Sons, 
1884). Preserved in TNA WO 33/42. 
68
 H.M.S.O., Annual Report…1885, p. 13. 
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(G.O.) 38, ‘specially issued’ on 13th March 1885.69 These set out new editions of both Table 
“A” and “B”, as well as replacing the bull’s eye target (although the central scoring ring 
retained that title) with figure targets for all practices. Further changes in detail included: 
 
 The theoretical training was to be conducted throughout the year, to remove  
the necessity for preliminary drills in the musketry table, and each occasion 
was to be recorded in a special diary 
 The ammunition fired at both 150 and 250 yards was halved, from 10 rounds 
to 5  
 The 400 yard practices were replaced with individual fire and movement 
  practices, in the manner of skirmishing exercises 
 Practices were to be conducted from more than one position. 
 
There are further specific instructions relating to recruit training. A recruit was to 
have received a set minimum number of lessons and drills, and would only be allowed to 
progress to range practices once his commanding officer passed him as ‘thoroughly 
proficient’. These were similar to the eight days of lessons conducted prior to the range 
practices in MR 1884, but had been altered slightly so that they could be organised into the 
recruit’s wider training.70 
For the range practices, the limit of 10 rounds per day remained, except in unusual 
circumstances. A note included underneath Table “A” stated that this was both to avoid 
rushing, and was considered the maximum a recruit could fire comfortably in a single day. 
The same limit was also placed on trained soldiers, but in that case was tied more strongly to 
the desire to avoid rushing, which would otherwise prevent proper supervision and training of 
poorer shooters. 
                                                 
69
 H.M.S.O., General Orders by His Royal Highness the Field-Marshal Commanding in Chief, 1874 to 1886 , 
(London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1887), p. 64 and 67-88 (Hereafter referred to as G.O. 38). 
70
 See Table 3. 
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Table 3: Recruit Lessons and Drills, as described in G.O. 38 
Care of Arms and Ammunition.  Four lessons to be taught to the recruit as soon as a rifle is 
issued to him. 
Position drills. 16 drills} To be combined with the first lessons imparted 
to the recruit in the firing exercises. Aiming drills. 6 drills} 
Theoretical principles. Four lessons. 
Blank firing practice. Four drills, viz. 
 1. Individual practice, standing, 10 rounds. 
 2a. Individual practice, kneeling (or sitting for Cavalry), 5 
rounds. 
 2b. Individual practice, lying down, 5 rounds. 
 3. Independent firing, 10 rounds, front rank kneeling (Cavalry 
single rank, kneeling or sitting). 
 4. Volleys, 10 rounds, of which 5 rounds front rank kneeling 
(Cavalry single rank, kneeling or sitting), and 5 rounds, 
single rank, lying down. 




For trained soldiers, perhaps the most important new individual practices were the 
‘Defence’ and ‘Attack Practices’. These were the first occasions that fire and movement were 
included into the individual training of soldiers on an annual basis, and similar practices were 
also included on days 4 and 5 of Table “A”. They all incorporated the usage of ‘fixed sights’, 
as had been used in the ‘Figure Target’ practice for Recruits the previous year. The ‘Defence’ 
simulated an advancing enemy, albeit by advancing the men towards their targets, which was 
why the starting distance was greater and the firing positions more exposed than those used in 
the ‘Attack’. The advances during the ‘Attack’ were also conducted in rushes, such as would 
be used in battle, rather than the orderly paced advance used in the ‘Defence’.72 The field 
practices had been slightly altered as well, and were listed in the order in which they were felt 
to have the greatest value: 
 
 
                                                 
71
 G.O. 38, p. 70. 
72
 As these were more fully described in Musketry Regulations, 1887, they are discussed in greater detail below. 
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o. Attack and defence practice. 
p. Skirmishing for Infantry, dismounted practice with horses (or without horses if the
  rifle range does not permit their use) for Cavalry. 
q. Individual firing at ‘vanishing’ targets, including timed rapid firing of a succession
  of shots. 
r. Individual firing at ‘moving’ targets. 
s. Rapid ‘section volleys’ (timed) under the proper section leaders. 
t. Long-range volleys at lines of ‘figure’ targets or screens, dummies, &c.73 
 
These built on the practices of MR 1884, strengthening the emphasis on their being combat 
simulations rather than simple range exercises, at least as far as facilities would allow. The 
classification scoring was also altered to reflect these changes. In 1884, soldiers had to 
achieve a score of 200 or higher from the range practices, together with an aggregate of 42 
from the field practices, to classify as Marksmen. Those that classified as First Class would 
have scored the same on the range, but achieved only 33 in the field practices, with the 
Second Class scoring between 150 and 199, and 24 points respectively. These figures were 
achievable – a soldier required an average score of 2.5 points per round to achieve 
Marksman, with the maximum possible score of 320 in the range practices. In 1885 the 
classification score had been simplified, using only the 80 rounds fired in individual practices 
as the basis for evaluation. Whilst this meant that it assured some men did not miss out if they 
were stationed in an area where field firing was impossible, it also removed some of the 
emphasis from these practices. The scoring for the two “fire with movement” practices 
reduced the maximum possible score to 300, with a score of 170 or better required to classify 
as marksman. This needed an average score of 2.1, although this was made more difficult 
through the two movement phases being laid out as a “hit or miss” practice, with each hit  
                                                 
73
 G.O. 38, p. 72. 
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Table 4: Regulations for Musketry Instruction, 1884 (as per G.O. 38, 1885). Table “A” 
 
Table 5: Regulations for Musketry Instruction, 1884 (as per G.O. 38, 1885). Table “B” 
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c 300 10 
5 rounds kneeling and then 5 
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rounds kneeling, then 2 
rounds standing 





shoulders on a 









500 10 5 lying down then 5 kneeling 
at each distance 
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i 800 10 
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5 rounds kneeling and then 5 
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2 150 10 
3 200 10 
” 5 rounds lying down and then 5 
rounds kneeling 
4 
3rd Class (but without 




2 rounds at each distance: 
standing at 100; kneeling at 150 
& 200; lying at 250 & 300 yds. Sight “fixed” at 200 
yds. (carbine 250 yds.). 






Target, 6ft. x 4ft., 
with head and 





4 rounds at 150, 2 rounds at each 







300 10 ” 5 rounds lying down, and then 5 
rounds kneeling at each distance 
Proper sight for the 
distances 
400 10 ” 
8 1st Class 500 10 ” Lying down 
9 
Volley, 6ft. x 12ft. 300 5 ” Cavalry, single rank kneeling or 
sitting 
Infantry, bayonets fixed, front 
rank kneeling 
Independent, 
6ft. x 12 ft. 
300 5 ” 
10 
Volley, 6ft. x 12ft. 400 5 ” 
Lying down in extended order 
Volley, 6ft. x 16ft. 500 5 ” 
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awarded 3 points. 
These amendments appear to be a direct response to the full report of the musketry 
committees, and are much more battlefield-orientated, as well as very similar to each other – 
the only real difference between Tables A and B were the distances the later practices were 
shot over, but they are otherwise almost mirror images of each other. Colonel Gurnell 
Tongue, then Commandant of Hythe, commented in his report that these were ‘important 
alterations,’ and whilst he felt that the standards may have been set high upon introduction, 
he was positive that the Army’s shooting would improve once the practices were more 
familiar.74 These changes were allowed to run for two cycles, which was the minimum length 
of time required to assess their effectiveness, before they were published as a manual in their 
own right. 
 
Regulations for Musketry Instruction, 1887 75 
These regulations were fittingly described by one contemporary as the formalisation of the 
1884 Committee’s recommendations.76 Using MR 1884 as the basis, it incorporated both the 
1885 amendments and further changes based upon subsequent experience. At a basic level, 
much continued unaltered. The organisational structure remained unchanged in terms of the 
allocated duties and qualifications of the various instructors, as did the amount of ammunition 
provided for training. There was one additional instructor; an Assistant Adjutant, who was 
also to hold the “Extra” qualification, and assist the Adjutant in the training of young officers 
and recruits where necessary. However, he was barred from involvement in the teaching of 
the annual course for trained soldiers, presumably to ensure that company officers did not 
avoid their responsibilities.  
                                                 
74
 H.M.S.O., Annual Report…1886, p. 16. 
75
 H.M.S.O., Regulations for Musketry Instruction, 1887 , (London, Harrison and Sons, 1887). [Hereafter 
referred to as MR 1887]. 
76
 Browne, On The Instruction of our Soldiers, p. 1272. 
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On the practical side, there was a new type of practice for recruits: miniature cartridge 
drill. This utilised a Morris Tube sub-calibre conversion – a rifled barrel liner and chamber, 
which could be fitted into service rifles. This meant that they retained the weight and 
handling characteristics of the Martini-Henry for training purposes, but without any recoil or 
the need for a full-size range. Recruits could then receive their first live-firing training in the 
relative comfort of an enclosed gallery range, with twenty rounds divided equally between 
the four firing positions, prior to the commencement of range practice proper. The 
ammunition was also less expensive, and so provided a second method of private training 
through the regimental rifle clubs, which were to be given “All possible encouragement…”77  
In keeping with the 1885 amendments, the bull’s-eye target was all but eliminated 
from training, apart from their use in aiming instruction. Instead, the black-on-white figure 
target was to be painted over the old targets as appropriate, with “…the lines describing the 
bull’s-eyes and centres…scratched, so as to be invisible to the firer”.78 This led to anomalies 
between the scoring area and the painted target: the First Class target depicted four figures, 
but the bull’s-eye actually occupied the space between the two inner figures.79 The 
Regulations recognised that these designs were flawed, and intended as interim designs; “The 
following targets…will be used till better designs can be introduced”.80 Recruits were also 
provided with a more distinct aiming mark, by painting the central scoring ring white for the 
first three days of practices.81 
It had become compulsory for Infantry recruits who passed Table “A” by September 
30th in their first year to complete Table “B” within the same year, to ensure that they were  
 
                                                 
77
 MR 1887, sec. 21. 
78
 MR 1887, para. 131. 
79
 MR 1887, para. 152 onwards. See also Figures 4 to 8. 
80
 MR 1887, para. 152. 
81
 MR 1887, para. 152. 
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Figure 4 – 8: Targetry, as described in MR 1887 
 Figure 4: Third Class Target
 Figure 5: Second Class Target 
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 Figure 6: First Class Target 
 Figure 7: Head and Shoulder Target






ready for active service in case of emergencies.82 Cavalry and Royal Engineers recruits were 
exempted from this rule, unless their commanding officer decided otherwise.83 The 
theoretical section of the course had also been compressed from eight days to six, but without 
a noticeable reduction in any particular lessons except for “Firing Exercises”, which were 
reduced to one lesson on each of the last two days, but supplemented by both miniature 
cartridge and/or blank firing practice (depending on the availability of ranges).  
Table “A” generally followed the table issued in 1885, with the largest visible 
changes actually being a revised layout rather than particular amendments to the actual 
description of the practices themselves. Days 1 to 3 were intended purely “to teach exactitude 
of aim”,84 ensuring that recruits were familiar with their rifles’ handling characteristics before 
the fixed sight practice on day 4. As noted above, this was a simplified version of the 
“Individual Defence Practice” in Table “B”, which was,  
 
…to train the soldier to fire with rapidity and effect at an advancing enemy between 
320 and 100 yards, when there would be no time to adjust the back-sight for each shot. 85 
 
The practice was given more structure for the recruits, who started at 300 yards and moved 
forward in a steady progression of fifty yard intervals, rather than making ten unmeasured 
advances, towards full-height figure targets. Day 5 was also based upon another practice from 
the Annual Course: the “Individual Attack Practice”.86 This used a head and shoulders target 
to represent a defender behind cover, in place of the full body of an attacker. Again, this was 
to be fired by adjusting the point of aim, rather than altering the sight elevation. Pairs of men 
were to rush into position, firing in turn, with the whole squad firing at each distance before 
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 MR 1887, sec. 28. 
83
 MR 1887, sec. 28. 
84
 MR 1887, para. 50. 
85
 MR 1887, para. 156. 
86
 MR 1887, para. 157. 
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. 2 150 10 
3 200 10 5 rds lying down, then 5 rds kneeling 
4 
3rd Class (but without 
centre or bull’s eye) 
100 
10 
2 rds at each distance, standing at 100; 






Head and Shoulders on 
a target 6ft. x 4ft 
150 
10 
4 rds at 150 and 2 rds at each remaining 







300 10 5 rds lying down, then 5 rds sitting 
400 10 5 rds lying down, then 5 rds kneeling 
8 1st Class 500 10 5 rds lying down, then 5 rds sitting 
9 
Independent, 
6ft. x 12 ft. 
300 5 Cavalry, single rank kneeling or sitting 
Infantry, close order, bayonets fixed, front 
rank kneeling 
10 Volleys{ 
6ft. x 12ft. 300 5 
do. 400 5 
Lying down in extended order 
6ft. x 16ft. 500 5 
 
advancing to the next. Once again, the recruits had specified distances to cover, rather than 
moving in unmeasured rushes. Together, these replaced the figure target and skirmishing 
practices of 1884, resulting in a greater emphasis on close-range individual shooting, as well 
as providing recruits with some preparation for those elements of the Annual Course. Few 
changes were made to the sectional practices, and those were minor: days 6 and 8 were now 
fired from the sitting position, rather than kneeling; the Independent practice on day 9 now 
only had a single practice on it, which was also to be shot using the ‘fixed’ sight as well. All 
three volley practices were now conducted on day 10; and there had been a revision of the 
classification scoring bands, widening that for 2nd class.  
Table “B” had seen even fewer changes from that issued in 1885. The practices were 
no longer lettered to indicate some sort of order, although even in 1885 this had been left at 
the discretion of the commanding officer. Certain details had also been altered in four of the 
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practices. In the first two practices, ‘fixed’ sights were to be used, as in the Defence and 
Attack practices, rather than altered to the respective distances. In the third practice, the 
standing position had been replaced by the sitting one, and in the sectional practices the 
Independent practice was to be fired from 300 yards using the ‘fixed’ sight, and before the 
Volley practices, as had been the case for Recruits. This may well have been done so that the 
practice order was more logical, and encourage commanders to carry it through in that 
sequence, whilst not restricting them to carrying out practices in a set number of days. 
Indeed, this was only to be guided by the number of rounds that could be fired per day: 
  
Note.-1. As a rule, only 10 rounds a day should be fired. Commanding Officers may, 
however, use their discretion in allowing any number not exceeding 20 rounds to be fired on 
one day.87 
 
As noted in the 1885 amendments, this was considered the maximum that soldiers could fire 
without being discomforted by the cumulative recoil. The course of fire appears to have been 
laid out with these figures in mind, so that either could be used with the minimum disruption. 
If no more than ten rounds were fired per day, the full course would be the same length as 
that for recruits - ten days. However, practices requiring the same targets had been grouped 
together, meaning that if a commanding officer chose to fire the maximum twenty rounds per 
day, the course could be compressed into six days without having to stop to change targets, or 
five days if the defence and attack practices were run as half days. This had also been made 
possible through two other changes implemented in 1885: halving the ammunition allotment 
for the first two practices; and the removal of the 400 yard practice on day 6. This allowed 
the “Defence” and “Attack” practices to be included without requiring extra days being added 
to the course.  
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Table 7: Musketry Regulations 1887, Table “B” 
Annual Course of “Range” Practice for Cavalry and Infantry  


































































































3 kneeling then 2 
standing 
Fixed at 200 
yards (250 
for carbine) 
Those who in the 80 
rounds in individual 
practice obtain:- 
250 5 do. 
300 10 




3rd Class, but without 





[4 prone, next 4 
kneeling, last 2 
standing]*88 








Head and shoulders on a 




10 [10 prone]* 
2nd Class 
500 10 5 lying down then 5 









sight will be 
used 






700 10 Any military 
position 800 10 
Independent Firing, field 
practice e, 6ft. x 12ft. 
300 5 
Infantry, close order 
with bayonets or 
swords fixed, front 
rank kneeling. 
Cavalry, single rank 









6ft. x 12ft. 400 5 
6ft. x 16ft. 
600 5 









The details of the “Defence” and “Attack” practices remained broadly unchanged 
from 1885, but each was laid out in greater detail. In the “Defence” practice, the unit started 
at a distance of 320 yards with bayonets fitted, advancing together, with each man firing at 
individual “Third Class” targets of a single standing figure. The “Attack” practice started at 
300 yards, with a pair of firers rushing to 265 yards, finding cover as they would in an assault 
and firing two rounds at head and shoulders targets. These would be marked, and the rest of 
the section would then fire in the same manner, before the conducting officer moved forward 
                                                 
88 Asterisked entries: In the original, these boxes refer the reader to two paragraphs where the full practice is 





“about 36 paces”.89 The process would then begin again, until they finished 150 yards from 
the target. 
The field firing exercises also remained broadly unchanged, but incorporated 
explanations of the purpose of the practices. The “Independent” practice, now being fired 
first and from 300 yards, was designed to demonstrate “…the continuous and rapid fire which 
may be required under certain special circumstances, such as previous to an assault…”90 It 
functioned as a test of both the section commander’s orders and soldiers’ individual 
judgement. Once the order to open fire was given, each soldier acted without further orders 
until he had fired the number of rounds specified, but they were “…not to fire, except when 
fair aim can be obtained as the smoke of the firing permits”.91 The final volley practices, 
whilst included within the unit’s Figure of Merit, were more focussed on practising the 
section commanders in their duties, and that of the section in operating cohesively, rather 
than simple accuracy.  
The emphasis on these two final practices had seemingly been increased by a 
memorandum issued by the Duke of Cambridge in November 1886, which stated that 
‘Independent firing in the attack formation should be discontinued altogether, and that in 
future volley-firing should be employed during all stages of the attack’.92 These appear to 
have been connected to wider fears that Independent firing allowed men too much latitude in 
action, and created the potential for wastage of ammunition, comments which were echoed in 
a contemporary description of the magazine rifle trials.93 Despite the Duke’s position as 
Field-Marshal Commanding in Chief, his comments appear to have been taken as a tactical 
matter, rather than immediately altering the course of training, as seen in the consistency 
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between G.O. 1885 and MR 1887. However, the relative merits of both styles of firing, and 
the logistical issues they might raise, would remain a topic of debate for many years to come. 
The relative consistency in the practices was also reflected in the classification scores. 
The scores for Marksman and Second Class had been reduced by five points, and that for 
First Class was raised by the same amount, to better balance the numbers of each. With 
regards to prizes, those laid down in MR 1884 appear to have caused problems, possibly due 
to the complexity of determining the order of merit. It also focussed very narrowly on 
individual skill, rather than on ensuring unit efficiency. In MR 1887, the system was altered 
so as to place the responsibility of allocating prizes firmly in the hands of Commanding 
Officers. A grant was made based upon the number of firers, at the rate of 1s per recruit and 
2s 6d per trained soldier. From this, those individuals forming the top ten percent of 
marksmen in the unit were issued 10s each. The remaining amount was then placed at the 
discretion of the Commanding Officer. That allocated for the recruits was to be divided 
amongst them as the Corps commander saw fit, subject to the approval of the area 
commander. The money allocated for trained soldiers went firstly towards the ten shillings 
noted above, and the remainder; 
 
…shall be paid in such awards for the additional encouragement of recruits, trained 
soldiers, and non-commissioned officers, and for proficiency in range and field practices, as 
may be deemed most conducive to efficiency.94 
  
Whilst this might appear to leave marksmanship at the whim of individual 
commanding officers, the regulations also stated that prizes would not be issued, “…to 
regiments or battalions which do not attain a satisfactory standard of efficiency”. This obliged 
commanding officers to ensure the standard of musketry training was maintained as a 
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measure of the regiment’s overall efficiency, with the prize money used to focus the efforts of 
soldiers at the weakest points. This was particularly referred to in the Hythe Report for 1888, 
where the Commandant hoped that more prizes would be given for field practices, which 
were generally the weaker ones.95 To bolster this, and ensure that the prizes were awarded 
purely on merit, the practice registers and each unit’s annual return were to remain the sole 
basis for estimating the proficiency of the men. The badges, which had previously been 
issued with the monetary prizes, became “Honorary Awards”, and were only issued in three 
categories. All those classifying as “Marksman” were to receive a badge of crossed rifles in 
worsted, which was to be issued as soon as the individual range firing had been completed so 
as to drive interest in the recognition, and worn on the left forearm. The best marksman in the 
company was to receive a gold braid version of the same badge, worn in the same location, 
and every sergeant of the best shooting company was issued a gold braid badge of crossed 
rifles and crown, displayed on the right forearm.  
The remaining funds were specifically barred from being used to finance prizes for 
the regimental rifle clubs, particularly as basic target competitions were often seen as 
counterproductive to battlefield efficiency. However, these clubs appear to have been the 
main opportunity for soldiers to practise outside of the annual course. An enlightened 
solution to this problem came from the Rifle Brigade, which in the latter half of the 1880s 
excused soldiers early morning parades for shooting practice, provided they paid for their 
ammunition.96 This, together with internal and inter-unit competition, seems to have been 
effective in stimulating rifle shooting. The 4th Battalion’s team won the Young Soldiers’ Cup 
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in both 1890 and 1891,97 and a sizeable number of the instructors at the School of Musketry 
were drawn from the regiment. 
Overall, the 1887 Regulations seem oddly contradictory; advancing the training of the 
individual soldier with more realistic practices, yet leaving the sectional volley fire practices 
almost entirely unchanged, save for targetry. This may be reflective of the Duke of 
Cambridge’s memorandum, but this alone does not account for why the individual standard 
was higher than that for the section. It may be attributable to the need to first raise the level of 
training imparted to the individual, so that those skills could then be better utilised as part of a 
fire unit.  In terms of prizes, the focus on the individual was identified by a contemporary as a 
flaw in the promising advances made after the musketry committee’s recommendations.98 Yet 
the Army’s experience of combat during this period may have disproven such sentiments. 
The British Army had been involved in conflicts on two different continents: the Sudan 
Expedition (1884-5); and the Third Burmese War (1885-1891). Whilst it is arguable that 
evaluation of the lessons from Burma was not yet seriously underway, it is worth noting that 
both had required very different styles of warfare from that which the British were trained to 
use. In Burma, after the British force had taken control of Mandalay at the end of 1885, gangs 
of ‘dacoits’ had sprung up.99 These were only eventually suppressed by the use of small 
columns under the command of junior officers, leading one historian to refer to it as the 
“Subaltern’s War”.100 This can be seen as an early example of small unit tactics, something 
which favoured independent action and was a style of warfare which was to receive greater 
attention towards the end of the century. The conflict in Sudan, by contrast, had been a 
disaster, with the British Government deciding to abandon the country. Tactically, it was a 
more conventional war than Burma, with open terrain within which to manœuvre a large 
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force, and with a greater focus on issues with the Martini-Henry rifle, although these were 
eventually put down to defective ammunition. Both seemed to support the flexibility of 
training which the British Army favoured, to adapt to the very different situations it could 
find itself facing, even though it also required that the focus was far broader than its 
contemporaries on the Continent. 
In the Hythe Annual Reports during this period, the Commandant repeatedly noted 
several issues, most notably the favouring of fixed distance range practices over field 
practices, despite the latter having, “…for their object…the training of officers, non-
commissioned officers, and men in all kinds of fire which would be used against the 
enemy”.101 Range practices, by contrast, were simply to steady the soldier in shooting, and 
give him familiarity with the sighting of his rifle prior to the field practices,102 which were 
still restricted by a lack of space. Towards the end of the decade the Commandant’s reports 
do note a slow, if somewhat patchy, progress, and he was hopeful that his advice was 
reaching a wider audience. This can particularly be seen in the opening comments of the 1890 
Report, where the Commandant stated that: 
 
Musketry training is gradually emerging from the somewhat narrow groove in which 
it has heretofore been too rigidly confined, and it is to be hoped that the hard and fast line 
which formerly separated musketry (in the usual sense of the term) from the practical field 
training of the soldier will shortly cease to exist. 
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We have hitherto in our musketry training laid far too much stress on slowly aimed 
individual shooting at a fixed mark at known distances; and the greater value of more rapid 
collective shooting is not yet fully recognised.103 
He hoped that these concerns would be addressed by changes that would be 
implemented with the new small-bore rifle, including the loss of many of the current 
practices, together with iron targetry, but with the reintroduction of some form of ‘definite 
visible mark to aim at’ for preliminary range practices.104 It just so happened that the 
Commandant was Colonel C.G. Slade. With the finalisation of the new rifle’s design, he had 
taken up the post of Commandant at Hythe at the end of January 1890, and his remarks were 
published only a month after the issue of the first rifles. It is interesting that he should be 
placed in such a position, but as the chief advocate of the move to small-bore rifles, he was 
now handed the challenge of creating the training to best utilise them. 
 
Army Order 47 and 160, 1890 
With the announcement of the “Magazine Rifle, Mark I”, in December 1889,105 the Army 
required a training programme which would best exploit the advantages of the new rifle. The 
changeover between the two designs was not instantaneous though – only 13,000 rifles had 
been manufactured by November 1889, with the first of these issued to the Aldershot 
battalions in December, followed by the Guards regiments in February 1890.106 This meant 
that the Martini-Henry remained the service weapon for many Infantry units into the early 
1890s, which were exchanged in order of priority. In the case of support troops, the Martini 
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action remained the service rifle for far longer, so as to reduce those units’ requirements for 
ammunition.  Martini-Enfield rifles remained on issue to colonial troops at the outbreak of 
the South African War in 1899,107 and some Royal Artillery units appear to have retained 
them even later than that.108 In terms of training, variations from the Infantry ‘standard’ were 
already being issued for the Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. The additional challenge during 
the transition period from Martini-Henry to Lee-Metford was to create training which was 
reasonably interchangeable between two completely different weapons systems. The first 
training written for the new rifle was issued with Army Orders on 1st February 1890.109 This 
was a modification of the Preliminary Drills in sections 1, 2 and 3 of Chapter III, MR 1887, 
and specifically covered: 
 
1. Care of Arms and Ammunition 
2. Firing Exercise 
3. Aiming Drill 
 
This ensured that the recipients of the new rifles could be trained in how to maintain 
them, and begin their basic drills in preparation for the commencement of the next musketry 
‘season’. It also includes a very firm note as to who was able to order the use of the 
magazine, and when:  
 
 Magazine fire must not be ordered by any Section Commander (except when 
he is acting independently) unless a distinct order to use it has been given by a superior 
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officer; nor is any individual soldier when acting with other men in a formed body to resort 
to it without orders.110 
 
This was in keeping with concerns relating to the potential wastage of ammunition by 
soldiers, and the failure of the command structure to exert its control over them. The same 
section also discussed the procedure for exchanging magazines, swapping the one attached to 
the rifle with the spare magazine with which the first rifles were issued.111 However, as the 
spare magazines were withdrawn from service in October 1890,112 this drill was quickly 
rendered obsolete. Another example of items with a short service life can be seen in a 
reference to the usage of the ‘Safety Bolt’, which was fitted to the left side of the receiver in a 
similar position to that later issued on the ‘Short’ rifle, but which was removed when the 
Mark I* design was brought in two years later.113 Overall, whilst there is some description of 
aiming practices, particularly on the new distances to be used for the ‘Fixed Sight’, the 
musketry program was not altered significantly beyond that required to accommodate the 
mechanical differences inherent in the new rifle. 
Later that same year, an amended Table “A” was issued for the use of recruits of the 
Infantry, Cavalry and Royal Engineers.114 Although the title referred to the Martini-Henry 
rifle, a paragraph at the bottom of the table gave instructions ‘For Troops issued with the 
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3rd Class (but with 
white bullseye) 
100 10 











































































































































































































































































2 150 10 
3 200 10 5 rds lying down and then 5 rds kneeling 
4 
3rd Class (but without 
centre or bullseye) 
100 
10 
2 rds at each distance, standing at 100; 
kneeling at 150 & 200; lying at 250 & 300. 






Head and Shoulders 
on a target 6ft. x 4ft 
150 
10 
4 rds at 150 and 2 rds at each remaining 








300 10 5 rds lying down, then 5 rds sitting 
400 10 5 rds lying down, then 5 rds kneeling 
8 
1st Class 
500 10 5 rds lying down, then 5 rds sitting 
9 600 10 Lying down 
10 
Independent, 
6ft. x 12 ft. 
300 5 Cavalry, single rank kneeling or sitting 
Infantry, close order, bayonets fixed, front 
rank kneeling 
11 Volleys 
6ft. x 2ft. 
300 5 
400 5 
Lying down in extended order 




(d.) Rapid individual 
firing 
200 10 See paragraph 163, Musketry Regulations 
 
13 (g.) Vanishing target 150 10 See paragraph 164 




10 See paragraph 165, (Cavalry, 166) 
15 





10 See paragraph 167, Musketry Regulations 
16 





10 See paragraph 170 




20 See paragraph 168, (Cavalry, 169) 
 
Repetition practice, or 
as Commanding 
Officer may direct 








Table “A” as amended above, except that the sights are to be adjusted to the distance, 
except when firing at or under 300 yards, or in volley firing at or under 400 yards, when the 
“fixed sight” will be used. Swords [bayonets] will be fixed under and at 200 yards, and for 
independent and volley firing in close order.115 
 
In terms of alterations, the existing practices had seen relatively few changes: A target 
practice at 600 yards had been added, together with an additional volley practice at the same 
distance, which had extended the table by an additional day. The classification scores had 
also been raised by ten points, to account for the additional target practice. However, the table 
no longer ended there, but contained an additional six days of field practices. Whilst all of 
these were practices which had appeared in MR 1887, they had never been part of Table “A”. 
This also required a significant increase in the ammunition allowance, to 185 rounds per 
recruit, with a further 15 rounds per man held at the Commanding Officer’s discretion. 
Including the discretionary ammunition, this represented a doubling of the annual allowance 
for recruits, and yet very little appears to have been said about this change. No explanation 
was included with the Order as to why this change had been made, and no direct reference to 
this table was made in the Commandant’s report for that year. The closest reference was a 
comment that field firing practices were ‘of a more practical nature than the “range” practices 
and therefore more important.’116 He also noted that forty-nine regiments and battalions 
failed to perform any field practices due to ‘want of suitable ground’.117 Those that were able 
to undertake such training would often have been below their ‘establishment’ strength, due to 
the need to supply drafts for battalions serving overseas. As such, they would have needed to 
combine units to make up numbers, an issue that was exacerbated on larger scale 
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manoeuvres.118 They were also run on relatively unrealistic lines, both in terms of a failure to 
use cover or entrenchments, leading to the farcical situation described by Major-General May 
(see above), or that which Ian Hamilton faced when he advanced beyond the regulation 
distance to use cover (see below). However, there is little indication that the Commandant felt 
that this was the greatest obstacle to proper training from a musketry perspective, citing 
instead issues which suggest the attacks practised lacked speed and focus, rather than 
manpower and realism.119 As such, the inclusion of these six practices may well have been 
part of a drive to encourage their practise on rifle ranges, although this did not entirely 
compensate for the lack of field firing space. Interestingly, given that this was the first year of 
issue, and only 10,000 men were practised with the magazine rifle (already being referred to 
by the Commandant as the ‘Lee-Metford’), the scores achieved averaged 4% better than those 
of units armed with the Martini-Henry rifle.120 
 
Amendments in the Regulations for Musketry Instruction, 1887 (1891)121 
The final amendments of the 1887 Regulations were issued as Army Orders 32 and 33 in 
February 1891.122 The tables that were included reversed the previous table’s bias towards the 
Martini-Henry, incorporating both rifles in the title, and appear to represent the point at which 
the magazine rifle had at least reached a par with the Martini-Henry in terms of numbers on 
issue.  
That it was a compromise was inevitable for several reasons: not only was there still 
the disparity in operation between a magazine-fed rifle and a single-shot one, but the reduced 
recoil of the new cartridge allowed the maximum number of rounds that could be 
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comfortably fired in practice to be raised from twenty to thirty. As such, the training for both 
recruits and trained men had to be flexible enough to allow for the Martini-Henry’s “vicious 
recoil”,123 whilst not handicapping those already issued with the Lee-Metford. Intriguingly, 
there is no mention of the disparity in sighting between the two rifles. The Lee-Metford Mark 
I was fitted with sights based on the design of a Major Lewes.124 These had been introduced 
just as the rifle’s design was being agreed, and were highly unusual in using a bar of light as 
the foresight. Although they were meant to be easy to teach, they had been poorly 
understood, and proved difficult to mass-manufacture to the required tolerances. They were 
discontinued in 1892, in favour of a modified version of the Martini’s sights, and existing 
examples were altered to the same pattern. Their late introduction, and limited lifespan, may 
have resulted in a failure to produce training material, as only one contemporary aiming 
exercise has been located, together with that in the List of Changes entry for the rifle’s 
introduction, but no diagrams to demonstrate their usage. As such, they represent not only a 
technical cul-de-sac, but a training anomaly which does not appear to have been fully 
addressed. 
In terms of changes, the ammunition allotment of 182 rounds represented a minor 
reduction from the previous year, and was due to the unusual number of rounds now allocated 
per practice – seven rather than ten. Whilst this corresponds with the original magazine 
capacity of the Troop Trials rifles,125 the Mark I rifle as issued held eight rounds,126 and all 
rifles from the Mark II onwards had a capacity of ten.127 Despite these changes, seven 
remained the base figure for ammunition allotment for all firing until 1896, and for individual  
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Figure 9: Instructions issued to the London Irish Rifles upon the issue of their Lee-Metford 
Mark I* rifles, c. 1891 (Author’s Collection).  
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practices until 1905. This may have originally been a practical choice, both in terms of not 
over-stressing the magazine springs in the rifles, as well as accommodating recruits firing the 
Martini-Henry, who would then not be too far over the previous limit of ten rounds per day 
during the Individual practices. This concern was echoed in a note printed above the table, 
stating that “With the Martini-Henry Rifle, carbine instead of rifle ammunition must be used 
at the first two distances” [original emphasis]. Carbine ammunition was loaded with a 
reduced charge and lighter bullet, producing less recoil and so less uncomfortable for new 
recruits on their first day firing live ammunition. 
This consideration did not carry into the section practices, where 21 rounds were fired 
on both days 15 and 16, and 28 rounds on day 17 – punishing for those firing the Martini- 
Henry. This could explain a comment in the notes below the table, which stated that it might 
be necessary to fire, “…a less or a greater number of rounds than is laid down for each day’s 
work”.128 This was the first time that it had been possible to extend the time taken for the 
course, and placed the initiative in the hands of commanding officers to best judge the 
situation. Another compromise had to be made with regard to distances, as the new rifle had a 
flatter trajectory than its predecessor, leading to the definition of “fixed sight” being raised 
from 300 to 400 yards.129 Despite this, the maximum distance practised over was 800 yards –
the greatest distance at which the trajectory of the Martini rifle created a danger zone for both 
cavalry and infantry, and which had previously been described as the furthest distance “at 
which…aimed rifle fire becomes very deadly”.130 These then were the areas where the 
training had to work hardest to balance the conflicting abilities of both rifles.  
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Under these amendments, Table “A” was to be preceded by eight days of preliminary 
drills, which were numbered as part of the table, seemingly in contradiction to the previous 
desire to have training practised throughout the year. The expansion was due to an increase in 
the number of “Care of Arms and Ammunition” lessons from two to eight, reflecting the 
relative complexity of the new rifle, the need for new cleaning techniques to maintain it, and 
a desire to thoroughly familiarise recruits prior to beginning the firing course proper. This 
was further assisted by four additional firing exercises, and a practice where eight live rounds 
were fired from between 100 and 200 yards at any target, and from any military position. 
There was also a corresponding decrease in both miniature cartridge and blank firing 
practices.  
As Colonel Slade had speculated,131 there had also been a reversion to bull’s-eye 
targets, although these were to be used for all individual practices,132 rather than just for the 
preliminary ones. This appears to have been done in preparation for the new Sectional target, 
which was far less distinct than any previously issued. Certainly, Slade was keen that senior 
officers should not continue to value the “Wimbledon” bull’s-eye ahead of sectional 
training,133 and it seems likely that the intention was for soldiers to be able to familiarise 
themselves with their new rifles before moving onto the more challenging section practices, 
with the individual practices intended to provide the means to ensure greater unit efficiency. 
The new targets had all been re-scaled as well. The “Third Class” target was reduced in 
height by 2ft., to 4ft. square, with the diameters of the scoring rings adjusted accordingly. The 
“Second Class” and “First Class” targets retained their overall dimensions from 1887, but the  
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Table 9: Musketry Regulations (Amendment) 1891, Table “A” 
*In these practices the lower 4ft. of the target may be coloured at discretion, or any figure or figures painted on 
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intermediate “Centre” scoring ring was slightly reduced on each. Those for the “Individual 
Attack” and “Individual firing by word of command” practices were different: “6 ft. x 6ft. 
The lower 4 ft. may be coloured at discretion, or may have any figure or figures painted on 
it”.135 This was intended, “To train the individual soldier to aim at the ground line or feet, 
preparatory to collective firing”.136 The design seems based on a field firing target trialled in 
India in the late 1880s, which simulated a trench obscured by smoke, and was designed to 
make soldiers take a full sight and aim low.137 However, that described in 1891 differed in 
awarding points for shots striking the top band of the target 
The distances that recruits fired over had also been revised. The first five days of 
instructional practices progressed from 200 yards back in hundred-yard intervals to 600 
yards, but without practices at intermediate distances, as had been the case the previous year. 
This may have been due to a combination of three factors: the additional preliminary firing 
practices; the new round’s flatter trajectory; and the additional time needed to allow four 
more rounds to be fired per distance. The regrouping of practices, whereby all of the 
instructional shoots were conducted prior to the “Individual Attack”, allowed recruits to 
familiarise themselves with their rifle’s sighting at all distances prior to combining fire and 
movement. Finally, there is no mention of the sitting position, although this was primarily 
associated with the cavalry, who had a separate Table “A”.  
The “Individual Attack” practice itself was slightly modified from that introduced in 
MR 1887. It was now virtually identical to that for trained soldiers, advancing from 500 to 
200 yards, and with the recruits firing from the kneeling or standing positions, rather than 
lying down. As noted above, the target was of a more challenging design, with recruits 
required to adjust their sights between 500 and 400 yards, but thereafter using a fixed sight 
and adjusting their point of aim as per the original practice. 
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The final five days had a revised set of section firing practices, mostly based upon 
pre-existing field firing exercises. The first practice on day 15 was the only totally original 
one, and provided a transition to the section practices. The recruit was trained specifically in 
responding to words of command, firing from 400 yards in the kneeling position and with a 
fixed sight at the same target used the previous day, practising both firer and commander. Of 
the five volley practices, four were conventional and applicable to both rifles, fired from a 
single rank in different positions as the distance increased. The final volley practice at 300 
yards was fired in two ranks, and was also the first to specifically mention the use of the 
magazine: “Volleys, magazine fire”. This suggests that, for the individual practices, the Lee-
Metford was operated as a single-loader, and with the magazine cut-off closed. This would 
mean that this and the following two “Independent, magazine fire” practices were the only 
occasions where recruits loaded from the magazine rather than from a belt pouch, which 
would correspond with contemporary thought on retaining the magazine as a reserve of 
fire.138 For those still issued with the Martini-Henry, “Rapid” fire was to be used instead. 
Whilst rapidity of loading had been discussed in 1884, rapid firing first appeared in field 
practices in 1887, designed, “To train men to the habit of loading, aiming, and firing as 
quickly as possible consistently with accuracy”.139 There was no specific rate of fire to be 
achieved other than the best the firer could attain, with a minute given for up to ten rounds to 
be fired at a figure target. It was to be used “under certain special circumstances…but must 
be intelligently directed and controlled by the section leaders”.140 This created a temporary 
increase in the volume of fire at decisive moments, such as immediately prior to an assault, 
which would explain why all three practices were fired from close range.  
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The final three practices were the most ambitious; two section attacks and one of 
skirmishing, which had first appeared the year before. The two section attacks differed only 
in the targetry used. The first utilised a single 6ft. by 8ft. target, painted as described above, 
representing a large target such as enemy artillery or transport. The second used sixteen 
“head & shoulders” targets, each separated by at least two feet, to simulate advancing 
infantry. These were also intended to challenge the fire commander, who would have to 
ensure that both types of target were engaged effectively. As an additional consideration, the 
unit was to advance in a very specific manner. The whole line would fire the first volley 
together and advance eighty yards, from where the left section fired a volley before the right 
section rushed forward forty yards. When the right section fired a volley, the left would 
advance to re-form the line, and the procedure would then be repeated until 180 yards was 
reached. From here they would rush to 150 yards and receive the order to fire the remaining 
six rounds independently, before bayonets were fixed for the charge. The final skirmishing 
practice was conducted over the same distances, but fired from “Any military position” at a 
3ft. by 2ft. target, the smallest encountered by recruits, who were given the freedom to adjust 
their sights as they saw fit. Completion of the full course would have given recruits 
grounding in all of the necessary basic training for combat, making the term “Trained 
Recruit” far more comprehensive than it had perhaps been previously, and may have been 
intended to prepare them for overseas deployment without the need for further training. 
By comparison, the Annual Course was more succinct. It commenced with a two day 
preliminary course, with two lessons on care of arms, one lesson on theoretical principles, 
two firing exercises (which were to include both individual and sectional instruction), and 
one aiming drill each day. Once this was complete, they then progressed to the firing section 
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rounds over eight days, a slight increase in ammunition if not necessarily in time. An 
additional 64 rounds were allocated for use in further practices, facilities permitting.141 If 
none of them were practicable, then the Commanding Officer was permitted to devise other 
practices as he saw fit, although the Hythe Annual Reports suggest that this was either 
ignored, or badly executed.142 
Unlike previous manuals, there seems to have been an attempt to integrate the training 
of both courses in a progressive manner, rather than standing alone. There was less revision 
of basic principles, with only four close-range practices, the first two being executed with 
fixed bayonets. This lowered the point of impact, hence the stipulation that a 300-yard setting 
should be used. The two rapid fire practices, despite being the only ones to use the magazine, 
allowed eight seconds per round, and were each preceded by an untimed practice under the 
same conditions to familiarise soldiers with the sighting of their rifles. All of the long-
distance practices fired over the following two days had reverted to firing from a single 
position, with kneeling favoured over prone, perhaps attempting to prevent an advance 
faltering behind cover. Aside from time constraints, the course remained relatively 
unchanged from the previous regulations. The “Individual Attack” practice was now shot 
from 500 to 200 yards, the same distances as those in Table “A”, using a slightly larger target 
to compensate for the longer distance, and with soldiers selecting their firing positions.  
This was the last of the practices to count towards the individual classification score, 
and the remaining three days were entirely section-based, all of which were expanded 
versions of field practices from 1887, and appear to have been fired without use of the 
magazine. That for Day 8 – three sets of seven volleys, punctuated by two rapid advances – 
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had originally seen the unit advancing from 400 to 300 yards, firing five volleys from any 
military position in a minute at each distance. It had now been given additional complexities: 
longer distances, requiring sight adjustments, and assuming a nominated firing position at 
each distance. Seventy seconds was now allowed at each distance, although an officer could 
fire six volleys if he felt that doing so would be more effective.143 
Day 9 was conducted from shorter ranges, first practising rapid volleys at both 500 
and 400 yards, and with the final exercise of the day combining two former practices, firing 
four short-range volleys followed by three rounds independently. The final day was identical 
to the “Section Attack” practice which recruits had undergone on their penultimate day. The 
classification scores had been raised, with an additional twenty-five points required to 
classify as a marksman but from ten fewer rounds. Combined with the reduction of the targets 
and scoring areas, this would appear to have made that classification very difficult to achieve. 
This was due to overcompensation after the adoption of the new rifle, and indeed there is a 
note in the Annual Report for this year that, “…the classification table [had] been fixed too 
high. It has since been lowered”.144 In all other respects, it would appear that the award and 
prize scheme remained unaltered from 1887. 
 
The Fighting of the Future: 
Throughout this period, the Army’s musketry training faced criticism from both serving and 
former officers. Many published their thoughts as short articles in the service press, often 
under pseudonyms, which appear to have had little direct impact. However, one writer is 
particularly notable for his proactive and detailed suggestions for an alternative approach to 
training. Ian Hamilton had demonstrated his abilities as a ‘thinking officer’ early in his career 
during a field exercise, extending a rush beyond the regulation distance to take advantage of 
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the cover of a brick wall – a move which (to his mortification) was singled out for special 
praise by the inspecting officer during the subsequent “Officer’s Call”.145 In 1878, whilst on 
leave in Britain, he attended the instructor’s course at Hythe; he passed with an ‘Extra First’ 
certificate, and was appointed battalion musketry instructor upon his return. Through hard 
work, perseverance, and extra ammunition purchased with his own personal funds, his 
battalion became the best shooting unit in India. Between 1879 and 1881 they served in both 
the Second Anglo-Afghan War and the First Boer War, and in the latter fought at the Battle 
of Majuba Hill, where the British were defeated by Boer irregulars. Despite their training, 
Hamilton’s battalion fared badly, a fact he blamed upon their not having practised whilst 
being on campaign. Hamilton himself was shot through the left wrist during the battle, a 
wound which crippled his hand for the rest of his life, and drove him to consider ways that 
musketry training and practices could be improved. After recuperating in Britain, he returned 
to India in June 1882 to take up the post of aide-de-camp to Lord Frederick Roberts, then 
Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army. Roberts was an experienced soldier, who 
understood the value of good musketry training and the challenges of those expected to teach 
it, the latter demonstrated in comments he made in 1888: 
 
Musketry has had a hard struggle to assert its position in the Army. When it was first 
introduced it was looked upon as a dangerous innovation, likely to interfere with many old 
traditions; such as, for instance, that it was a sheer waste of time to keep soldiers on the 
range longer than was necessary to fire off the limited number of rounds sanctioned by the 
regulations of those days. The musketry instructor was voted a nuisance by everyone, and 
unless he was possessed of an unusual amount of tact and was popular in the regiment, he 
often experienced great difficulty in carrying out his duty.146 
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With the sympathetic ear of a senior commander, Hamilton started to set out his own 
ideas of how a modern musketry course should be organised. As a skilled shot with both rifle 
and revolver, having competed as part of Lord Roberts’ staff team with great success, he was 
able to write from personal experience of the entire process at a time when an officer’s 
shooting skills were not formally tested.147 The resulting paper was shown to Roberts in 
1884, who suggested it be published, and when the formal work, The Fighting of the 
Future,148 appeared a year later, it was radically different from the Musketry Regulations. 
Hamilton started from a very simple idea: that every army in the world thought, 
trained, and fought the same way. Under those circumstances, it was believed battlefield 
superiority could only be achieved through superior numbers, as all other factors were 
roughly equal. However, he felt that this overlooked other areas which would make a given 
volume of fire as effective as possible, offsetting any numerical disadvantage and allow a 
force to overcome a numerically superior adversary. This would be particularly useful in 
modern warfare, as centralised command had been rendered increasingly difficult by the 
sheer noise of battle. The close formations that such control required had also become more 
dangerous, due to the increased range and accuracy of modern rifles that Hamilton had 
witnessed first-hand in South Africa. His solution was simple but radical: the British Army 
should alter its recruitment criteria, as the basis of a more proactive system of training. With 
recruits selected to higher standards, drill could be reduced to a bare minimum, allowing 
more time to focus on creating a new style of fighting. His reasoning was simple, and 
eloquently stated: 
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Drill was devised to secure unreasoning obedience. We now want reasoning 
obedience…149 
 
In pursuit of this, he proposed that once soldiers had completed their basic training the 
official allocation of “10 days” per year of musketry should instead be turned over to drill,150 
with the majority of the year used for musketry training. Each soldier would be allocated four 
hundred rounds, two and a half times the amount issued for trained soldiers under MR 1884, 
to be used for five types of practice: 
 
a) 50 rounds fired at 200 yards, standing: the rifle used as a gun, hand and eye 
  working together, without looking along the barrel or through the sights. 
b) 60 rounds fired from 800 to 1200 yards, where space permitted, any position, 
and according to the old style. 
c) 60 rounds for practising “Celerity and Precision” 
d) 140 rounds at moving objects 
e) 100 rounds for field-firing151 
 
Hamilton chose to describe only the individual practices in detail, as he felt these had 
to be mastered before field firing would be of serious benefit.152 He described a less rigid 
form of shooting, rather than simple rote mastery; as he noted, only practice b was to be 
conducted “according to the old style”.153 However, even this was innovative: individual 
shooting at distances over 800 yards had never been included before, and 1200 yards was 
nearing the maximum sighted range for the Martini-Henry.154 Practices A, C and D all 
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incorporated elements of snap-shooting practices. The first practised instinctive aiming, 
which C expanded by emphasising rapidity and accuracy in shooting. Whilst the two overlap, 
he justified it by stating that C was “a more deadly style than A, but requires a shade more 
time, as most men would make use of their sights”.155 Together, they covered both very 
close-quarter situations and longer range encounters with fleeting targets. D combined the 
two using an unusual form of moving target called “Jumping Jemmies”, which were less 
predictable in their movement than the regulation targets. They were described as being 
shaped as the head and shoulders of a man, which would “rise up out of the ground, remain 
upright for, perhaps, two seconds, and then fall forward on its face”.156 This was not the only 
change to the targetry; those for practice C were described as having dark brown figures 
painted on a light brown background, the result having much less contrast than contemporary 
service targets, and being correspondingly nearer to service conditions. The only 
circumstances that the course did not cover was that of an enemy advancing, for which he 
proposed adapting a practice used by Indian hunters, originally designed to simulate firing at 
a charging tiger, of rolling barrels or kerosene drums down a slope towards the soldier, giving 
him greater confidence in controlling his aim at a critical moment.157  
However, Hamilton did not support all change simply for its own sake. He was very 
clear that he did not support the introduction of the magazine rifle simply to maintain parity 
with Continental powers, at least under the existing training system. He felt that soldiers 
should first be taught, “…to look on each bullet as an enemy’s life in prospective…”,158 
ensuring they took the time to aim, rather than simply exhausting their magazines in an un-
aimed barrage. This was compounded by the tendency of inexperienced soldiers to be caught 
up in the moment, something which he had himself witnessed, where physical intervention 
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had been required to force a soldier to cease fire.159 To avoid this, contemporaries had 
suggested that the magazine would only be fitted to the rifle when ordered, but this was 
unacceptable to Hamilton for two reasons: in his opinion, soldiers should be more than 
simple machines; and parade square obedience could not be relied upon in the heat of battle, 
as a soldier under fire might decide to attach the magazine without being ordered to do so. 
The only solution he felt practicable was to ensure that each soldier “regulates his fire of his 
own accord”,160 and in doing so fire control was transferred from a pro-active role of the 
commander to an innate function of the soldier’s training. Rather than firing in volleys, each 
soldier was to utilise a self-assessment cycle with two outcomes:  
 
 Selecting his target,  
 Firing,  
 Adjusting his aim if necessary, or observing the area for other targets if he had
  hit 
 Repeating the process.  
 
In doing so he acted individually, yet still operated as part of his unit’s effort towards a 
nominated objective. Once that level of training had been attained, then “the new weapon 
could not be issued too quickly”.161 
If enacted completely, it would have created an army that was capable both of 
harassing an enemy at long range, such as was faced in Africa and India, and of engaging 
them in close cover such as was encountered in Burma. Contemporary reviewers generally 
agreed that reform was necessary, and that Hamilton included elements that were lacking in 
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the Regulations, but also felt that his proposal was not without deficiencies of its own.162 In 
particular, they disagreed that reform needed to be quite so radical, or that drill was 
irrelevant. In terms of official implementation, Hamilton’s plan faced two major problems. 
The first was that of money: the British Army in the 1880s was subject to severe budget 
restrictions. No large-scale annual manœuvres had been held since 1873 due to 
“Parliamentary economy”,163 and the cost of the additional ammunition would have been a 
serious issue. The other problem was that, whilst India had the space to accommodate these 
types of exercises, even normal range practices were severely restricted in some areas of 
Britain due to safety concerns, and few areas were able to host battalion field-firing exercises, 
let alone greater numbers. This was another reason why large-scale manœuvres were not 
conducted during this period, and was only partially resolved by the purchase of large areas 
of Salisbury Plain in 1898.164 
Fighting of the Future is an extremely rare book today, suggesting that it originally 
had a fairly limited print run.165 As such, it would be unsurprising if such a work had failed to 
achieve any impact upon the military establishment. However, whilst its suggestions were 
never directly adopted, it did raise the profile of its author. When Lord Roberts was made 
Commander-in-Chief, India, in November 1885, he appointed Hamilton as Assistant 
Adjutant-General for Musketry. This gave him responsibility for the training of the Native 
Army, a role he fulfilled with great success according to contemporaries. One article, 
published in The Pioneer in 1889, suggested that Hamilton had managed to achieve the main 
objectives he had outlined four years earlier, as well as revising the field firing practices. The 
article makes reference to a target he had introduced that was “painted drab or khaki colour 
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with a narrow white band at the top”, designed to simulate a trench obscured by smoke; “Hits 
upon the white band are not to count, the object being to force the men to aim low with a full 
sight at the bottom of the target…The results are to count in the figure of merit…”166  
However, his aim had been to change the British Army, something which he could 
only do indirectly through the demonstrable success of his training of the Native Army. This 
was highlighted in a series of three articles preserved in Hamilton’s scrap book, apparently 
printed in 1890, suggesting that the new British regulations had been delayed another year 
despite the success of the Native Army’s training regime. The writer blamed this upon the 
introduction of the new magazine rifle, but also implied that jealousy at Hythe had played a 
part.167 Yet, in contradiction of this, the Commandant pointed out in his Report for 1890 that 
the new rifle would, “cause many changes of more or less importance in the details of our 
musketry training”. On the same page, he also mentions that Lord Roberts had submitted 
proposals for changes, some of which the Commandant felt would probably be adopted very 
soon. Whether the suggestions were Roberts’ alone, or were being passed on from Hamilton, 
is impossible to confirm, but the comments do show that Hythe were not being as deliberately 
obstructive as was being implied.168 Hamilton also influenced training through a second 
route. His paper had been read by another critic of the British Army’s approach to training: 
Captain C.B. Mayne, a professor at the Royal Military College in Kingston, Canada. Mayne’s 
own work, Infantry Fire Tactics, was praised by a contemporary instructor as one of the very 
few serious musketry text books of its time,169 and the second edition listed Hamilton’s paper 
as one of the reference works consulted.170 Mayne’s book went on to become required 
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reading for the Officer’s “Extra” certificate at Hythe from 1892,171 six years before Hamilton 
returned to Hythe as its new Commandant. 
 
Summary: 
Over the period 1884 to 1891, the British Army continued a long-standing and relatively 
continuous process of assessment and adjustment of its training techniques. This can be seen 
by the issuance of training manuals at intervals of between three and four years since the first 
in 1853, with the longest interval being five years.172 Each manual incorporated significant 
changes from its predecessor, formalising interim amendments as well as incorporating new 
alterations where necessary. These affected both the recruits’ and trained soldiers’ courses, 
particularly as the two became more closely linked, but this was done with the knowledge 
that, with units based around the world, the courses only dictated what was ideally desirable, 
and had to remain flexible enough to adapt to whatever facilities were available locally.  
There are several important trends in the evolution of training during this period:  
 In terms of advances, the most notable is the training of recruits. Simplistic 
marksmanship exercises were slowly replaced with those more closely related to 
battlefield practices, if necessarily idealised in design. There was also growing usage 
of the miniature rifle and/or blank firing practices to familiarise them with basic 
techniques in controlled environments. Both courses began to incorporate what had 
previously been optional field firing practices for trained soldiers. This can be viewed 
as both an attempt to reinforce the practical applications of their training, and as a way 
of ensuring that those commanding officers, who did view musketry as a “sheer waste 
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of time”, could not escape them all. Finally, soldiers were given more autonomy in 
adapting to circumstances, particularly selection of firing positions, and setting sights 
independently which, though minor, were a definite step away from “unreasoning 
obedience”.  
 There were reverses too: Individual targetry, in particular, is notable for the swing 
from the bull’s-eye to the figure target and back over the course of only seven years. 
However, the reversal seems to have been implemented to allow the Sectional target 
to be made more realistic. The various changes necessitated the corresponding 
adjustments in the classification scheme, but may also have had an influence on the 
allotment of funds to incentivise and reward success, which Hythe consistently hoped 
would be diverted from rewarding individual prowess to focussing on the work of the 
section as a unit.  
 There was also, in the case of the 1890 and 1891 amendments, the unavoidable 
tension created by taking the first uncertain steps towards introducing new technology 
alongside the existing equipment, resulting in necessary compromises in training that 
made certain practices more physically demanding on recruits than would have been 
permissible previously.  
 
It is worth stressing that all of these changes were underpinned by theoretical and 
administrative consistency. The methods by which recruits were taught during the 
preliminary drill phase remained unchanged throughout this period, as did the forms of 
control used during sectional practices. The number of instructors per company was slightly 
increased and the required qualification standards were maintained, ensuring relative 
consistency of training across the Army as a whole. The focus appears to have been on 
increasing both the breadth of knowledge within the command structure, and the 
effectiveness of the practical application of these lessons. 
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These regulations also show how musketry had a political dimension, having to 
respond to fiscal and foreign policies whilst trapped between different schools of tactical 
thought, and attempting to incorporate new technologies in the best way to both appease and 
serve these interests. In particular, the amendments of 1891 seem designed to satisfy the roles 
of the Army as defined by the Secretary of State for War, Edward Stanhope, in a 
memorandum written in December 1888.173 By raising recruits to a higher level of training in 
a shorter period of time, the army were better placed to provide trained soldiers for the draft 
for India, as well as overseas garrisons – sections b and c of the memorandum. However, the 
net result of this was often to leave the home battalions comprised solely of ‘ineffectives’.174 
These were men who were either too young or otherwise unfit to serve, and whose status was 
often in part due to their relative lack of musketry skill, meaning that field practices in 
particular were even less likely to be carried out correctly or even usefully. They were also 
therefore of no real use to the civil power in the United Kingdom, which was listed in the 
memorandum as the army’s primary role.175  
The suggestions of the Army’s critics were normally incompatible with the realities of 
a military serving a democracy. Whilst Ian Hamilton could very well have become part of 
that group, he appears to have achieved a successful compromise in the eyes of his 
contemporaries. However, the British Army had very different requirements and constraints 
from the Native Army, and it was unlikely that Hamilton would enjoy the same freedom and 
support that he had enjoyed under Lord Roberts, a challenge he would face when he took 
command of Hythe in 1898. 
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 As was stated at the beginning of this chapter, this period was also to prove important 
for the future of musketry training in the first decade of the Twentieth Century. Men like 
Norman McMahon, a future Chief Instructor at Hythe (1905-09), and Jesse Wallingford, its 
Experimental Warrant Officer (1894-1911), joined the Army during this period, meaning that 
these regulations governed their first experiences of rifle training. They were amongst the last 
generation to handle the Martini-Henry, and some of the first to handle both the Lee-Metford 
and the Maxim Gun.176 In many senses they grew alongside the new technology, rather than 
coming to it later in their careers. This accident of timing was perhaps their greatest gift: 
much of the equipment that was to reach its pinnacle during the First World War was 
introduced and refined during their early years. They were exposed to it at a practical level, 
and so when they were in positions to influence training their technological knowledge still 
retained a degree of relevance that would not have been the case if they had started a few 
years earlier. But the force which was to drive the next change was again technological: the 
introduction of the first smokeless powder cartridge at the end of 1891, together with the new 
problems that it created.177 These smokeless powders, most famously Cordite in British 
service, would come to define the Twentieth Century battlefield by its emptiness, in the same 
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Chapter 2: 1892-1900: The Dawn of the Empty Battlefield
178
 
Whilst the 1880s had been a process of technological development, particularly of the new 
rifle, the 1890s focussed on the refinement of both rifle and training to suit the Army’s 
requirements. In 1893, after three years in service, the design of the Lee-Metford was updated 
to the Mark II, incorporating improvements based upon lessons learnt from practical 
experience. Perhaps the most important of these was a larger ten-round magazine,179 which 
required new actions to be made wider to accommodate it, and so could not be retrofitted to 
existing rifles. The new magazine had the benefits of being slightly shallower than the 
original design, so less likely to catch on equipment, whilst also being easier to load, and a 
larger capacity than the contemporary German and French designs.180 The new rifle also 
incorporated the revised barleycorn sights, and other minor alterations to simplify the 
manufacturing process.  
Perhaps the most important change made in this decade was the introduction of 
smokeless propellants for service ammunition. The first of these had been developed in 
Prussia in the 1860s, but had only been used commercially for sporting purposes as 
‘Schultze’ powder. It was not until 1884, and the invention of ‘Poudre B’ by French chemist 
Paul Vielle, that a smokeless powder suitable for military service was created. The first rifle 
to use this new propellant was the revolutionary Lebel rifle, which entered service with the 
French Army in 1886. The British Army were slow to follow suit, as there was uncertainty 
over the stability of smokeless powder in long-term storage.181 This had led to a Committee 
on Explosives being formed in 1888, and the first .303 rounds being loaded with black 
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powder as an interim measure.182 It was only in 1892 that ‘Cordite’ was formally introduced 
as the new propellant.183 A blend of nitroglycerine and guncotton, it produced an increased 
velocity, resulting in a flatter trajectory and slightly longer range. However, it also burned at 
a much higher temperature, resulting in rapid erosion of the relatively shallow Metford rifling 
and significantly reducing the average service life of a barrel.184 This had led to further 
experimentation with rifling designs by both William Metford and the Royal Small Arms 
Factory at Enfield Lock, with the resulting ‘Enfield’ pattern being introduced in November 
1895 in the new ‘Magazine Lee-Enfield’ rifle.185 These served alongside the older Lee-
Metford in the South African War, and the latter remained in use in secondary roles and with 
Colonial troops into the twentieth century. The visible effect of these changes was minimal: 
as the announcement of the Lee-Enfield’s introduction stated, ‘The only part special to this 
rifle is the barrel’.186 From a marksmanship perspective, the only modification was that the 
foresight was offset slightly to the left of centre, ‘to compensate for the drift of the bullet to 
the left’,187 which would not have been obvious to the firer. It was this design which, with 
only one very minor alteration,188 would serve until 1903, when it was replaced by the first 
charger-loading model in the aftermath of the South African War. 
From a training standpoint, the stability provided by this relatively limited change to 
the rifle itself allowed judgements of ‘best practice’ to be made, driving changes in other 
areas. Four manuals were issued between 1892 and 1898, the most intensive cycle of whole-
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scale revisions since the general introduction of the first rifle-musket in the 1850s. Whilst this 
drove innovation, it meant that it became almost impossible to accurately gauge the Army’s 
relative overall efficiency, with the result that Hythe abandoned its tabulation of this after 
1894. Indeed, throughout this period the Reports attempted to avoid averages where possible: 
with up to 150 battalions submitting annual returns, the resulting figure was rarely truly 
indicative, and often concealed subjects or units in need of remedial training.  
 
Regulations for Musketry Instruction, 1892189 
The amendments of 1891 were replaced the following year with two new sets of Regulations, 
one issued for each rifle. As before, the new regulations both formalised the amendments, 
and introduced new changes. Whilst the training hierarchy had been maintained unchanged 
from previous years, the section discussing ‘Tactics as Influenced by Fire’ had been seriously 
altered.190 This had originally been Appendix II in 1887; a twenty-one page treatise covering 
every phase of an assault, going into such detail as to lay down the methods by which 
Infantry could render artillery pieces inoperable when captured. By MR 1892, this had 
become ‘Infantry Tactics as Influenced by Fire’, and covered just two pages.191 Ideas that had 
previously been discussed in much greater detail were compressed together, seemingly with 
the sole purpose of justifying why volley fire was to be utilised for as long as possible in an 
attack, as per the Duke of Cambridge’s memoranda in November 1886.192 The argument was 
summed up in the third paragraph: 
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Volley fire allows of complete control of direction and of concentration of fire, it also 
admits of correction of elevation and direction, enables the expenditure of ammunition to be 
regulated, keeps men well in hand, and is an aid to discipline.193 
 
This implies that volley firing formed the core of the army’s operation in battle, 
having both disciplinary and logistical benefits which did not exist when firing was 
conducted independently, or even individually. It is in keeping with the comments of men 
like Colonel Slade,194 who stated that: 
 
With the easy loading and rapid fire of modern military breech-loaders, cases of 
individual marksmanship will become more and more rare, the tendency of modern fire 
tactics being to favour rapid volleys in preference to individual skill.195 
 
It was feared that it would be much harder for an attacking force to gain superiority of 
fire during the final stages of the attack if soldiers were not properly directed, particularly 
against fortified positions. As such, the magazine was only to be used at distances of less than 
300 yards, when a sudden increase in fire would have the most effect. There were also fears 
that the increased rate of fire would create logistical difficulties, with troops expending their 
ammunition more quickly, although this was an idea that Slade dismissed.196 Given the 
suggestion that the days of individual marksmanship were finished, the Army’s solution to 
this was perfectly logical, aiming to develop volley fire and ensure maximum fire control 
during the attack. This was reflected in the Hythe Annual Reports, which stressed that too  
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Table 11: Regulations for Musketry Instruction. 1892. Lee-Metford Rifle. Table “A” 








Position Sights Remarks 
1st 





refer to the 
Musketry 
Regulations. 
” ” ” 7 Kneeling 
2nd 
Individual 2nd Class 300 7 Standing 
” ” ” 7 Kneeling 
3rd 
Individual 2nd Class 400 7 Kneeling 
” ” ” 7 Lying down 
4th 
Individual 1st Class 500 7 Kneeling 
” ” ” 7 Lying Down 
5th 
Individual 1st Class 600 7 Kneeling 
” ” ” 7 Lying Down 
6th 
Individual 1st Class 700 7 Lying Down 
” ” 800 7 ” 
7th 




See para. 126 
Volleys *” 300 7 
Single rank, 
standing 
See para. 126 
” *” ” 7 
Single rank, 
kneeling 
See para. 126 
8th 




See para. 126 
” *” 500 7 
Single rank, 
lying down 
See para. 126 
” *” 800 to 600 14 
Any military 




See para. 126 
9th Section Attack 
4ft. high by 
6ft. wide 
600 to 200 21 
Any military 




at and after 
500 









See para 133. 
Independent *” 200 7 
Single rank, 
kneeling 
See para. 127 




See para. 127 
11th Skirmishing 
4ft. high by 
2ft. wide 
600 to 200 14 Any military As preferred See para. 130 
 
much emphasis was being made upon individual range training, when it was actually the field 
practices, and particularly the larger scale ones, that were the most useful training for battle. 
Both tables had been altered, incorporating elements from both the 1887 and 1891 
regulations in a simplified layout, and with the maximum range that recruits fired extended to  
800 yards. The ‘Fixed Sight’ distance was now 500 yards, and whilst there was still 
flexibility in how firing was conducted, the maximum to be fired in any one day had been 
reduced from thirty to twenty-eight rounds. Given that all practices were now allocated 
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ammunition in multiples of seven,197 this seems to have been an administrative point rather 
than due to concerns over recoil. There was also a note placed at the top of Table “A”, to the 
effect that recruits were to fire eleven service rounds, from any position and at any target, 
between 100 and 200 yards, prior to undertaking the course. If any scored badly, they could 
be sent back once to repeat the firing drills, after which they would fire a few more rounds (if 
available) before commencing the practical course. This was a slight expansion of the final 
preliminary drill introduced the year before, which had not included the requirement to repeat 
the drills before continuing to the full course. 
The duration of the training schedule remained the same, but there were three new 
practices: two long-range practices on day six, and the advancing volleys on day eight. There 
had also been an increase of ammunition allowed for the ‘Section Attack’, resulting in an 
overall increase of thirty-five rounds. This had been reduced to a nett rise of just seven 
rounds, by removing the ‘words of command’ practice, as well as the second ‘Section 
Attack’, and halving the ammunition used for the ‘Individual Attack’ practice, with the total 
allowance now 189 rounds. The table also completed the grouping of practices by the type of 
fire, with the volleys and section attack now placed together, followed by a day of magazine 
practices, and concluding with skirmishing as before. This created a logical progression under 
the requirements of the period, with the individual phase practising recruits in two positions 
per distance under ‘ideal’ conditions, before moving onto individual movement with fire.  
This approach was then repeated for sectional practices, teaching unit fire discipline at 
three distances prior to the advancing volley practice, which had first appeared in Table “B” 
only the year before. Of the magazine practices, the volley had been moved back to 400 
yards, but otherwise all three were conducted under the same conditions as laid down in 
1891. These alterations were possible after the separation of training for the Martini-Henry,  
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Position Sights Remarks 
1st 




















” ” 7† ” 
2nd 




” ” 7† ” 
3rd 




” ” 7† ” 
Individual ” 600 7 Any Military 
4th 
Individual 1st Class 700 7 Any Military 









‡Volleys ” 800 to 600 14 






6th Section Attack 
4ft. high by 
6ft. wide 
600 to 200 21 
Any military to 500 
yds., kneeling or 
standing after that 
distance 
“Fixed 



















*” 300 7 





as grouping of the magazine practices in 1891 would have meant those recruits firing twenty-
one rounds under ‘rapid’ conditions. This could have been extremely uncomfortable, and 
would have had a concurrent effect on accuracy and morale.   
Table “B” had undergone fewer changes, and used the same ammunition allocation of 
126 rounds, but this had been redistributed within the course of fire. The amounts used in the 
‘Individual Attack’ and the advancing volley practice were reduced by seven rounds in each 
case. This allowed for a new rapid fire practice at 500 yards, and an increase in the allotment 
for the Section Attack, which was now conducted against a single large target rather than 
using head and shoulders targets. The reduction of the ammunition used for the ‘Individual 
Attack’ meant that this could now be fired on the same day as the advancing volleys, 
shortening the overall duration of the range course to just seven days. The ‘Volley and 
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Independent’ practice had been retitled ‘Independent with Magazines’, but was otherwise to 
be fired under the same conditions. The only change to the order from 1891 was that the 
‘Section Attack’ was conducted before the magazine volley practices. Sixty-four rounds were 
still allocated for field practices, with the note that long-range volleys and large scale field-
firing were to be undertaken ‘wherever the ground will permit’.198  
For targetry, those relating to the individual targets remained true to the designs 
included in 1891. However, in sectional practices, the 6ft. x 12ft. target was no longer used 
for long-range practices, with the 6ft. x 8ft. now the main target, used for all except the 
section attack. Whilst the scoring system remained unaltered, with hits on the lower 4ft. 
scoring two points and on the upper 2ft. one point, the design painted on the target had 
changed. In 1891, the targets, ‘...may be coloured at discretion, or may have any figure or 
figures painted on it’.199 In 1892, it appears to have been felt necessary to provide more 
detailed instructions:  
 
*In these practices a bull’s-eye must not be painted; the lower 4 feet may be white 
with black figures, see para. 126, or all black, or brown, or a field gun may be painted on the 
target.200  
 
The “black figures” referred to were a variation of those introduced in 1887, but whilst they 
had originally shown the silhouettes of four soldiers advancing upright, they had now adopted 
a kneeling position, with their right leg at an angle to the side.201 This pattern was also to be 
repeated on the 4ft. x 6ft. targets which were used in the ‘Section Attack’ practice, although 
in this case there was no blank space above the figures.  
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The prize funds were scaled and allocated under similar conditions as they had been 
in 1887, with each commanding officer deciding the most effective way to award prizes that 
would promote interest in musketry, and the General Officer Commanding having final 
approval. The regulations did suggest categories for prizes, with those for individuals being 
‘Individual range practices’, ‘Rapid individual firing’, and ‘Moving target practice’. The first, 
whilst it did allow commanders to address specific weaknesses, would appear to have been a 
difficult choice given how uniform the majority of individual practices had become, with the 
exception of the ‘Individual Attack’. Its inclusion seems counter to the principles guiding the 
rest of the regulations, particularly that of attempting to turn the focus of commanding 
officers away from individual achievements under ideal conditions, towards the sectional 
practices.  
In his Annual Report for 1892, the Commandant of Hythe commented that, ‘The 
changes in the annual course have all been in the direction of making it more practical and in 
simplifying the details…’202 This simplification was made possible through the division of 
the training system, focussing on each rifle separately, rather than continuing a compromise 
course to cover both. The duality was reflective of the Infantry as a whole, with slightly more 
battalions issued with Martini-Henry rifles than Lee-Metfords when the course was 
introduced.203 The course itself continued the trend of using the individual practices as purely 
preliminary to those for sections and field firing, demonstrated by the continued usage of 
bull’s-eye targets for the former, and the minor refinement of the target design used for the 
latter. This was stated explicitly in the Annual Report for 1894: 
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The practices are carried out each year by the soldier in order that he may know the 
shooting of his rifle at a fixed target at a known distance, without which knowledge he cannot 
be expected to shoot with any success at moving or vanishing objects or at unknown 
distances.204 
 
These seem to have had the desired effect, and the Commandant also noted that the inclusion 
of the three timed practices had ‘been productive of much good’, to the point that some 
companies actually fired better under timed conditions than in normal practices.205 
The Annual Reports for this period also record the Commandant’s optimism that, 
after many years of complaining, the general interest of all involved in training was 
increasing; a change which he felt could only be to the Army’s benefit.206 This had perhaps 
been helped by a new requirement that subalterns fire the individual practices of Table “B” 
alongside their companies, with their scores included in the unit’s figure of merit.207 
However, the experience of subalterns in musketry may well have been somewhat limited 
prior to joining their regiments. Whilst a contemporary history states that musketry was 
included as part of the cadets’ course at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, from 1893,208  
evidence presented to that Committee in 1902 suggested that it had ceased to be taught by 
1900.209 This meant that, unless individual officers chose to join the College’s rifle club, their 
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amount of practical experience with the main arm of the infantry was likely to be highly 
variable, at best, before receiving their commission.  
In parallel with these changes, the School ran its first ‘course for senior officers’ in 
1892. This was aimed primarily at company commanders, and was designed to demonstrate 
how effective rifle fire from trained men could be under service conditions.210 It was hoped 
that this would in turn raise their interest in the subject, and so have a corresponding effect on 
training standards.211 Whilst this interest was growing, however, the Army faced a serious 
practical problem. Due to concerns over public safety from the greater range of the Lee-
Metford, so many rifle ranges had been deemed unsafe that training within Britain was 
severely restricted, compounding the long-standing lack of field practice areas. In the worst 
example, eleven battalions in Ireland were noted as having no practical experience with the 
Lee-Metford, but remained liable for active service.212 To address these concerns, and to 
allow units to continue using those ranges that could not be extended, a ‘Short Range 
Practice’ cartridge was introduced in 1895,213 which was usable ‘on any range safe for the 
M.H. rifle.’214 The drawback was that it had a maximum range of only 500 yards, but it did at 
least allow for some practical training to be undertaken. 
 
Regulations for Musketry Instruction, 1894215 
Despite having only been in use for two years, and with the scores included in the musketry 
returns showing progress, a new manual was issued. This meant that there was no basis on 
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which to compare classification standards, as noted in the Annual Report for 1892.216 The 
new manual also coincided with several changes at Hythe. A new Commandant was 
appointed in July 1894,217 and the scope of his Annual Reports was altered. Rather than 
covering all British forces, they were now limited to those serving within Britain. This also 
reduced the period they covered from fifteen months, to cover tropical stations where training 
ran from April to March,218 to just twelve.219 This appears to have caused a gap in the 
sequence, with no Report found that covers the period from May to December 1894. The 
format had also been revised, with a greater focus on field firing and incorporating more 
statistics, which was in keeping with the move to place sectional practices at the heart of 
training.  
Despite the formality of issuing a new manual, the changes were, as far as range 
practices were concerned, fairly minimal. The tables had been condensed, both by removing 
details and using new terminology, including the first usage of the term ‘Individual rapid’ in 
Table “B”. Recruits still received the same amount of preliminary training, including the 
eleven rounds fired from between 100 and 200 yards in preparation for Table “A”. The 
targetry had undergone more significant changes. Those used in the Individual practices, 
whilst of the same overall dimensions, had all had their layout altered. One scoring ring had 
been removed from each target, leaving three scoring areas: a bull’s eye; one outer ring; and 
the remainder of the target. The bull’s eye on the Third Class target, and the ‘centre’ ring on 
the First Class target, had also been expanded slightly to balance the relative proportions of 
the scoring areas. For the Sectional practices, the height of the scoring area on all screen  
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Position Sights Remarks 
1st 




















” ” ” 7 Kneeling 
2nd 
Individual 2nd Class 300 7 Standing 
” ” ” 7 Kneeling 
3rd 
Individual 2nd Class 400 7 Kneeling 
” ” ” 7 Lying Down 
4th 
Individual 1st Class 500 7 Kneeling 
” ” ” 7 Lying Down 
5th 
Individual 1st Class 600 7 Kneeling 
” ” ” 7 Lying Down 
6th 
Individual 1st Class 700 7 Lying Down 
” ” 800 7 ” 
7th 
































” ” 400 7 








Any military as 










Any military to 












Volleys 4ft. by 8ft. 400 7 











” ” ” 7 




11th Extended order practice 4ft. by 2ft. 
600 to 
200 







targets was reduced to four feet (the height of the figures depicted), with hits on the upper 
two feet no longer counted. This brought them into line with that previously used for the 
‘Section Attack’, although the target was to be either six or eight feet wide depending on the 
practice. For recruits, the final ‘Skirmishing’ practice had been renamed ‘Extended order 
practice’. Whilst the text describing the practice had been slightly altered from 1892, this did 















Position Sights Remarks 
1st 



















See para. 133 
” rapid ” ” 7 ” 
2nd 
Individual 3rd Class 300 7 Kneeling 
” 
” rapid ” ” 7 ” 
3rd 
Individual 2nd Class 500 7 Kneeling 
” ” rapid ” ” 7 ” 
Individual ” 600 7 Any Military 
4th 
Individual 1st Class 700 7 Any Military 
 
” ” 800 7 ” 
5th 
Individual attack 4ft. by 6ft. 500 to 200 7 Kneeling or Standing 
“Fixed 
sight” 
See para. 134 
‡ Volleys 4ft. by 8ft. 800 to 500 14 
Any military as 
suited to the ground 
Sights for 
distance 
See para. 136 
6th Section attack 4ft. by 6ft. 600 to 200 21 
Any military to 500 
yds., kneeling or 






See para. 137 
7th 
Volleys, rapid 4ft. by 8ft. 400 7 Single rank kneeling 
“Fixed 
sight” 
See para. 139 
”     ” ” 400 7 





” 300 7 ” ” See para. 140 
 
Table 14a: Regulations for Musketry Instruction. 1894. Table “B”, with pencil annotations 
6th Section attack 4ft. by 6ft. 600 to 200 20 
7th 
Volleys, rapid 4ft. by 8ft. 300 10 
”     ” ” 400 10 
Independent with 
magazines 
” 300 10 
 
With the exception of the changes to the targetry, Table “B” remained generally 
unaltered from 1892 at a practical level. The simplification of terms had been continued here, 
creating a much neater presentation. However, some interim changes do appear to have been  
made prior to the course’s replacement in 1896. A copy held in the Royal Armouries Library 
has had the last four practices amended in pencil.220 These were the first changes to the 
ammunition allowance since 1891, and seem designed to exploit the full capacity of the Mark 
II’s ten-round magazine, although this placed those issued with the Mark I* rifle, which held 
only eight rounds, at a slight disadvantage. The change of distance on day seven may have 
been made to provide practice of rapid volleys over two distances. Unfortunately, these are 
the only changes found in that copy, and are undated. There is also no reference to them in 
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the Annual Report for 1895, so it is unclear what the motivation behind the changes was, or 
even whether they were only made at a local level. Whilst they do prefigure alterations that 
were introduced in 1896, none of these exact changes appeared in the next Table “B”. 
Whilst silent on the alterations above, the Annual Report for 1895 does include 
several comments on how training was proceeding. The Commandant noted that, ‘The course 
for the infantry is a very difficult one compared with that of a few years ago’.221 This seems 
to relate to the greater practicality of the course, mentioned in the Report for 1892, rather than 
the introduction of any particularly complex ideas. Whilst the Infantry were generally felt to 
be shooting better, there were still units who saw it purely as something to ‘be got over as 
quickly as possible’. At the same time, Cordite had now completely replaced black powder in 
service use,222 which was much more satisfactory than a combination of the two, as those 
issued with black powder had felt themselves to be at a disadvantage.223 The focus of 
instructor training was widening: from 1896, the Hythe course was extended from six weeks 
to two months’ duration, to ensure that new equipment such as the Maxim gun could be 
properly covered.224 The Commandant also singled out the success of the rule, introduced in 
1892 (see above), obliging subalterns to fire Table “B” alongside their companies: 
 
The regulation by which subaltern officers were obliged to fire a trained soldier’s 
course annually has already caused a vast improvement of the knowledge of the rifle 
possessed by those officers, and has moreover resulted in rifle shooting being taken up as a 
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introduction of a separate course for the Maxim gun. See Oborn, ‘The School of Musketry’, p.62. 
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recreation by considerable numbers, whereas a few years back such a thing was unknown, 
except in very rare cases.225 
 
Perhaps the foremost example of an officer shooting recreationally during this period 
was Captain Charles Etches. He first competed with the Sandhurst rifle team whilst a 
cadet,226 before receiving his commission in November 1892.227 Within a year, he had 
qualified as an instructor with an ‘Extra’ certificate, as well as earning a special mention in 
the Commandant’s report for achieving the highest score in the Individual practices at the 
School that year.228 He returned to the School as an Assistant Instructor in 1899, serving both 
at Hythe and in South Africa during his six-year posting, and was described by his last 
Commandant as ‘one of the most accomplished rifle shots in England’.229 His competitive 
record supports that claim: between 1895 and 1902 he appeared as one of the Army’s top 
three marksmen on five occasions, and was the only officer to win the Army Sixty’s ‘Gold 
Jewel’ in two consecutive years during this period.230 Etches resigned his commission only 
four months after leaving Hythe, but in his fourteen years of service did much to show that 
officers could be the equal of their soldiers on the ranges, and perhaps served as an 
inspiration to others. 
 
Musketry Regulations, 1896231 
The revised regulations that appeared in 1896 are remarkably succinct by comparison to 
those which had come before. This appears to have been achieved by creating a separate 
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manual to cover the descriptions of ‘firing exercises’ (the drills used to teach soldiers the 
firing positions).232 The brevity is also noticeable in the tables, where the descriptions of the 
firing to be carried out only fill a single page, the other side listing which practices were to be 
carried out by the various arms, the number of rounds allocated, and the classification scores. 
The hierarchy around which training was based remained unaltered, and this may go some 
way towards explaining why so many changes could be made during this period – they were 
mostly of a practical, and relatively minor, nature within the overall scheme. In contrast, the 
underlying doctrine remained largely unchanged, resulting in relative consistency when it 
came to applying the training in the field. This inter-changeability also applied to technology, 
with the inclusion of the ‘Enfield’ rifling pattern in the technical section of the manual, 
although there was a note that the pattern for the Lee-Enfield rifle had ‘not yet been 
sealed’.233 
Recruit training had undergone significant alteration from 1894, bringing it much 
closer to Table “B”. The ammunition allowance was now only 174 rounds, a reduction of  
fifteen rounds due to a reconfiguration of the practices. However, the rules regarding repeat 
practices for the poorest shots had been changed. Whilst the preliminary practice had been 
removed, recruits could be put back to another squad for remedial training at any time during 
the preliminary phase, or even during the first instructional practices. If a soldier could still 
not achieve the requisite score, they were to be allowed to either fire lying or from a rest. This 
was accompanied by a strict warning against placing the desire to get the highest possible 
figure of merit above proper training in firing standing or kneeling. If they then achieved the 
qualifying score from the rest, they could then continue the course, and could be put back ‘as 
often as may be necessary, until they are fitted to take their places in the ranks as trained  
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Figures 10 – 13: Targetry, as described in MR 1896 
 Figure 10: Third and Second Class Targets




 Figure 12: Sectional Target
 Figure 13: Extended Order Target  
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soldiers.’234 If they classified as third-class shots, the Assistant Adjutant was to give further 
aiming and firing instruction, and make them fire twenty rounds at any distance and target. 
This gave a level of attention to the worst performers which had not been allowed before, and 
may only have been possible through the reduction of ammunition formally allocated to 
practices. 
The most obvious major change in the Individual practices was that, as had been the 
case in the previous Table “B”, one practice at each distance was now a ‘rapid’. These were 
to be fired loading from the magazine, whereas deliberate practices appear to have still been 
fired loading individually from the pouch or bandolier. The kneeling practice at 600 yards 
had been replaced by a third practice at 200 yards, which allowed recruits to practice both the 
kneeling and standing positions in separate deliberate practices first. To provide a larger 
aiming mark, the Third Class target was no longer used at 200 yards, with the larger Second 
Class target used for all practices up to 400 yards. These changes had all been achieved 
without the need to alter the balance of the Individual training, covering almost all the same 
positions and distances, and using the same amount of ammunition, as had been prescribed in 
1894. 
The changes made to the Sectional practices went further. The one practice marked as 
‘Rapid’ was to be conducted using the magazine, and would ‘be only employed when sudden 
or close contact with the enemy takes place’, but could be used at longer ranges ‘in rare 
cases’.235 To overcome the disparity between rifles, those soldiers issued with the Mark I* 
rifle were instructed to load the first two rounds individually, before using the magazine for 
the remainder of the practice. Three practices had been removed: ‘Individual Attack’, 
‘Extended order practice’, and the advancing volley practice. With the ammunition allowed 
for the ‘Section Attack’ reduced to twenty rounds, there was an overall saving of thirty-six  
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1 Individual Deliberate 3rd 200 7 Standing 
2 ” Rapid 3rd 200 7 ” 
3 ” Deliberate 3rd 300 7 Kneeling 
4 ” Rapid 3rd 300 7 ” 
5 ” Deliberate 2nd 500 7 ” 
6 ” Rapid 2nd 500 7 ” 
7 ” Deliberate 2nd 600 7 Any military 
8 ” ” 1st 700 7 ”       ” 
9 ” ” 1st 800 7 ”       ” 
10 Independent  300 10 Two ranks, standing 








300 10 ”    front rank kneeling 
12 ” Rapid 300 10 ”       ” 
13 ” ” 400 10 Single rank, kneeling 
14 ” Deliberate 500 10 ”       ” 
15 ” ” 600 10 ”       ” 























































1 Individual Deliberate 2nd 200 7 Kneeling 
2 ” ” 2nd 200 7 Standing 
3 ” Rapid 2nd 200 7 Kneeling 
4 ” Deliberate 2nd 300 7 Standing 
5 ” Rapid 2nd 300 7 Kneeling 
6 ” Deliberate 2nd 400 7 ” 
7 ” Rapid 2nd 400 7 ” 
8 ” Deliberate 1st 500 7 Lying down 
9 ” Rapid 1st 500 7 ”       ” 
10 ” Deliberate 1st 600 7 ”       ” 
11 ” ” 1st 700 7 ”       ” 










300 10 Single rank 
kneeling 
14 ” 
 300 10 Front rank 
kneeling 
15 Volleys Deliberate 300 10 ” 
16 ” Rapid 300 10 ” 
17 ” Deliberate 400 10 
Single rank 
kneeling 
18 ” ” 500 10 ” 
19 ” ” 600 10 ” 







rounds, part of which had been redistributed amongst the remaining independent and volley 
practices to provide them all with ten rounds each. This extended the principle incorporated 
in the changes made in Table “B” of the Royal Armouries copy of MR 1894. 
Of the eight remaining sectional practices, the first ‘Independent’ practices had simply 
been moved to 300 yards, but the Volley practices had undergone more alterations. Three of 
the practices, those fired at 300 and 500 yards, followed formats that had last appeared in 
1891, and whilst a 600-yard practice had also been included in that table, it had been fired 
lying down rather than kneeling. This left the practice for 400 yards as the only one to remain 
unaltered from 1894. Finally, the ‘Section Attack’ had been extended to 800 yards, 
incorporating the longer distances previously included in the advancing volley practice.  
The course for trained soldiers had undergone fewer alterations, with the Individual 
practices left unchanged from 1894. As for recruits, the Sectional practices had been 
reorganised, with the ‘Individual Attack’ and advancing volley practices replaced with three 
deliberate volley practices. These were identical in execution to those adopted in Table “A”, 
as was the ‘Section Attack’. Unlike recruits, trained soldiers fired only one Independent 
practice, as this was a type of fire only to be used ‘in certain special circumstances, such as 
previous to an assault’.236 The position, ‘Two ranks, standing’, is also unusual as it had never 
been specified before. The subsidiary manual of firing exercises described it as one to be used 
‘Should circumstances render it desirable’, but also stated that firing would normally be 
conducted with the front rank kneeling, and that if both were standing the rear rank must 
‘close well up to the front rank’.237 They also executed a second rapid volley practice, but 
firing from 400 yards and conducted in the same manner as the comparable deliberate 
practice from Table “A”. The extra ammunition provided for Sectional practices, along with 
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the additional practice, raised the total allocated for range practices to 143 rounds, the first 
increase since 1891.  
When it came to the time allowed for completing the tables, this was the first manual 
since 1887 where the left-hand column only numbered the practices, rather than listing 
days.238 Instead, the course duration was based upon the number of rounds fired per day, 
extending the flexibility permitted in previous tables. The recommended daily amount was 
fourteen rounds for Individual practices, rising to twenty for Sectional practices. However, if 
necessary this could be increased to twenty-one and thirty respectively for recruits, or twenty-
eight and thirty for trained soldiers. 239 Under the normal daily rate, this gave ten days for 
Table “A” (although this required thirty rounds being fired on the last day), and eight days for 
Table “B”, which matched that allowed in 1894. This could be compressed to seven and five 
days respectively, although trained soldiers would fire the last individual practice and the first 
two sectional practices on the same day.  
When it came to awarding prizes, the money allocated was left unchanged, but it was 
noted that ‘sectional practices are of greater importance than the individual practices’.240 This 
was a slight change in wording from 1894,241 strengthening the importance of sectional 
practices, perhaps in acceptance that not all units could undertake field practices. In the list of 
suggestions for individual prizes, the ‘vanishing target practice’ was added to those from 
1894. This had previously been hampered by the need for special apparatus to operate the 
targets, but an improvised design had now been sanctioned that could fulfil the same 
purpose.242 The suggestion seems designed to guide commanding officers towards including 
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the practice, particularly where it might previously have been impracticable, perhaps as 
preliminary to field exercises. 
The Annual Reports for this period do not comment on the introduction of this set of 
regulations, only noting that they had been followed correctly. The Report for 1897 did 
include a note that ‘This year all regiments and battalions will carry out the new course’.243 
However, this was a reference to the next set of regulations, which had been in development 
since 1896, when the Commandant had made the following remark:  
 
It has now become a matter for consideration whether too much time is not given to 
individual shooting and too little to collective firing.244 
 
Given the increasing emphasis on Sectional practices, this was the next logical step, 
but to accomplish it required significant alterations to both tables. In the outline that followed 
Table “A” was to be divided into two parts, with recruits undergoing a longer period of 
individual instruction, and having to demonstrate competency in the first part before 
progressing to the second. As the table was already laid out in this manner, it would simply 
formalise the transition between the two halves. The intention was that, once this first course 
had been completed, subsequent training would only have to include: 
 
...a short course of careful individual practice at a few fixed distances up to 800 yards 
when the exact position of each shot fired can be shown...to enable him to keep in touch with 
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the sighting of his rifle, and to give him some practice previous to his taking part in the 
annual collective firing...245 
 
The unallocated ammunition could then be divided, with one half placed at the 
discretion of the company commander, and the other expended during the musketry 
inspection of the battalion or regimental commander, normally during the field-firing 
exercises. In his following report, the Commandant specifically noted that these ideas had 
undergone practical testing in an experimental course, conducted at Aldershot. A relatively 
high proportion of the soldiers who participated had classified as third-class shots, but this 
did not worry the Commandant, who pointed out: 
 
...now that very much greater attention is to be given to the training of recruits and 
further training of third-class shots, it will soon be found that the standard required to pass 
out of the third-class is none too high and that the percentage of third-class shots will come 
down again.246 
 
As such, the experimental course appears to have been considered satisfactory, and it became 
the basis for the next set of musketry regulations.247 
 
The Musketry Regulations, 1898248 
Whilst the plan outlined in the Annual Report for 1896 had suggested that the new 
Regulations were to be organised differently, particularly in their focus and layout, this was 
not achieved by starting afresh, but by further adaptation of the existing layout. Practices 
were still grouped by distance, with different positions practised at each distance. The 
ammunition allocated for sectional practices was reduced to seven again, but this appears to 
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have been done purely to simplify how many practices could be undertaken in any one day. 
Recruits fired fourteen rounds per day, which could be increased to twenty-one rounds only 
‘under exceptional circumstances’.249 For trained soldiers this was fourteen for Individual 
practices, and twenty-one for all others. The maximum fired per day was never to exceed 
twenty-one and twenty-eight rounds respectively, with a specific note that twenty-eight was 
also permissible ‘when individual and collective practices are fired on the same day’.250 This 
may have applied to those who had to fire a remedial practice at the end of Part 1, as under 
normal circumstances that should not have been required.  
The table for recruits is divided into four parts, rather than the two originally 
discussed, and noticeably enlarged from 1896, in keeping with the desire to ensure 
preliminary training was more comprehensive. Nine practices had been added, most of which 
were basic instructional practices, making Part I almost as long as the entire Individual 
section had been in 1896, despite only covering half the distances. The largest change was the 
repetition of all three practices at 200 yards, using the smaller Third Class target on the 
second occasion. The prone position, which had not been taught at distances under 400 yards 
since 1887, was now included at every distance, with an extra kneeling practice added at 400 
yards. Together, these made Part I the most comprehensive short-range training ever 
designed. If their scores were satisfactory, the recruit would then pass onto Part II, which 
comprised the five long-range practices that would complete his instructional training. Part 
III moved the focus towards more practical training. The rapid practices were now paired, 
rather than being spread over all four distances, allowing two positions to be taught at both 
one short and one medium distance. The relatively flat trajectory of the bullet, which the 
‘fixed sight’ practice had exploited, meant that the training would also cover any intermediate 
distances. This approach had only previously been used in Table “B”, albeit in a minor way,  
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 PART  I.     
1 Deliberate individual 2nd 200 7 Lying 
2        ”              ” 2nd 200 7 Kneeling 
3        ”              ” 2nd 200 7 Standing 
4        ”              ” 3rd 200 7 Lying 
5        ”              ” 3rd 200 7 Kneeling 
6        ”              ” 3rd 200 7 Standing 
7        ”              ” 2nd 300 7 Lying 
8        ”              ” 2nd 300 7 Kneeling 
9        ”              ” 2nd 300 7 Standing 
10        ”              ” 2nd 400 7 Lying 
11        ”              ” 2nd 400 7 Kneeling 
 PART  II.     
12 Deliberate individual 1st 500 7 Lying 
13        ”              ” 1st 500 7 Kneeling 
14        ”              ” 1st 600 7 Lying 
15        ”              ” 1st 700 7     ” 
16        ”              ” 1st 800 7     ” 
 PART  III.     
17 Rapid individual 2nd 200 7* Kneeling 
18     ”           ” 2nd 200 7* Standing 
19     ”           ” 1st 500 7* Lying 
20     ”           ” 1st 500 7* Kneeling 
 PART  IV.     








300 7 Front rank, kneeling 
22        ”         independent 300 7     ”       ”          ” 
23 Rapid            ” 300 7* Single rank, kneeling 
24 Deliberate volleys 500 7     ”        ”          ” 
25        ”            ” 600 7 Single rank, lying 
26 Rapid volleys 300 7* Front rank, kneeling 
27     ”         ” 500 7* Single rank, kneeling 
 

























































 PART  I.     
1 Deliberate individual 3rd 200 7 Kneeling 
2        ”              ” 3rd 200 7 Standing 
3        ”              ” 2nd ‡500 7 Lying 
4        ”              ” 2nd 500 7 Kneeling 
5        ”              ” 2nd 600 7 Lying 
6        ”              ” 1st 800 7     ” 
 PART  II.     








†300 7 Front rank, kneeling 
8 Rapid volleys 300 7     ”      ”           ” 
9     ”     independent †300 7     ”      ”           ” 
10 Deliberate volleys       † †500 7 Single rank, kneeling 
11 Rapid volleys 500 7*     ”         ”          ” 
12     ”     independent      † †500 7*     ”         ”          ” 
13 Deliberate volleys 600 7 Single rank, lying 
14 Rapid volleys 600 7*    ”         ”        ” 
15 Attack practice 
800 to 
200 
21 As found necessary 
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through the omission of 400 yards for individual shooting after 1885. 
Part IV was the only section where practices had been removed, with the loss of one 
deliberate volley practice,251 and the ‘Section Attack’. The loss of the latter meant that 
recruits no longer received any training in combining fire and movement. Two ‘rapid’ 
practices had been included in their place, which created a more complete foundation for 
Table “B” to then expand into a practical training system. The reduction of the ammunition 
issued per practice meant that the whole course only required a net increase of fifteen rounds, 
and the rifle was to be loaded from the belt pouch unless a practice was designated as ‘rapid’.  
As had been suggested in 1896, Table “B” was now almost identical to Table “A”. 
Part I comprised a reduced selection of purely instructional deliberate practices, which 
allowed for two positions to be practised at both 200 and 500 yards, along with the inclusion 
of the prone position, which was another revival from 1887. There were no longer practices 
at 300 and 700 yards, but the six remaining practices provided the chance for soldiers to re-
familiarise themselves with their rifles over all of the distances included in Part II, and ensure 
they were of a competent standard. There were then nine sectional practices, although these 
now copied Part I in being organised by distance rather than type of practice. After the 
removal of the 400-yard rapid practice, they now only covered three distances, but included 
three extra rapid practices, both independent and volley fire. The position of ‘Two ranks, 
standing’ was no longer practised, although it was still taught,252 and both practices at 600 
yards were fired from the lying position, something which had not appeared in any previous 
tables.253 The final practice was the ‘Attack practice’, the only one to be allocated more than 
                                                 
251
 Practice 17 in MR 1896. 
252
 H.M.S.O., Rifle and Carbine Exercises. Manual Exercise, Firing Exercise, Bayonet Exercise, Firing 
Exercise for Webley Pistol, and Instructions of Cleaning Arms. 1898 , (London, Harrison and Sons, 1898), para. 
79. 
253
 Although practices from 600 yards had previously been listed as being fired from ‘any military position’, this 
was the first table to specify the lying position for sectional practices. 
116 
 
seven rounds, and which was conducted along the same lines as the ‘Section Attack’, in 
preparation for the field exercises. 
The 1898 Regulations were certainly successful in creating a different direction for 
musketry training, very much in the spirit of the plan outlined in 1896. As had been intended, 
Table “A” was now a thorough grounding in all of the basic types of fire that a soldier would 
need, whilst Table “B” was far more focussed on sectional practices than had previously been 
the case. It also served as a preliminary course for the field exercises, integrating the whole 
training process rather than the latter being almost a separate entity. These changes were 
attributed to Ian Hamilton by a recent biographer, as Hamilton took up the post of 
Commandant in May 1898,254 stating that ‘Realistic battle conditions and individual accuracy 
summed up the revolution in training instituted by him’.255 Certainly, his Annual Report for 
1898 displays a different approach in assessing the capabilities of the Army as a whole, 
bringing a remarkable amount of energy to the role, particularly as there were competing 
demands on his time.256 However, as described above, there is clear evidence that MR 1898 
was conceived and developed during his predecessor’s tenure, and the trend towards ‘realistic 
battle conditions’ had arguably begun in 1885, the same year that Hamilton’s book was 
published. Moreover, many of the changes attributed to him are actually very much in 
keeping with the published opinions of previous Commandants.  
Given that it appears to have taken two years to develop and implement new ideas or 
processes, Hamilton’s time at Hythe was far too brief.257 Whilst his two predecessors had 
both served four year terms, Hamilton held the position for just sixteen months before being 
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appointed Assistant Adjutant General on the staff of Sir George White, the new General 
Officer Commanding Natal.258 Intriguingly, shortly before leaving Hythe, he wrote to a 
fellow officer who was apparently joining the staff of Sir Redvers Buller,259 recommending 
that Buller request the issue of 100 rounds per man for use in additional practices at ‘moving 
and vanishing targets etc’. He also recommended undertaking a full, field-firing practice 
‘with 50 rounds of ball in pouch’. These suggestions, to give the soldiers some practise under 
battlefield conditions, may in part have been spurred by his own experiences during the First 
Boer War. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that his suggestion was taken up, but the letter 
represents a moment of foresight, prefiguring the alterations that were made only three years 
later. 
Although it appears that he failed to achieve the ideas he had presented in the 1880s, 
the British Army had taken a very different direction from that which he had suggested in 
1885, one which he was perhaps too early to alter. It would take the external impetus of the 
South African War, together with the appointment of Lord Roberts as Commander-in-Chief 
in 1901, before training began to move in a direction much closer to Hamilton’s ideas from 
the 1880s. However, he did have a role in deciding the direction that the design of the rifle 
would evolve in the coming decade. In 1895 there had been a discussion as to whether the 
Army wished to adopt the new Cavalry carbine as the standard Infantry weapon, due to 
having comparable accuracy, whilst being lighter and handier. Whilst it was turned down on 
the grounds that the barrel was not long enough to make full use of the pressure generated by 
the cartridge, the question was resurrected in 1898. Lord Wolseley, the then Commander-in-
Chief, stated that he wished to lighten the existing rifle, although he did not wish to see it 
shortened. A committee of four officers, led by Ian Hamilton,260 oversaw comparative trials 
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between four designs. In spite of Wolseley’s directive, their findings favoured a shortened 
design, and they requested that twelve be made to that pattern, together with a further twelve 
which were to be even further lightened. These were ordered, but the trials were interrupted 
by the South African War and never completed. However, the matter was brought back to the 
fore in 1900, and at Earl Roberts’ suggestion the design selected by Hamilton’s committee 
was used as the basis for the subsequent trials.261 These would eventually lead to the 
introduction of the ‘Short’ rifle, whose successors would go on to serve successfully through 
both world wars. 
 
The National Rifle Association 
The National Rifle Association (NRA), although in operation throughout the period of study, 
were at their most involved with military affairs during the 1890s. The Association was 
founded in 1859 ‘for the encouragement of Volunteer Rifle Corps, and the promotion of 
Rifle-shooting throughout Great Britain’.262 Whilst its main competitions could only be 
entered by members of the volunteer forces, and shot using service rifles and ammunition, the 
NRA also offered prizes open to all-comers aimed at stimulating the development of both 
firearms and ammunition technologies. Metford rifling had been a product of that process, 
achieving great success in long-range Match Rifle competitions during the 1870s. This had 
given the Association the unofficial role of secondary experimental centre after Hythe, 
focussed on creating the most accurate combination of rifle and ammunition possible, both 
driving development and demonstrating the failings of designs. This was seen at the ‘Imperial 
Meeting’ in 1899, when the new Mark IV bullet proved to be disastrously flawed.263 In 
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recognition of their technical expertise, the NRA had a representative on the Small Arms 
Committees. This post was originally filled by Colonel Sir Henry Halford,264 followed later 
by his protégé, Thomas Fremantle,265 both of whom were noted target shots. Between them, 
they participated in every committee from the Magazine Rifle Trials of the 1880s through to 
the First World War.  
The competitions of the Army Rifle Association, despite having the Commandant of 
the School of Musketry serving as its president,266 were run along NRA lines, much to the 
annoyance of the military authorities as this went against their drive for greater realism. In 
response to assurances from ‘the highest opinion in the Army’ that the standing position, 
‘was in fact the only position of importance for fighting’, the NRA redesigned its 
competitions for the Imperial Meeting of 1900. These were now shot from the standing 
position at 200 yards, with the kneeling position used at 500 and 600 yards. However, this 
move was universally unpopular amongst competitors, and the meeting was poorly attended. 
Against the background of defeats in South Africa, where the British Army’s poor 
performance was blamed upon the soldiers’ ‘failure to conceal themselves when in action’, 
the experiment was abandoned, and all future attempts at change were stiffly resisted.267  
The School of Musketry had been linked to the NRA from its inception, as it was at a 
training course at Hythe in 1859 that the idea for the Association was first raised. The then 
Commandant, Major-General Hay, held a place on the Council and was invited to act as chief 
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umpire at their first meeting.268 The strong representation of Hythe staff members, both in 
providing administrative assistance and in the prize lists of the army and all-comers 
competitions, also ensured that there were many with strong individual ties. Perhaps this is 
best represented by Colonel John Hopton, who served in most of the officer roles at Hythe, 
including acting as Commandant after Ian Hamilton’s departure.269 He was also a highly 
active competitive shot, captaining the Army Eight between 1891 and 1907, and representing 
England in the ‘Elcho Shield’ thirty-six times, with an illustration of him shooting for that 
competition used as the frontispiece to Halford’s book on target shooting.270 However, the 
professional relationship between the two bodies was not always smooth, and there were 
those who felt that the NRA influenced the direction that training took during the 1890s. A 
history of the School of Musketry, written in 1914 by Joseph Oborn (the School’s 
Adjutant),271 is notable for its criticism of training prior to the South African War: 
 
To the desire to secure kudos for the Army at Bisley has been attributed the 
concentration of effort to train a few superlative bull’s-eye shots, to the neglect of the 
majority, and the consequent indifference to other forms of shooting, in which, we were told, 
our opponents in South Africa were superior. 
 The successive editions of the Musketry Regulations afford an indication of the 
trend of army training in shooting. If this be so, a study of the little book of 1898 will show 
the extent to which what may be described as the Bisley tradition had taken hold. In Table 
“B” the trained soldier fired only at 200, 500, 600, and 800 yards- Bisley ranges. The 
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shooting was all deliberate and at bull’s-eye targets. In collective practices he fired only at 
known distances and at a large target of known size. It is true one or two other practices 
were described in the book and a section was devoted to field firing. The former were 
permissive, the latter designed for large bodies and only practicable in the few places where 
range accommodation was extensive. A comparison of this work with its predecessors 
suggests that the fundamental necessities of military training had to a great extent been lost 
sight of in the effort to produce a body of experts in that kind of shooting which is useful only 
as a means to an end. Devotion to the means had eclipsed the end. 
 The energies of the Army Rifle Association were applied in a direction 
indicated by the programme of the National Rifle Association. District and regimental 
meetings naturally followed suit.272 
 
In contrast, the opinion of another contemporary, speaking in 1897, was more 
positive: 
 
...it will be admitted on all hands that the last decade has seen considerable 
improvement in our “system” of instruction‒apart altogether from the question of the 
efficacy of this rifle or that, or this cartridge or that‒which are subjects in themselves. Much 
pedantry has been left behind, and the tendency has been towards practical efficiency. 
Why, then, should we not hope for further progress during the next decade?273 
 
This second writer, Colonel E.C. Browne,274 had been linked with musketry training 
since the 1860s, and written in favour of training more closely representing ‘Active Service 
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Conditions’ in 1889.275 As such, he seems well placed to judge the evolution of musketry 
training during this period from a contemporary perspective, and his comments suggest that 
he felt it to be improving, even if it was not yet perfect, reflecting the opinions given in 
Hythe’s Annual Reports. As noted above, MR 1898 was both in line with, and atypical of, 
training across the decade, with combinations of positions and distances that had not been 
included since the 1880s included in a layout that had been evolving since 1891. Critics of 
both the NRA and the Army during the 1890s tended to focus their complaints on areas such 
as technology or declining standards of marksmanship, rather than on the pursuit of 
realism.276 Oborn’s comments are coloured by hindsight; the knowledge that training in the 
1890s had essentially failed in its primary function of preparing the Army for the war to 
come. However, he ignored the relatively progressive nature of the training when judged by 
the standards of its time, and the aims of the men who created it. 
There is another area which suggests the more direct influence of the NRA: the 
inclusion of the ‘Back Position’ as a military position in MR 1892.277 This was a firing 
position that, whilst it had seen limited use during the Peninsular War, had been almost 
entirely the preserve of long-range competitive shooters since its re-introduction in the 
1870s.278 Indeed, Punch had already satirised its military shortcomings in a cartoon published 
during the Zulu War,279 and no reference to either its inclusion or subsequent omission 
appears in the Hythe Annual Reports of the period. It was a complicated position to achieve, 
and the description makes it clear that whilst it might be found ‘advisable or necessary on 
service to...assume the back position...it is unnecessary to teach him [this] as a regular 
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Drill’.280 In the opinion of Colonel Halford, it was the ‘only steady position’ for firing 
downhill, as prone was uncomfortable and sitting required ‘as much practice 
as…standing’.281 That is not to say there was only one supine position,282 but that depicted in 
MR 1892 is the one which Halford described as being ‘the one in general use’. The only 
major impediment he saw was that the soldier’s campaign equipment tended to make the 
position uncomfortable, if not impossible; something he hoped would be rectified in the 
future. T.F. Fremantle cited this as the most likely reason why the position had only made 
one appearance, as well as the difficulty of mastering the position initially.283 Another 
contemporary book on sharpshooting, printed during the Boer War, suggested that the 
position had been included to allow the N.R.A. to list the position amongst those permitted in 
competitions shot under military conditions. At the same time, the writer chose to depict and 
describe a different variation to that which the military laid down.284 Whatever the reasons, 
and faults, subsequent manuals dispensed with it in favour of the more practical, and 
comfortable, kneeling and seated positions. The manual’s illustration was adopted by the 
civilian target-shooting community, and was still being used in works on target shooting well 
into the next decade.285 
What does become clear, from histories of both the School of Musketry and the NRA, 
is that both had very different opinions as to the best method of training riflemen. The NRA 
focussed upon the perfection of the individual marksman, whereas Hythe, as Oborn put it, 
was concerned with creating ‘an Army in which every man who carries a rifle may rightly be 
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regarded as a good shot’.286 Whilst an army of marksmen might have been the ideal, the 
authorities were realistic enough to understand that they would be unwieldable in battle 
without a discipline and command structure, and so focussed on raising the average 
proficiency as high as possible. However, the standards and context within which this was 
assessed were about to be challenged by the practical experience of another war in South 
Africa. As Punch had remarked in 1881, the Boers had previously proven to be a ‘practical 
musketry instructor’,287 and it quickly became apparent that they were to teach the British 
Army a second lesson. 
 
Summary: 
The four manuals issued between 1892 and 1898 represent a committed approach to refining 
training to best suit both the new rifle and ammunition, as well as building on existing trends. 
This meant that the changes were often more subtle than those seen in the previous decade, 
particularly regarding the content of the training programme. The most notable changes were: 
 Simplification of the table layout, with all but the most basic details removed. 
This resulted in a table which was far better suited for rapid reference, 
although the practices themselves remained relatively consistent throughout 
the period. 
 The balance between Individual and Sectional practices, with the focus of 
 training moving away from individual achievement and towards ensuring unit
 efficiency. This culminated in the sub-division of both tables in 1898, 
 requiring soldiers to attain a minimum standard before progressing to the next
 part.  
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 The greater breadth of recruit training, both to ensure that they could be ready
 for overseas service as quickly as possible, and reduce the time required for
 individual practices during subsequent annual courses. As with the previous
 decade, this incorporated a greater number of ‘realistic’ practices, with certain
 elements of recruit training much closer to that for trained soldiers than had
 previously been the case. This also led to a corresponding expansion of 
 sectional practices for trained soldiers, with four added over the course of the
 decade. 
 Whilst the targetry had remained relatively similar, formal training had 
 become more static after the loss of the ‘Individual Attack’ and advancing 
 volley practices. However, this appears to have been in part a response to 
 difficulties with providing suitable areas for training, as well as being 
 compensated for by allowing more time for field firing practices, which would
 fulfil the same roles. 
This new approach to training, particularly separating the tables into parts to assess 
the progress of training, was to become the standard format for all tables issued up to the First 
World War. Whilst the Army were confident that the training system in 1898 was the most 
comprehensive and practical that had ever been issued, it is worth noting that in other areas 
matters had remained relatively stable. Whilst the styles of training had been expanded, the 
ammunition allowance for Table “A” was almost identical between 1892 and 1898, with a 
temporary reduction in 1896. This was the reverse of the pattern for Table “B”, the allowance 
for which had been substantially increased in 1896, before being heavily cut back in 1898, 
although this then allowed for more ammunition to be used for field practices. The Hythe 
Annual Reports do make several references to a need for more ammunition to be allocated for 
training purposes, but almost in the same sentence admit that there are reports that the current 
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allocation was going unused due to failure or inability to undertake the field exercises. This 
was a problem throughout the Army as a whole. As was noted in the previous chapter, it 
wasn’t until 1898 that Salisbury Plain was purchased and large scale exercises were finally 
undertaken. During these ‘Grand Combined Manœuvres’, which involved 50,000 men, Ian 
Hamilton commanded a brigade under Sir Redvers Buller. Although Buller’s force was 
defeated, Hamilton had used raiding parties to effectively disrupt the opposition’s command 
structure, an approach which anticipated the mobile guerrilla-like attacks of the Boer 
‘commando’. However, in a worrying statement on British contemporary tactical thought, 
Hamilton was reprimanded for using unorthodox tactics during the debriefing.288 
  At the beginning of the South African War, the opinions of the Army hierarchy, as 
well as of men like Hamilton and Browne (both former critics), appear to have been that 
training was evolving in a positive direction, if not yet perfected. Hamilton’s Report as 
Commandant in 1898, whilst generally positive regarding basic training, highlighted many 
issues with carrying out sectional practices. He took particular issue with the fire control of 
officers, who he found using the incorrect words of command and giving poor descriptions of 
targets. He was also worried by the hesitation of soldiers in responding to orders during field 
practices. In many ways, this was reflective of the relative neglect of sectional training and 
field exercises, which the new Regulations were designed to address. The section on 
‘Marksmanship’ was more positive, and ended with the following comment: 
 
I have, indeed, no hesitation in saying that, whoever our enemy may be, the 
marksmanship of our men may in the future be relied upon to compensate to a very great 
extent for our presumptive inferiority of numbers.289 
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This was echoed in the pronouncement given in the next Report by John Hopton, as 
acting Commandant, that ‘The results generally may be regarded as ‘very satisfactory’.290 He 
also included a section entitled Value of South African Campaign from Musketry Point of 
View.‒ 
 Undoubtedly much useful musketry knowledge will be gained from the war now in 
progress in South Africa; already, from information received of the shooting by our men in 
this war, musketry generally must have made vast strides in the interval that has elapsed 
since the last time we were engaged with an enemy in that part of the world. No doubt some 
of this improvement is due to the better shooting powers of the Lee-Metford and Lee-Enfield 
rifles as compared with the Martini-Henry, but the chief improvement is due to the far 
greater care and trouble now taken with musketry training throughout the Army, and to the 
great advance made in the fire discipline of all ranks. Many points will be most interesting to 
note in this connection. For instance, what kind of fire was most generally used and found 
most effective, whether “individual,” “independent,” or “volley”; also what were the most 
generally adopted “positions,” i.e., “standing,” “kneeling,” “sitting,” or “lying”; at what 
distances most of the firing took place, and whether long range fire was much used and found 
effective; the uses to which machine guns were put, and their general behaviour; what 
revolvers were found the most suitable; also whether the present bayonet was much used and 
found to answer well, &c. 
Any alterations that may be thought necessary in Tables A and B, and in the musketry 
course generally, can conveniently be submitted when a new edition of the Musketry 
Regulations is required.291 
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These were sentiments which Ian Hamilton had also expressed in the letter discussed 
above.292 It should be noted that the Report was formally signed on 30th December 1899, and 
so may well have been written without knowledge of what came to be known as ‘Black 
Week’.293 However, by the end of 1899 it certainly did not seem that the British were quite 
the effective force that Hamilton had described only a year previously, and that far more 
reassessment was necessary than Hopton could have anticipated. What the Army did come to 
understand very quickly was that the style of warfare that smokeless ammunition created was 
unlike anything that had ever been encountered before. With no tell-tale smoke to reveal a 
soldier’s position, locating the enemy had become almost impossible, and the distances over 
which battles could now take place made this an even more difficult matter. The battlefield 
was no longer something hidden under a cloud of smoke, with units dressed and operating in 
a manner that would have been recognisable to troops from the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, but was now a more anonymous space, witnessing the beginnings of camouflage and 
concealment, and challenging almost all of the ideas which the British Army had operated 
under since the mid-1880s. 
The last Annual Report of this period was published in 1901,294 which, due to the full 
mobilisation of the Army, provided only a very basic collection of figures to describe the 
training conducted between 1 November 1899 and 31 October 1900. Thereafter, no further 
reports appear to have been produced by Hythe until 1903, by which time the Army had 
undergone a series of investigations into the failings seen in South Africa, the results of 
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which would come to define the direction of the British Army during the decade prior to 




Chapter 3: 1900-1908 – Mastering the art of taking cover
295
 
The South African War marked a watershed for the British Army, being the first major 
conflict in which it faced an opponent armed with modern European weapons.296 There were 
also a number of other firsts, including the first major usage of khaki uniforms, marking the 
beginning of the Army’s move towards camouflage, and providing the possibility to conceal 
the movement of troops on the battlefield.297 However, despite the various changes made to 
British training during the eighteen years since they had last fought, the Boer forces still 
possessed a superior level of both marksmanship and fieldcraft.298 Although the British 
eventually won the war, with the assistance of Imperial forces, it exposed major issues with 
their equipment, tactics, and training. These caused the War Office to initiate an evaluation 
exercise in May 1900,299 surveying the opinions of commanding officers regarding every 
piece of equipment issued.300 This was followed, in September 1902, by the ‘Royal 
Commission on the War in South Africa’, otherwise known as the Elgin Commission, which 
was formed to: 
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...inquire into the Military preparations for the War in South Africa, and into the 
supply of men, ammunition, equipment, and transport by sea and land in connection with the 
campaign, and into the Military operations up to the occupation of Pretoria;301 
 
Their recommendations, together with those of the Esher Committee, formed the basis for the 
modernisation of the British Army, and made the British Expeditionary Force that sailed to 
France in 1914 a very different one to that sent to South Africa only fifteen years before.302  
From a training standpoint, the first changes to be overcome were technological, as 
any changes to the rifle would have a direct impact upon the training revisions. The Lee-
Enfield had proven to have several serious manufacturing flaws, not least that some 25,000, 
‘owing to bad sighting, threw [the bullet] eighteen inches to the left at 500 yards’.303 The 
answers to the survey of commanding officers concurred that the rifles were capable of 
grouping, but that ‘the group was not often where it was intended’.304 Cavalry units had also 
complained of issues with the accuracy of their Lee-Metford and Lee-Enfield carbines at long 
range,305 and felt that a rifle would be of greater use to them.306 Field-Marshal Lord Roberts’ 
own opinion, as expressed to the Secretary of State for War whilst he was Commander-in-
Chief in South Africa, was that the Lee-Enfield could be improved ‘by shortening, lightening, 
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and adding a clip’.307 The ‘clip’, a system to facilitate rapid loading, was seen as one of the 
key advantages of the Boer fighters, and had already been recommended in 1898 by units 
armed with the Lee-Metford Mk.I*, fighting on the North-West Frontier of India.308 The tests 
of four patterns of shortened and lightened rifles, conducted by Ian Hamilton at Hythe that 
same year, appear to have been unrelated to this recommendation. The committee eventually 
recommended a design ‘reduced in weight to 7lbs. 12½oz., and with the barrel shortened by 
6¼ inches’,309 but the outbreak of war had prevented further trials. With a new Small Arms 
Committee convened to examine the various issues raised with both the rifle and carbine, the 
authorities began to consider the potential of a single rifle to fulfil the requirements of both 
Cavalry and Infantry, and at Earl Robert’s suggestion turned to this shortened design as the 
basis for new trials. 
The pattern rifle was finally created in January 1901, incorporating all of the desired 
changes, and this became the guide for the manufacture of a thousand ‘Short’ rifles for 
extended trials alongside the existing ‘Long’ Lee-Enfield rifle. Steps were taken to ensure 
that they were both shot under as similar conditions as possible, along with a stipulation that 
‘Volley firing will not be used’.310 Eight tests were carried out, designed to evaluate not only 
the new rifle’s accuracy, but also to compare the two designs under a variety of conditions, 
with three of the practices based on the training issued for 1902.311 After the trial reports were 
submitted,312 the rifle underwent minor alterations before being introduced into service in  
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Figure 14: Comparison of British and European service rifles, circa 1903 
 
December 1902.313 It was introduced as the ‘Rifle, short, magazine, Lee-Enfield (Mark I)’, 
which gave rise to the acronym by which it is still more commonly known – the SMLE. 
However, the design was unpopular with target shooters, who felt it was a retrograde 
step. Independent tests, conducted at Bisley in early 1905 by seven experienced firers, pitted 
their own ‘Long’ rifles (with and without windage-adjustable sights) against three SMLE 
rifles. Their conclusions placed the SMLE last, which they described as poorly balanced, 
badly sighted for snap-shooting, inaccurate, and with greater recoil than the previous design. 
These conclusions were reported in the Times, leading to questions being asked in both the 
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national press and Parliament as to the suitability of the design,314 and used in support of a 
motion in the House of Lords to prevent the issue of the SMLE rifle to the Infantry. There 
were also claims made that the Committee had been too narrow in its investigations, and 
predisposed to the new design, fuelled by accusations of hidden agendas. During the debate, 
Lord Roberts quoted from a letter written by the Commandant who had overseen the original 
trials, where he stated that the Hythe Staff had actually started ‘with a bias in favour of the 
long barrel’. He was also assured that the trials were conducted with ‘rigid impartiality’,315 
and that the conclusion in favour of the ‘Short’ rifle was purely evidence-led.316 Roberts’ 
distrust of rifle meetings also appears in his comments to the Prime Minister in private 
correspondence the previous year.317 The disparity between the conditions under which the 
Bisley test was shot and battlefield conditions were also highlighted in a review of the Times 
article, written by Colonel R.J. Marker for the Secretary of State for War, H.O. Arnold-
Forster. Marker pointed out that Bisley was no guide for war, and that the rifle was intended 
for use by men who were not necessarily marksmen.318 Arnold-Forster privately distrusted 
the new rifle, but admitted to the Prime Minister that his opinions were not based upon expert 
opinion.319 
Further tests into the accuracy, handling, and recoil of the two rifles were conducted 
by John Hopton, as Chief Inspector of Small Arms, in February 1905.320 The comments state 
that, although the Short rifle gave a slightly lower muzzle velocity, attributable to the shorter 
barrel, the rifle was still felt to answer the brief as had been set down by the Director-General 
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of Ordnance. Although the motion in the House of Lords was defeated, the debate 
demonstrated what Ralph Hely-Hutchinson, the Under-Secretary of State for War, described 
as the dissent between the ‘Army’ and ‘Sporting’ schools of thought,321 due to the different 
requirements of the two. The gap which had already formed between the Army and the NRA 
over the conduct of competitions would only increase during this period.  
In terms of training itself, this period appears to have been heavily influenced by one 
man; Charles Monro, who joined the School as Chief Instructor in February 1901, and served 
as Commandant between 1903 and 1907. This was the longest that a single officer had served 
at the School since the 1870s, and meant that he was involved in every set of regulations 
issued throughout this period. The style of training that appeared in this period was given the 
title ‘Monro Doctrine’,322 although his role in the process was later disputed by Ian Hamilton, 
who claimed the idea originated from Hamilton’s mentor, Lord Roberts.323 Roberts’ remained 
a vocal supporter of musketry training throughout this period, speaking publicly at Bisley in 
1901 of ‘the necessity of making soldiers good shots and of developing their individual 
intelligence’.324 He was also in the perfect place to transform his ideas into action, having 
succeeded Lord Wolseley as Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in December 1900.325 
It is thus entirely possible that at least some of the ideas came from him, but whilst he took a 
proactive role in the promotion and enforcement of the new training, it was left to Monro, 
first as Chief Instructor under Richard Pennington, and then as Commandant, to create and 
revise the practical training in response to both tactical demands and the abilities of the new 
rifle.  
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Monro also benefitted from a surplus of rifle ammunition, left over from the South 
African War, which allowed for an increase of 100 rounds per soldier in the infantry, and 150 
for the cavalry.326 The majority of this appears to have been channelled into field practices, as 
these figures are not reflected in the ammunition allocated to the individual practices. The 
allowance for Table ‘A’ actually rose only slightly in 1902, to 200 rounds from the 189 
issued in 1898. This figure was reduced to 113 in 1903 and to just 100 rounds in 1904. It 
returned to 1902 levels in 1905, with 195 rounds allocated, before a minor reduction to 180 in 
1909 which remained in force until 1914. The allowance for Table ‘B’ was actually reduced 
in 1902, from 119 rounds to 106, but was set at 140 in both 1903 and 1904. In 1905, it rose 
again to its highest figure of 295 rounds, which was then reduced to 225 in 1909. As such, 
although there was a reduction in the gross ammunition allowance from 1908, it appears that 
its impact was limited to field practices, a point made in an article on musketry training in 
1912 where the writer hoped for a reversal of the reduction in ammunition by 50 rounds to 
ensure such practices were effectively taught.327 
 
Provisional Course of Musketry for the year 1902328 
Whilst training and experiments appear to have been conducted throughout 1901 and 1902, 
no surviving copies of the Hythe Annual Reports have been found.329 The only indication of 
the state of training comes from an article printed in The Times in December 1901,330 which 
refers to a new set of Regulations having nominally been in a state of preparation for some 
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time, but which had only been formally announced in Army Orders that month.331 The article 
was highly critical of both the delay and the provisional nature of the course, feeling that all 
of the lessons to be learnt from the war had already been amply demonstrated.332 However, 
the delay reflected the fact that certain developments, particularly concerning the ‘Short’ 
rifle, had still not been confirmed. This course was to serve as an interim measure, similar to 
the amendments made in 1891. In this case, the course was written as a comprehensive series 
of amendments to MR 1898, rather than a stand-alone set of regulations. The Times article 
went into such great detail when listing the points of innovation, that it is possible to almost 
completely reconstruct the new tables from it.333 This suggests a far higher level of public 
interest in British musketry training than had previously been the case. The full tables 
demonstrate how drastic a shift towards individual marksmanship had been made, beginning 
with the complete removal of the sectional practices which had been considered so crucial 
only five years earlier. 334 
Given the nature of the tables as amendments, their basic layout and progression show 
strong elements of continuity from 1898. Table “A” was still arranged in four parts, and 
although there had been some alterations to the headings they still followed an almost 
identical progression, with only two changes of note within the first three sections. The first 
of these was the usage of the ‘sitting’ position for practices 5 and 8. This had previously only 
been used by the Cavalry, in place of the kneeling position, to prevent them sitting on their 
spurs. However, the South African terrain appears to have demonstrated it had a wider 
application, being the most practical and balanced position for firing downhill whilst wearing 
service equipment,335 and from 1902 its usage was extended to the Infantry. The other change  
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 PART  I.     Parts I., II., and III. count for classification 
1 Independent 2nd 200 7 Lying 
Any kind of natural or artificial rest may be used by 
a recruit, if found necessary. 
2 ” 2nd 200 7 Kneeling 
3 ” 2nd 200 7 Standing 
4 ” 3rd 200 7 Lying 
5 ” 3rd 200 7 Sitting 
6 ” 3rd 200 7 Standing 
7 ” 2nd 300 7 Lying 
8 ” 2nd 300 7 Sitting 
9 ” 2nd 300 7 Standing 
10 ” 2nd 400 7 Lying 
11 ” 2nd 400 7 Kneeling 
 PART  II.      
12 Independent 1st 500 7 Lying  
13 ” 1st 500 7 Kneeling  
14 ” 1st 600 7 Lying  
15 ” 1st 700 7 ”  
16 ” 1st 800 7 ”  
 PART  III.      
17 Magazine Independent 2nd 200 7 Kneeling 
Time allowed, 45 secs. from command 
“Commence.” 
18 ”                   ” 2nd 200 7 Standing ” 
19 ”                   ” 1st 500 7 Lying ” 
20 ”                   ” 1st 500 7 Kneeling ” 
 PART  IV.      
21 Independent Vanishing 100 7 Lying Target exposed 4 secs. The rifle may not be brought 
to the present before the target appears. 
22 ” Fixed Head 
& Shoulders 
100 7 ” The firer, crouching behind cover, momentarily 
exposes himself sufficiently to fire a rapid shot. 4 
secs. allowed for exposure, fire, and complete 
return to cover, from command or signal of 
commander. The rifle may be rested, and the firer 
must expose as little as possible of his head and 
arm. When the spotting disc is fixed, the man will 
rise by command, to observe the result of his shot, 
and will resume concealment. 
23 ” Moving 
Figure 
100 7 Standing For details of targets, run, &c., see Instructions for 
Use of Moving and Vanishing Targets, which may 





150 7 Lying As for practice 23. 
 
 
    
Note.- (Targets for practices 21 and 22 will be as 
described in Note 3, Provisional Table B; scoring 
as for practices 7 to 10 of that table.) 


















































Instructions for conduct of practice 
PART  I.- INDEPENDENT 
1 Independent 3rd 200 7 Position, kneeling 
2 ” 3rd 200 7       ”     , standing 
3 ” 2nd 500 7       ”     , lying 
4 ” 2nd 500 7       ”     , sitting 
5 ” 2nd 600 7       ”     , lying 
6 ” 1st 800 7       ”     ,    ” 
7 ” Vanishing Head & Shoulders 100 7 Any Position. Target exposed 4 seconds 
8 ” Fixed Head & Shoulders 100 7 The firer, crouching behind cover, 
momentarily exposes himself sufficiently 
to fire a rapid shot without necessarily 
aligning the sights. 3 seconds allowed for 
exposure, fire, and complete return to 
cover from command or signal of 
commander 
9 ” Vanishing Head & Shoulders 200 7 Position, kneeling behind cover. Target 
exposed 3 seconds 
10 ” Fixed Head & Shoulders 200 7 Instructions as for practice 8, but 4 
seconds allowed 
11 ” Vanishing 2nd Class 500 7 Position, lying behind cover. Target 
exposed 4 seconds 
12 Magazine 
Independent 
” 600 7 Position, any. Magazine fire. Target 
exposed 45 seconds 
PART II.- M ISCELLANEOUS PRACTICES 
13 Independent Moving figure About 
150 
7 Standing. For details of targets, run, &c., 
see Instructions for Use of Moving and 
Vanishing Targets, which may be varied 




Moving figure About 
200 
8 Any position behind cover. Magazine fire, 
two shots at each backward and forward 
run. Detail as in 13. Run not less than 28 
feet, pace quick time. Each hit, 2 points. 
15 Magazine 
Independent 
Vanishing figure About 
200 
7 Any position behind cover. A target to 
appear at intervals of 5 seconds, each time 
at a different place, and to remain 
exposed 4 seconds. Horizontal space for 
each man’s target not less than 28 feet. 
For detail of target, &c., see Instructions 
for Use of Moving and Vanishing 
Targets. Each hit, 2 points 
PART III. 
 
Part III. consists of practices for which rounds are allotted to commanding officers and company commanders. These 
should take the form of field practices executed under tactical schemes, and off measured ranges whenever possible. 
Attention is directed to special instructions for moving and vanishing targets and range appliances, which will assist 
in framing schemes and in selection of suitable targets. 
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was to allow recruits to use any form of rest in Part I if necessary. This extended the rule 
introduced in 1896, but avoided the need to remove a recruit from his section for remedial 
instruction with a different group. The terminology used in Part III had been changed from 
‘Rapid Independent’ to ‘Magazine Independent’, but was effectively the same practice with a 
reduced time allowance of forty-five seconds.  
Part IV had seen the largest number of changes, with the introduction of four further 
individual practices to replace the sectional practices. These introduced ‘Vanishing’ and  
 ‘Moving’ targets into range practices for the first time since their introduction in the 1880s, 
together with use of cover. Each was conducted at short range and stressed rapid acquisition 
of the target, although in different ways. The first two would later be described as ‘snap-
shooting’, allowing four seconds to come to the aim, fire, and return to cover. However, 
whilst the first used a disappearing target, which the recruit had then to react to, the latter 
reversed this by using a stationary target, with the firer taking an opportunistic shot. The 
moving targets were based upon a new design, which could be adapted to the ground 
available, and were to move at approximately the same speed as a walking man. Finally, the 
remaining 32 rounds, including the eleven previously set aside for discretionary practices, 
were allocated to three field practices, the design of which were left to the discretion of the 
assistant adjutant, who was simply directed to ensure they were ‘as practical as possible’. In 
many ways, recruits received a more practical course than that for trained soldiers in 1898. 
It was from Table “B”, specifically practices 9, 10, and 14, that the practices used in 
evaluating the ‘Short’ rifle the previous year were drawn. As with recruits, the table retained 
the same basic layout as that from 1898, but with the addition of a third section. The removal 
of the sectional practices called for a greater amount of rearrangement. This meant that, 
although the first two sections had the same total number of practices, there were now twelve 
independent practices. The first six, which had previously formed the entirety of Part I, were 
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unchanged with one exception: the incorporation of the sitting position. The remaining six 
practices were a mixture of ‘Vanishing’ and ‘Moving’, at both short and medium distances. 
These were generally similar to those for recruits, although Practice 8 only allowed three 
seconds per exposure. As the instructions noted, the soldier might fire ‘without necessarily 
aligning the sights’, a suggestion that Hamilton had made in 1885, and which required the 
adoption of a form of reflex learning, training soldiers to fire based purely upon instinctive 
alignment of the rifle.  
The ‘Miscellaneous practices’ in Part II were all very different from previous training, 
and again have elements that relate back to Hamilton’s suggestions in the 1880s. The targets 
appear to be attempting to replicate:  
 
 A soldier moving into a defensive position;  
 A soldier advancing in rushes, and;  
 Soldiers in a trench. 
 
These were all conducted at short range, and with strict guidelines on the timings of the target 
exposures, to ensure that training was as realistic as possible. The allocation of eight rounds 
in practice 14 marks the first increase of ammunition used in an individual practice. However, 
this may have been purely due to needing an even number of rounds. Even with these new 
practices, a larger amount of ammunition was left unallocated at the end of Part II. Part III 
divided this amount between the Company Captain and the Commanding Officer, to be used 
at their discretion, with the captain’s allowance increased to fifty-three rounds.336 However, 
certain conditions were made, most notably that the Commanding Officer’s allowance was to 
be used for practices conducted during his annual inspection, and that all practices were to be 
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designed and executed in as practical a manner as possible, using the instructions relating to 
the new targetry for guidance. 
The bull’s eye target continued to be used for the basic ‘Independent’ practices, but 
there were now a series of new designs for the more advanced practices. The most simple of 
these were a basic head and shoulders target, used for practices 21 and 22 in Table “A”, and 7 
to 10 in Table “B”, and a modified Second Class target used for Practices 11 and 12 of Table 
“B”. These were both described in the notes to Table “B” thus:  
 
Targets for practices 7 to 12.– 
The target for practices 7, 8, 9, and 10 to be a black head and shoulders painted on the 
bottom of a 3rd class target. Dimensions as follows: a rectangle 2 feet wide by 1 foot high, 
with a rectangle 1 foot square on top…  
The target for practices 11 and 12 to be a 2nd class target with a central vertical black 
band, 2 feet 6 inches wide. 
Position of hits and misses to be shown by spotting discs in practices 7 to 11 after 
each shot; and in practice 12 after 7 shots. 
For further details as to vanishing targets, see special instructions on the subject.337 
 
Although these were similar to pre-existing designs, the widespread introduction of canvas 
targetry meant that they could now be made to disappear behind cover. This allowed for the 
basic vanishing practices to be carried out using standard range equipment.  
The more advanced designs, referred to in the ‘Miscellaneous Practices’ of both 
tables, has appeared as a pamphlet with Army Orders in March 1901.338 This depicted nine 
designs, ranging from head and shoulders targets to a group of six soldiers moving 
perpendicular to the firer, together with details of their construction. The materials used were, 
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for the most part, relatively simple, being thick paper mounted on canvas or wood, which 
allowed for more humanoid shapes than had previously been possible. The pamphlet also 
included notes on which design was suitable for various types of training and levels of 
experience. There were four ‘vanishing’ and five ‘moving’ designs; these were to move at 
‘quick time’, the standard marching speed. In many ways, these were simply refinements of 
older concepts using lightweight materials, but there were also more innovative falling and 
collapsing targets. The first of these were mild steel plates, twelve inches square, designed to 
fall over when struck. The collapsing targets were the only design not to be depicted, but 
were simply described as being balloons ‘hung from strings stretched between upright 
sticks’.339 These provided a more varied selection of targetry for officers designing field 
practices, and appear to have been inspired by the desire to make these practices more 
interesting than had previously been the case. 
An article printed in the Strand Magazine in December 1901,340 discussing the ‘new 
style of field firing’ used to train units in preparation for South Africa,341 described a battle 
simulation using these types of targets. The scenario was laid out on Ash Ranges near 
Aldershot, where a British force on patrol encountered and engaged Boer forces over varied 
terrain, including not only infantry, but a machine gun section, cavalry, artillery (complete 
with simulated shell fire) and an armoured train. Although undoubtedly a far more realistic 
test of musketry than anything previously conducted within Britain, it was quite complex in 
operation and required a large amount of space to stage, and no further references to this 
layout or similar designs have been found.  
In April 1902, a royal warrant came into force which altered the terms of enlistment. 
Although the overall length of service remained twelve years, the time which had to be spent 
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‘with the colours’ was reduced from seven years to three, with the remainder spent in the 
reserve. Those who wished to extend their service with the colours could do so provided they 
were ‘efficient in the duties of their arm of service’. For the infantry, this included achieving 
the required musketry standard, albeit on a reduced musketry course to allow for the part-
time nature of their service. Failure to meet this standard would result in a reduction of pay 
for the following twelve months.342 Lord Roberts also issued a Special Army Order that 
September,343 in which he stated his dissatisfaction with the attitude of officers to musketry 
training, who saw it as an ‘irksome business’, to be completed ‘as quickly as possible’, and 
without evaluation of the results.344 As such, he wished to impress upon them that they were 
to lead by example; to master the rifle, and to carry out ‘a far more complete and finished 
system of instruction than exists at present’. To aid this, he laid down seven points, which 
addressed the training of recruits and trained soldiers, in both the Regular and Auxiliary 
Forces. He also included a description of the revised training for 1903: 
 
The official instructions for the musketry practices for 1903 will embody, as far as 
possible, the principle that skill at short ranges is of the utmost importance, and that it is 
useless to allow a man to shoot at the longer ranges, or in advanced practices, until he has 
become a reliable shot at the shorter distances.345 
 
Roberts also made General Officers Commanding ‘personally responsible’ for ensuring that 
this training was carried out as effectively as possible. They were ordered to submit reports to 
the Adjutant-General on 1st January 1903, detailing the improvements they had made, and 
any suggestions that they had for further changes. This proactive approach on the part of the 
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Commander-in-Chief, expanding the ideas that he had started in India almost twenty years 
earlier, was to have a lasting impact on musketry training for the next decade. 
 
 The Musketry Regulations (Provisional), 1903346 
To enforce the changes outlined by Lord Roberts, the training for 1903 was printed as a full 
set of regulations, rather than as further amendments to MR 1898. However, they were still 
‘provisional’, and further changes had been made to both the layout of the tables and the 
practices they contained, including the stipulation that only one practice could be fired per 
day.347 Both tables now contained a squad ‘Skirmishing Practice’, similar to the ‘Section 
Attack’ practices of the previous decade, but designed to teach the principles of skirmishing 
as embodied in Infantry Training, 1902.348 The ‘fixed sight’ distance remained set at 500 
yards,349 and there had been a reduction in the distances shot over, in line with Roberts’ 
comments. The maximum distance of any recruit practice had been reduced to just 600 yards, 
and only marksmen or first-class shots were eligible to shoot the final ‘Independent practice 
of Table “B” at 800 yards. The time and ammunition that was saved was reallocated, with 
both tables including a greater number of ‘Miscellaneous Practices’. Alongside these 
changes, and again in line with Roberts’ orders, it was now ‘desirable for company 
commanders’ to fire Parts I and II of Table “B” with their companies,350 whereas previously 
only subalterns had been required to do so. 
For recruits, the first change to Table “A” was the introduction of a system of 
‘Qualifying points’ in the first three parts. Whilst the scores for each practice were included  
                                                 
346
 H.M.S.O., The Musketry Regulations. (Provisional). 1903 , (London, Harrison and Sons, 1903). [Hereafter 
cited as MR 1903]. 
347
 MR 1903, p. 41. 
348
 H.M.S.O., Infantry Training (Provisional), 1902 , (London, Harrison and Sons, 1902), pp. 134-146. This 
described Skirmishing as ‘…extended order, in which each individual acts and thinks for himself, and makes 
use of all his powers, mental and physical, to attain a common object.’ It also focused on development of 
individual intelligence and a ‘spirit of independent action’. 
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Instructions for Conduct of Practice. 
Parts I, II and III. – Qualification Practices 
 Part I.      
1 Independent 2nd Class 200 7 20 Lying 
2 ” ” 200 7 19 Kneeling 
3 ” ” 200 7 16 Standing 
4 ” 3rd Class 200 7 16 Kneeling 
5 ” ” 200 7 14 Standing 
     85  
 Part II.      
6 Independent 2nd Class 300 7 16 Kneeling 
7 ” ” 300 7 16 Sitting 
8 ” ” 400 7 17 Lying 
9 ” 1st Class 500 7 18 Lying 
10 ” ” 600 7 15 Lying 
     82  
 Part III.      
11 Magazine 
Independent 
2nd Class 200 7 15 Standing. 50 seconds allowed from command 
“Commence.” 




” 400 7 14 Lying behind cover. 60 seconds allowed from 
command “Commence” 
14 ” 1st Class 500 7 15 As for Practice 13. 
  Total rounds 98 59  
Part IV.- Miscellaneous Practices 









100 7 Lying behind cover, which should consist of sandbag 
loopholes, &c. Target exposed 4 seconds. The rifle may 
not be brought to the present before the target appears. 
The target will be exposed, and the shot hole indicated by 
the marking disc after each shot. 
17 ” Figure No. 3 100 7 The firer, crouching behind cover, exposes himself 
sufficiently to fire a rapid shot. 4 seconds allowed for 
exposure, fire, and complete return to cover from 
command or signal of commander. When the marking disc 
is placed the man will rise to observe the result of his shot, 





150 7 Instructions as for Practice 16, except that exposure will 
be for 3 seconds only. 
19 ” Figure No. 3 150 7 As for Practice 17. 
20 Moving 
Target 
Figure No. 5 150 7 Lying behind cover. Hit of miss to be signalled after each 




Any Figures 500 to 
200 
12 The practice to be conducted in accordance with the 
principles laid down in “Infantry Training.” A target for 
each man. Intervals between skirmishers not less than 10 
paces; between targets not less than 5 paces. 
  Total rounds 54  
Notes: 
2. In practices 16, 17, 18, and 19, the figure will be affixed to a 3rd Class target in order that the position of misses may be 
shown with the marking disc. 
3. In order to give recruits confidence they may be permitted occasionally to use any artificial rest for the rifle in practices 1 















































Instructions for Conduct of Practice. 
Part I. – Classification Practices, Counting for Figure of Merit. 
1 Independent 3rd Class 200 7 Standing. 
2 Rapid Independent ” 200 7 Kneeling behind cover. 45 seconds allowed from 
command “Commence.” 
3 Independent ” 300 7 Sitting. 
4 Magazine 
Independent 
” 300 7 Lying behind cover. 35 seconds allowed from 
command “Commence.” 
5 Independent 2nd Class 400 7 Kneeling. 
6 ” ” 500 7 Lying. 
7 Magazine 
Independent 
” 500 7 Lying behind cover. 35 seconds allowed from 
command “Commence.” 
8 Independent ” 600 7 Lying. 
9 Rapid Independent ” 600 7 Kneeling behind cover. 45 seconds allowed from 
command “Commence.” 
10 Snap Shooting Vanishing Figure 
No. 3 
150 7 Any position. Target exposed for 3 seconds. The 
rifle many not be brought to the present before the 
target appears. The target will be exposed and the 
shot hole indicated by the marking disc after each 
shot. 
11 ” Figure No. 3 150 7 The firer, crouching behind cover, exposes himself 
sufficiently to fire a rapid shot. 3 seconds allowed 
for exposure, fire, and complete return to cover from 
command or signal of commander. When the 
marking disc is placed the man will rise to observe 
the result of his shot, and will resume concealment. 
12 Snap Shooting Vanishing Figure 
No. 3 
200 7 Lying behind cover, which should consist of 
sandbag loopholes, &c. Target exposed 3 seconds. 
The rifle may not be brought to the present before 
the target appears. The target will be exposed, and 
the shot hole indicated by the marking disc after 
each shot. 
13 ” Figure No. 3 200 7 Instructions as for Practice 11. 
  Total rounds 91  
Part II. – Miscellaneous Practices. 
14 Moving Target Figure No. 5 150 7 Standing. Hit or miss to be signalled after each run. 
Pace, quick time. 
15 Moving Target. 
Magazine Fire 
Figure No. 5 200 8 Any position behind cover. Two shots at each 
backward and forward run. Run not less than 28 
feet. Pace, quick time. 
16 Snap Shooting. 
Magazine Fire 
Any Figure 200 7 Any position behind cover. A target to appear at 
intervals, each time at a different place in a trench or 
gallery, and to remain exposed for 4 seconds. 




Any Figure About 
650 to 
200 
10 The practice to be carried out in accordance with the 
principles laid down in “Infantry Training.” A target 
for each man. Intervals between skirmishers not less 
than ten paces; between targets, not less than five 
paces. 
18 Fixed sight and fixed 
bayonet practice 
3rd Class 200 7 Any position. (Cavalry fire without the bayonet.) 
19 Independent 
(for marksmen and 1st 
class shots only 
1st Class 800 10 Lying. 
  Total rounds 49  
Part III. – Field Practices. 
Notes: 
2. In practices 10, 11, 12, and 13, the figure will be affixed to a 3rd Class target, in order that the position of misses may be 




primarily as a guide, a recruit had to achieve the overall score for each part before being 
allowed to progress. Those that did not were to repeat the practices which they had failed to 
qualify in.351 Six ‘Independent’ practices had been removed, comprising:  
 Three long distance practices;  
 Two of the prone practices at short range;  
 And the secondary practice at 400 yards. 
The ten that remained seem to have the same basic intention as the Individual practices in MR 
1898 – to ensure that recruits had a firm grounding in all of the major positions across the 
primary military distances. This is perhaps best demonstrated by the two practices at 300 
yards, where the kneeling and sitting positions had separate practices, whereas they had 
previously been listed as alternative positions in the same practice. Having completed these 
first two sections, recruits moved to the final part of the classification, which now comprised 
two ‘magazine’ and two ‘rapid’ practices. The latter was a reversion to loading from the 
bandolier at longer distances, in keeping with the practice of retaining the magazine as a 
reserve of fire for when decisive range had been reached, and which necessitated the greater 
time allowance. The time allowed for the ‘magazine’ practices had also been increased by 
five seconds, which may have been done to ensure that accuracy was not sacrificed for speed, 
as the intention was to teach a balance between the two. 
Part IV still contained seven practices in preparation for field exercises, but details 
were now provided for all of them, including two practices previously abandoned in 1898 – 
the ‘fixed sight and fixed bayonet’ practice, and skirmishing (discussed above). The other 
five practices were mostly ‘snap-shooting’ practices, at both static and vanishing targets, 
which reinforced the reflex training that had been introduced in 1902. Practices 16 and 18, 
using vanishing targets, specifically incorporated loopholes and sandbags within the cover the  
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Figures 15– 24: Targetry, as described in MR 1903 
 Figure 15: Bull’s eye targets 
 Figure 16: No. 1 Figure Target 
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  Figure 17: No. 2 Figure Target
 Figure 18: No. 3 Figure Target
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 Figure 19: No. 4 Figure Target
 Figure 20: No. 5 Figure Target
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 Figure 21: Falling Plate Target 
 Figure 22: No. 6 Figure Target 
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 Figure 23: No. 7 Figure Target
 Figure 24: Aiming Figures  
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firer used, replicating a defensive position, with the target representing an attacking force. 
Practices 17 and 19, using fixed targets, reversed these roles, with the soldier now on the 
offensive. The exposure time, particularly in practice 18, seems short, especially as the rifle 
was not to be in the shoulder until the target appeared, but prepared recruits for Table “B”. 
The final individual practice, against a moving target, was a repeat of practice 24 from 1902, 
and completed their preparatory training in close-quarter shooting. Table “B” had also been 
restructured. The classification practices in Part I were rearranged, returning to the layout 
used in MR 1896 by pairing ‘independent’ practices with either ‘rapid’ or ‘magazine’ 
practices. With the removal of the long-distance practices, this allowed training to focus more 
closely on close-range training, including 400 yards, a distance that had not been used for 
individual firing since before 1884. There were now five ‘Independent’ practices, one at 
every distance, with a ‘Rapid’ practice at 200 and 600 yards, and a ‘Magazine’ practice at 
300 and 500 yards. All four were conducted from behind cover; ‘Rapid’ being fired kneeling, 
to allow for loading from the pouch or bandolier, and ‘Magazine’ fired prone. The four ‘Snap 
Shooting’ practices, whilst generally conducted along the same lines as those in Table “A”, 
used three seconds per exposure, with the first two practices moved to 150 yards. The targets 
had also been redesigned, and now depicted a figure from the waist up, rather than simply the 
head and shoulders. 
Part II had also been expanded, and now had a total of six practices, the first three of 
which remained broadly unchanged from 1902. The exception was the target for the first two, 
depicting a soldier running in a more realistic crouched position, replacing that of a soldier 
standing upright, cut off at the thighs. The three new practices were similar to those added to 
Table “A”, with minor differences: the ‘fixed sight and fixed bayonet’ practice was fired at 
the smaller Third Class target; and the skirmishing line started from 650 yards with ten 
rounds, instead of at 500 with twelve rounds. The marksman’s practice at 800 yards was fired 
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from the prone position at the largest of the bull’s-eye targets, the First Class. This also 
received ten rounds, rather than the normal seven, but appears to have been included purely 
as a basic marksmanship practice at long distance, rather than any particular tactical 
principle.  
The details of the Field Practices in Part III were again left to the discretion of the 
officers, who were directed that the skills learnt on the range were now to be applied ‘in a 
practical manner at unknown ranges.’352 Only one practice was to be undertaken per day, and 
every practice was to incorporate eight principles: 
 
a) Decentralisation of Command 
b) Casualties amongst Leaders 
c) Invisibility 
d) Passing of Orders 
e) Mutual Action and Support 




To allow these to be practised properly, the overall ammunition allowance had been 
increased to 300 rounds, with 106 rounds allocated for Part III,354 and an instruction that 
‘Ammunition must be freely used, and risks accepted.’355 Eight types of silhouette targets 
were designed for use in field practices; variations of those that had been published in 1901, 
and arguably even more realistic in their appearance. Point C, ‘Invisibility’, was described as 
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 MR 1903, p. 47. 
353
 MR 1903, pp. 47-48. 
354
 In addition to the 140 rounds allotted to Parts I and II, fifty had been provided for miniature cartridge 
practices, and four rounds noted as ‘surplus’, to be used as needed. 
355
 MR 1903, p. 50. 
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having ‘acquired an importance second only to fire effect’.356 This appears to have expanded 
upon the use of cover in the classification practices, which was only now possible due to the 
use of khaki uniforms. There was also a strong emphasis on both officers and men being 
encouraged to use their initiative in these practices. In part, this evolved from experiences in 
both South Africa and on the North-West Frontier, where a greater spacing between soldiers 
was found necessary to reduce their vulnerability to artillery and small-arms fire. This also 
meant that orders were harder to communicate, and it became more difficult to generate the 
weight of fire necessary for the final assault. As such, a push towards giving troops more 
flexibility in how they achieved a defined objective, using their own initiative, was seen as a 
solution to this problem. The new training also focussed on building on the reflex training of 
the classification practices in the selection of targets. This included several references to 
building the intelligence of soldiers generally, as well as more specific examples of 
independent action on the battlefield.357 Overall, a soldier was now not only better equipped 
to act individually within defined parameters, but also understood how to use the terrain to 
his advantage, both defensively and offensively. 
The loss of the long-distance practices may initially appear to be a retrograde step, 
particularly when, according to some reports, engagements in South Africa had sometimes 
commenced at longer ranges than 600 yards, which was considered ‘decisive’. However, this 
allowed for more intense training at the remaining distances, and reflected tactical practice, 
where individual firing would not normally be used at greater distances than 600 yards. With 
that exception, these tables were perhaps the most comprehensive which had yet been drawn 
up, responding to the lessons of South Africa within the limitations of the ‘Long’ Lee-
Enfield. This was the last set of regulations to differentiate between ‘Rapid’ and ‘Magazine’ 
practices, as the introduction of the charger-loaded SMLE, together with the retrospective 
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fitment of charger-guides onto ‘Long’ rifles, meant loading would no longer be done using 
individual rounds. It was this basic but fundamental change that would dictate the next 
changes in musketry training. 
 
Amendment to Musketry Regulations, 1904358 
In early 1904, the first of the new SMLE rifles were issued to ‘a number of cavalry 
regiments’.359 As these were only to be loaded using chargers, not using individual rounds, 
training had to be amended to account for this, as well as other alterations to training. As in 
1902, this was accomplished through Army Orders, this time as an amendment of the 1903 
regulations.360 For the first time, the training of the Cavalry was identical in every aspect to 
that of the Infantry, regardless of whether the course was fired with the ‘Long’ or ‘Short’ 
rifle. Alongside this, a new classification course was introduced for those troops issued with 
the SMLE, with those still using the ‘Long’ rifle continuing to use the 1903 tables. Every 
practice was allocated ammunition in multiples of five, the number of rounds held by an 
individual charger, and with a note that ‘all loading will be through the magazine’.361 The 
change to five rounds per practice also had an added benefit, as it meant that the ammunition 
saved could be transferred to further practices, expanding the breadth of the tables whilst only 
requiring a modest increase in the overall ammunition allowance. 
In Table “A”, this allowed nine extra practices to be added, eight of which went 
towards the overall qualification score. Recruits now fired sixteen ‘Independent’ practices, 
the first six of which were all fired from 200 yards. This allowed for the lying, kneeling, and 
sitting positions to be practised twice, using the smaller Third Class targets on the second 
occasion. Provided the Recruit achieved a passing score, they then undertook the remaining  
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Instructions for Conduct of Practice. 
Parts I, II and III. – Qualification Practices 
 Part I.      
1 Independent 2nd Class 200 5 14 Lying. 
2          ”       ” 200 5 13 Sitting. 
3          ”       ” 200 5 13 Kneeling. 
4          ” 3rd Class 200 5 12 Lying. 
5          ”       ” 200 5 10 Sitting. 
6          ”       ” 200 5 10 Kneeling. 
     72  
 Part II.      
7 Independent 2nd Class 300 5 12 Lying. 
8          ”       ” 300 5 12 Lying behind cover. 
9          ”       ” 300 5 11 Kneeling. 
10          ”       ” 400 5 12 Lying. 
11          ”       ” 400 5 10 Kneeling. 
12          ”       ” 400 5 12 Kneeling behind cover. 
13          ” 1st Class 500 5 13 Lying. 
14          ”       ” 500 5 13 Lying behind cover. 
15          ”       ” 600 5 10 Lying. 
16          ”       ” 600 5 10 Lying behind cover. 




 Part III.      
17 Rapid 
Independent 
2nd Class 200 5 11 Lying. 35 seconds allowed from command 
“Commence.” 
18          ”       ” 200 5 10 Kneeling. 35 seconds allowed from command 
“Commence.” 
19          ”       ” 300 5 10 Lying. 35 seconds allowed from command 
“Commence” 
20          ”       ” 300 5 9 Kneeling. 35 seconds allowed from command 
“Commence.” 
21          ”       ” 400 5 9 Lying. 35 seconds allowed from command 
“Commence” 
22          ” 1st Class 500 5 11 Lying. 35 seconds allowed from command 
“Commence” 
  Total rounds 110 60  




Figure No. 3 
100 5 Lying behind cover, which should consist of a sandbag 
loophole &c. Target exposed 4 seconds. The rifle may not 
be brought to the “present” before the target appears. The 
target will be exposed, and the shot hole indicated by the 
marking disc after each shot. 
24       ”          ” 150 5 
25       ” Figure No. 3 100 5 The firer, crouching behind cover, exposes himself 
sufficiently to fire a rapid shot. 4 seconds allowed for 
exposure, fire, and complete return to cover from 
command or signal of commander. When the marking disc 
is placed the man will rise to observe the result of his shot, 
and will resume concealment. 
26       ”         ” 150 5 
27       ” Vanishing, Figure 
No. 3 
200 5 Instructions as for Practice 23. 
28       ” Figure No. 3 200 5 As for Practice 25. 
29 Moving 
Target 
Figure No. 5 100 5 Lying behind cover. Hit or miss to be signalled after each 
run. Pace, quick time. 
30       ”       ” 150 5 
















































Instructions for Conduct of Practice. 
Part I. – Classification Practices, Counting for Figure of Merit. 
1 Independent 3rd Class 200 5 Lying. 
2          ”       ” 200 5 Lying behind cover. 
3 Rapid, Independent       ” 200 5 Lying. 30 seconds allowed from command 
“Commence.” 
4 Independent       ” 300 5 Sitting. 
5 Rapid, Independent       ” 300 5 Sitting. 25 seconds allowed from command 
“Commence.” 
6          ” 2nd Class 300 5 Lying behind cover. 25 seconds allowed from 
command “Commence.” 
7 Independent       ” 400 5 Kneeling. 
8          ”       ” 400 5 Kneeling behind cover. 
9 Rapid, Independent       ” 400 5 Kneeling behind cover. 25 seconds allowed from 
command “Commence.” 
10 Independent       ” 500 5 Lying. 
11          ”       ” 500 5 Lying behind cover. 
12 Rapid, Independent       ” 500 5 Lying behind cover. 25 seconds allowed from 
command “Commence.” 
13 Independent       ” 600 5 Lying. 
14          ”       ” 600 5 Lying behind cover. 
15 Rapid, Independent       ” 600 5 Lying behind cover. 30 seconds allowed from 
command “Commence.” 
16 Snap Shooting Vanishing, Figure 
No. 3 
150 5 Any position. Target exposed 3 seconds. The rifle 
may not be brought to the “present” before the target 
appears. The target will be exposed and the shot 
hole indicated by the marking disc after each shot. 
17          ” Figure No. 3 150 5 The firer, crouching behind cover, exposes himself 
sufficiently to fire a rapid shot. 3 seconds allowed 
for exposure, fire, and complete return to cover from 
command or signal of commander. When the 
marking disc is placed the man will rise to observe 
the result of his shot, and will resume concealment. 
18          ” Vanishing, Figure 
No. 3 
200 5 Lying behind cover, which should consist of a 
sandbag loophole &c. Target exposed 3 seconds. 
The rifle may not be brought to the “present” before 
the target appears. The target will be exposed, and 
the shot hole indicated by the marking disc after 
each shot. 
19          ” Figure No. 3 200 5 Instructions as for Practice 17. 
  Total rounds 95  
Part II. – Miscellaneous Practices. 
20 Moving Target Figure No. 5 150 5 Standing. Hit or miss to be signalled after each run. 
Pace, quick time. 
21          ”       ” 200 10 Any position behind cover. Two shots at each 
backward and forward run. Run not less than 28 
feet. Pace, quick time. Hit or miss to be signalled 
after each run. 
22 Snap Shooting Any Figure 200 10 Any position behind cover. A target to appear at 
intervals, each time at a different place in a trench or 
gallery, and to remain exposed for 4 seconds. 
23 Skirmishing Practice 
(by squads) 
Any Figures About 
650-
200 
10 The practice to be carried out in accordance with the 
principles laid down in “Infantry Training.” A target 
for each man. Intervals between skirmishers not less 
than 10 paces; between targets, not less than 5 paces. 
24 Independent (for 
marksmen and 1st 
class shots only) 
1st Class 800 10 Lying. 
  Total rounds 45  
Part III. – Field Practices. 
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ten practices, starting with three at both 300 and 400 yards, with one practice at each distance 
fired from behind cover. This was also the case for the two practices at both 500 and 600 
yards, and the qualification section closed with six ‘Rapid Independent’ practices. The time 
allowed for these had been reduced proportionally, in line with the reduction in ammunition 
allocated, but still gave an average of seven seconds per round. Part IV now had eight 
‘Miscellaneous’ practices, but these were not all the same as those in the 1903 table. Two 
extra ‘Snap Shooting’ practices replaced the “Fixed Sight” and “Skirmishing” practices, 
despite their having only been introduced the previous year, allowing pairs of practices at 
100, 150, and 200 yards. These were conducted under the same conditions as previously, 
replicating both offensive and defensive scenarios, each allowing four seconds per exposure. 
There was also an additional ‘Moving Target’ practice, allowing training to take place at both 
100 and 150 yards, but without any alterations to how they were conducted. Despite these 
additions, the reduction of two rounds per practice meant that overall the course used two 
rounds less than the previous year. 
Table “B” had undergone similar changes, and been expanded from nineteen to 
twenty-four practices, but with no change in the overall allocation of ammunition. The 
classification section now began with fifteen practices; three at every distance between 200 
and 600 yards. Again, the previous training was expanded, although without a consistent 
pattern other than the inclusion of a basic practice at every distance. The remaining two then 
incorporated either usage of cover and/or rapid fire. Unlike 1903, there was normally only 
one position used per distance, with the exception of 300 yards. There, the first practice was 
fired sitting, then followed by two rapid practices; one sitting, and the other lying behind 
cover, with the latter fired at the smaller Second Class Target. Part I concluded with four 
‘Snap Shooting’ practices, which remained unchanged from 1903. With the exception of the 
‘Fixed Sight’ practice, which had been removed, the five ‘Miscellaneous Practices’ of Part II 
161 
 
remained unchanged other than the number of rounds used. Apart from practice 20, all used 
the full magazine capacity of ten rounds, the first individual practices to do so since the larger 
magazine was introduced in 1892. Of these, practices 21 to 23 appear to have been conducted 
with the magazines fully charged from the beginning, rather than reloading. Again, the table 
closed with the 800 yard ‘Independent’ practice, fired under the same conditions as before. 
The details of the ‘Field Practices’ in Part III remained at the discretion of commanding 
officers, rather than being prescribed within the table itself, and appear to have had the same 
ammunition allowance as before. 
To assist instructors during preliminary training, particularly for recruits, new 
instructional equipment, particularly aiming and firing rests, was introduced to better 
demonstrate the correct aim picture and standing position. Alongside these, a separate work 
on Musketry Exercises had been published,362 which included the first usage of photography 
in the training manuals. Up to 1902,363 the firing positions had been depicted through line 
drawings. These had the benefit of being both very clear and relatively inexpensive to print, 
particularly when considering mass reproduction. The disadvantage was that the positions 
themselves were very much in the form of drill movements, depicting both the ‘Ready’ and 
‘Present’ stances for the various positions, as well as some variations within those. The 
introduction of charger-loading, along with the new focus on the usage of cover, required 
some adaptation. There was also a desire to replace the old practice of ‘drilling by 
numbers’,364 which was a remnant of the old form of rote training. Photography may have 
been used in an attempt to meet both these criteria,365 as the resulting thirteen plates show a 
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Sergeant-Instructor of the School of Musketry,366 demonstrating the correct loading and firing 
positions, both in the open and from behind cover. For the latter, a second image was 
included of the view from the front, showing how concealed the soldier should be if correctly 
instructed. The purposes of these new images seems to have been an evolution from their 
original purpose – demonstrating the ‘right’ position, which had its roots in the Seventeenth 
Century – but to better demonstrate the intent of the new practices.367 
The Commandant’s Report for this year reveals four interesting points.368 Although 
there is no reference to the amendments for the SMLE, he does note that the musketry 
regulations had ‘been remodelled’, apparently part of a backlog of revisions which the School 
had finally been able to address.369 The new system of marking, introduced in 1903 to 
prevent ‘the irregularities which occurred in previous years’, had been successful. This 
allowed him to suggest that the majority of reports could now be taken as being an accurate 
reflection of unit efficiency,370 although his assessment of those returns suggests that the 
scores were far from satisfactory. This was blamed on units completing the practices between 
February and April, as instructed in Infantry Training,371 but which had been affected by 
particularly poor weather and hurried due to a lack of range accommodation. This also meant 
that recruit training could not be carried out to the fullest extent. As might be expected with a 
relatively new system, there were problems in converting both the equipment and the 
instructors to the new methods, particularly in the correct application of new principles, with 
a comment that the competitive spirit meant that realism was occasionally sacrificed in 
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favour of a higher figure of merit.372 However, in general there was felt to have been a 
marked rise in the interest in musketry by all ranks,373 with a Senior Officers course being run 
at Hythe for the first time since 1895.374 As before, the course was designed to demonstrate 
the changes in training through both lectures and practical demonstrations, and involved 
discussion of the rifles of other armies, the effect of rapid and deliberate fire, as well as a full 
day devoted to the powers of the Maxim gun, both as a long range weapon and in comparison 
to twenty-five riflemen. Framing the relative value of a machine gun in terms of an 
equivalent number of riflemen was part of the contemporary debate, and would have an 
indirect effect on the future development of training, when it was decided that a method of 
supplementing the fire effect of the infantry was required. 
 
The Musketry Regulations, 1905375 
The duplication of tables was only a temporary measure whilst the SMLE rifles were issued, 
with a formal set of regulations published the following year. For the first time since the 
South African War, these were no longer ‘provisional’. The new manual was also more 
compact than previous editions, as it focussed entirely on range training. The sections relating 
to fire theory and basic fire positions, which had been printed in ME 1904, were incorporated 
into a separate text which served as the appendix to several training manuals.376 Whilst the 
tables were based on those issued in 1904, they had undergone further revision to fulfil their 
stated intention, of ‘giving progressive instruction in accuracy and quickness of shooting at 
various targets’.377 Each table had six additional instructional practices, as well as a short 
series of familiarisation practices before the qualification/classification section proper was 
undertaken. The inclusion of the latter may have been in response to comments received from 
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Commanding Officers in 1904, to the affect that it was unfair for soldiers to go straight into 
the classification practices.378 Practices involving static targets were now classed as either 
‘Slow’, ‘Timed Slow’, or ‘Rapid’. The reasoning behind this was laid out at the beginning of 
the section on Field Practices. 
 
In Tables A and B, the soldier is trained to acquire a high standard of skill in 
shooting at known ranges in the open and from cover. 
He first fires deliberately at bullseye targets, practices designed to enable him as a 
recruit to carry out what he has been taught on the barrack square; or as a trained soldier to 
revive his previous skill. He thus learns the peculiarities of his rifle, and what allowance in 
adjusting the backsight to make for light and wind and all other conditions affecting 
shooting. 
Deliberate practice at a bullseye target, however, tends to inculcate a slow method of 
shooting. The soldier is accustomed, before pressing the trigger, to wait for a lull in the wind, 
or a favourable light, to rest when he is unsteady, &c. 
To overcome these tendencies he is also trained to fire first under a time limit, then 
rapidly at a figure; to shoot from cover; and finally in snap shooting.379 
 
In this context, ‘Timed Slow’ provided an intermediate stage between the two other 
types of practice. The incorporation of a time limit, whilst not immediately challenging, 
would have assisted in building the soldier’s reflexes and muscle memory in rapidly adjusting 
his aim and firing, preparing him for the later, faster practices. To further assist recruits, and 
in recognition of the level of fitness required to maintain ‘prolonged bursts of firing’ without 
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fatigue, gymnastic training had also been introduced, running concurrently with the musketry 
training of recruits.380 
Table “A” now commenced with three ‘Elementary Instructional Practices’, which 
were not dissimilar to previous preliminary sections, and focussed on acclimatising recruits to 
live firing as well as to the different firing positions. If felt desirable, these practices could be 
conducted in a Miniature Cartridge Range, which would serve to practice marksmanship 
principles without the recoil factor. These were also normally indoors, which may have been 
felt to benefit morale, rather than subjecting those firing for the first time to poor weather on 
an open range. As no more than fifteen rounds were to be fired on any one day, this formed 
their first full day of firing, preparing them for the ‘Qualification Practices’ proper. These had 
undergone some alterations, the largest of which was that recruits were now only assessed on 
Parts I and II. These were all ‘Slow’ practices, the first three of which had been moved to 100 
yards, allowing the same Third Class bull’s-eye target to be used for all six practices. These 
were the most basic practices, designed simply to test three positions at each distance. Part II 
was also generally similar to the previous year, but with only one basic prone practice at each 
of the four distances, allowing two more practices to be fired from behind various forms of 
cover. Far greater detail was included regarding the construction of these, which were either 
representations of a wall or entrenched defences. There was also a note as to whether the 
recruit should fire over or round the cover, or even through a loophole, as was apparently the 
case at 500 yards.  
Having attained the necessary score, recruits then proceeded to Parts III and IV, 
which were something of an intermediate step towards Table “B”. Part III had been expanded 
to ten practices, and retained the clear aiming mark of the bull’s eye target, but introduced 
time constraints similar to those applied to trained soldiers. The five ‘Timed Slow’ practices  
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Instructions for Conduct of Practice. 
Elementary Instructional Practices 
… Slow 3rd Class bullseye 100 5 … Standing 
… ” ” 100 5 … Kneeling 
… ” ” 200 5 … Lying 
  Total Rounds 15   
Parts I and II. – Qualification Practices. 
 Part I.      
1 Slow 3rd Class bullseye 100 5 13 Lying. 
2 ” ” 100 5 12 Sitting. 
3 ” ” 100 5 12 Kneeling. 
4 ” ” 200 5 12 Lying. 
5 ” ” 200 5 11 Sitting. 
6 ” ” 200 5 10 Kneeling. 
     70  
 Part II.      
7 Slow 2nd Class bullseye 300 5 13 Lying. 
8 ” ” 300 5 13 Lying behind cover, consisting of two 
sandbags or a heap of stones round 
which the recruit will fire. 
9 ” ” 300 5 12 Kneeling behind cover, consisting of a 
screen, or pit of such height or depth 
as to represent a wall, over which the 
recruit will fire. 
10 ” ” 400 5 12 Lying. 
11 ” ” 400 5 12 Lying behind cover, as in 8. 
12 ” ” 400 5 12 Kneeling behind cover, as in 9. 
13 ” 1st Class bullseye 500 5 14 Lying. 
14 ” ” 500 5 14 Lying behind cover, which should 
consist of a sand bag loophole, &c. 
15 ” ” 600 5 9 Lying. 
16 ” ” 600 5 9 Lying behind cover, as in 8. 
  Total Rounds 80 120  
Part III. 
17 Timed slow 3rd Class bullseye 100 5 Standing 
20 seconds allowed for 
each shot 
18 ” ” 200 5 Kneeling 
19 ” 2nd Class bullseye 300 5 Lying 
20 ” 1st Class bullseye 500 5 Lying 
21 ” ” 500 5 Lying behind cover 
22 Rapid 3rd Class bullseye 200 5 Lying. 40 seconds allowed 
23 ” ” 200 5 Kneeling. 40 second allowed 
24 ” 2nd Class bullseye 300 5 Lying behind cover, as in 8. 40 seconds allowed. 
25 ” ” 300 5 Kneeling behind cover, as in 9. 40 seconds allowed. 
26 ” 1st Class bullseye 500 5 Lying behind cover, as in 14. 45 seconds allowed. 
  Total Rounds 50  
Part IV. 
27 Slow 3rd Class figure 200 5 Lying in the open. 
28 ” ” 200 5 Lying behind cover, as in 14. 
29 ” ” 200 5 Kneeling behind cover, as in 9. 
30 ” ” 300 5 Lying in the open. 
31 ” ” 300 5 Lying behind cover, as in 14. 
32 ” ” 300 5 Kneeling behind cover, as in 9. 
33 Snap 
Shooting 
Vanishing 3rd Class 
figure 
100 5 
} Lying behind cover, which should consist of a  
} sandbag loophole, &c. Target exposed 6 seconds. 
34 ” ” 150 5 
35 ” 3rd Class figure 100 5 } Kneeling behind cover, as in 9, target exposed for 
} 6 seconds. 36 ” ” 150 5 















































Instructions for Conduct of Practice. 
Part I. – Preliminary Practices 
1 Slow 3rd Class bullseye 200 10 Lying in the open. 
2 ” ” 200 5 Kneeling behind cover, consisting of a screen or pit of 
such height or depth as to represent a wall, over which 
the soldier will fire. 
3 ” ” 300 10 Lying in the open. 
4 ” ” 300 5 Lying behind cover, consisting of two sandbags or a 
heap of stones. &c., round which the soldier will fire. 
5 ” 2nd Class bullseye 500 10 As in No. 4. 
  Total Rounds 40  
Part II. – Classification Practices 
6 Timed slow 3rd Class figure 200 5 Lying in the open. 20 seconds allowed for each shot 
7 ” ” 200 5 Kneeling in the open. 20 seconds allowed for each shot 
8 Rapid ” 200 5 Kneeling behind cover, as in 2. 30 seconds allowed 
9 Timed slow ” 300 5 Sitting or kneeling in the open. 20 seconds allowed for 
each shot 
10 ” ” 300 5 Kneeling behind cover as in 2. 20 seconds allowed for 
each shot. 
11 Rapid ” 300 5 Kneeling behind cover as in 2. 30 seconds allowed 
12 Timed slow 2nd Class figure 500 5 Lying in the open. 20 seconds allowed for each shot 
13 ” ” 500 5 Lying behind cover, as in 4. 20 seconds allowed for 
each shot 
14 Rapid ” 500 5 Lying behind cover, as in 4. 30 seconds allowed 
15 Timed slow ” 600 5 Lying in the open. 20 seconds allowed for each shot. 
16 ” ” 600 5 Lying behind cover, as in 4. 20 seconds allowed for 
each shot. 
17 Rapid ” 600 5 Lying behind cover, as in 4. 35 seconds allowed 
18 Snap Shooting Vanishing 3rd 
Class figure 
200 5 Lying behind cover, which should consist of a sandbag 
loophole, &c. Target exposed 4 seconds 
19 ” ” 200 5 Kneeling behind cover, as in 2. Target exposed 4 
seconds 
20 ” ” 200 5 Standing in the open. Target exposed for 4 seconds 
21 Moving Target Figure 5 150 5 Standing. Length of run, 30 feet. Pace, quick time. 
22 ” ” 200 5 Kneeling behind cover, as in 19. Two shots at each 
backward or forward run, except the first. Length of run, 
not less than 30 feet. Pace, quick time. 
23 Snap Shooting Vanishing Figure 
No. 3 
200 5 Standing in the open. The target will appear at different 
places in the trench or gallery, and be exposed for 4 
seconds. 
24 Snap Shooting, 
fixed bayonet 
” 200 5 Lying behind cover, as in 18. The target will be exposed 
for 4 seconds 
  Total Rounds 95  
Part III. – Marksmen’s Practices (for cavalry and infantry only). 
25 Slow 1st Class bullseye 700 5 Lying in the open 
26 ” ” 700 5 Lying behind cover, as in 4 
27 ” ” 900 5 Lying in the open 
28 ” ” 900 5 Lying behind cover, as in 4 
29 ” ” 1,000 10 Lying in the open 
30 ” ” 1,000 5 Lying behind cover, as in 4 
  Total Rounds 35  
Part IV.- Individual Field Practices 
Total rounds…50 





were fired from the three positions required in Table “B”, including standing, with the final 
practice fired from behind cover. These were followed by five ‘Rapid’ practices, three of 
which were fired from behind the same cover as described in Part II, but with between ten to 
fifteen seconds more allowed than in the comparable practices in Table “B”. The last section, 
Part IV, bridged the final gap between the two tables by introducing recruits to figure targets 
and snap shooting. The first six practices bear some similarities to the preliminary practices 
in Table “B”, using both the lying and kneeling positions from behind cover.  
The final four ‘Snap Shooting’ practices were fired at the same Third Class Figure 
target, which replaced concentric scoring rings with horizontal scoring bands, the lower of 
which was coloured brown to represent a figure appearing from a trench. Hits on the figure 
received the highest score, followed by hits on either side, then those below and finally those 
above. This was a continuation of the principle that troops should be taught to aim low, as the 
strikes might ricochet or spray up earth that would disturb the opponents aim. However, this 
layout was altered by a note below the table, which stated that, ‘For practices 33 to 36 the 
target will be prepared as described in para. 212’.381 The alteration involved the addition of a 
vertical rectangle, the width of the figure, which extended from its base to the lower edge of 
the frame. In marking terms, this reduced the scoring area to the width of a standing man, 
with only strikes to the figure or within this vertical rectangle being counted. In addition to 
this, there is a suggestion that the target was to be used in different ways. Although the 
instructions all seem to describe a target that was raised and lowered, two were distinguished 
as using a ‘Vanishing 3rd Class figure’. Whilst the differentiation had previously been made 
in practices where the firer knelt behind cover, appearing for four seconds and firing at a 
static target, this does not appear the case here, and no explanation of the difference is made 
in the related text. 
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Table “B” had undergone similar changes, with Part I now given over to five 
“Preliminary Practices”. These used bull’s eye targets to allow the soldier to check the 
sighting of his rifle, as per the instruction quoted above, with one practice at each distance 
allocated ten rounds rather than five. They also incorporated usage of cover, and firing from 
two positions, in preparation for Part II. The Classification practices themselves included two 
notable milestones. For the first time since 1890 they were entirely shot against figure targets 
and, perhaps more importantly, both snap and moving targets now formed part of the 
marksmanship assessment. This had been made possible by replacing the three practices at 
400 yards with two moving target practices and an additional snap shooting practice, the 
latter to be fired with the bayonet fitted. The introduction of ‘Timed Slow’ meant that every 
classification practice now included some form of time restriction, creating a table that was 
the same length as the previous year, but was the most varied yet issued. There had also been 
further minor alterations: practices 18 to 20 used the same modified target as practices 33 to 
36 of Table “A”; and the final two practices actually used a smaller outline target. This was 
affixed to a pole, rather than being mounted on a canvas square, which could then appear at 
different points along the face of the butts,382 introducing another element of unpredictability. 
The sitting position appeared as an option in one practice only, and there was only one rapid 
practice at each distance. These were allowed an additional five seconds per practice, despite 
the fact that the training appendix included the note that: 
 
“Rapid” fire, at the rate of about 15 rounds per minute, is the highest rate consistent 
with reasonable accuracy.383 
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This allowance may have been influenced by a perception that this was an area where 
training needed to be improved, as suggested in the Commandant’s Report for 1905, where 
he noted that the average soldier was perhaps only capable of ten rounds per minute, but that 
training would improve this.384  
The expansion of Part II removed the need for the majority of the ‘Miscellaneous 
Practices’, allowing the single long-range practice to be expanded to six, now reserved solely 
for those that classified as ‘marksmen’. These were conducted without a time limit, and used 
the First Class bull’s eye target, with one practice to check sights and a second fired from 
behind cover. As such, they lacked most of the more advanced elements which had been 
introduced over the previous three years, with the barest of practical elements. However, they 
allowed the very best shots the chance to practice at exceptional distances, perhaps with the 
intention that they could be used to harass forces prior to the main engagement. The table 
concluded with the individual and collective practices, each being given a separate section 
with its own ammunition allocation, which was a higher figure than had previously been 
allowed. As the preamble to the field practice section emphasised, these were intended both 
to teach elements which could not be demonstrated on a target range, and to practice officers 
in their duties as fire commanders.385 The instructions for field practices also emphasised the 
principles that were to be taught, through a series of progressive exercises rather than all 
being incorporated into a single exercise. To aid in this, suggested practices were described, 
although these were intended to be exemplars rather than to be followed rigidly.386 
MR 1905 marked the final iteration in an intensive four-year cycle of adoption and 
revision, which had arguably produced greater change than the previous decade. This had 
also been achieved in the face of similar complications: adapting to a new rifle; a new method 
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of loading; and changing tactical ideas. That the result was considered satisfactory can be 
seen in the fact that it was this table which was to remain in use until 1909.  
 
Summary - Monro Doctrine 
Together, these four sets of tables chart the development of ‘Monro Doctrine’, as described 
by The Times in 1911.387 This appears to be the first occasion where musketry training was 
considered the coherent product of a single individual, rather than the responsibility of the 
School at Hythe as a whole. Yet whilst The Times used this term to describe the framework 
within which training operated, the article actually named three officers who had had a hand 
in its creation: 
 
Some years ago, Major-General C.C. Monro, C.B., was Commandant at the Hythe 
School of Musketry, and Lieut-Colonel [sic] N.R. McMahon, D.S.O., of the Royal Fusiliers, 
his chief instructor. The ability and enthusiasm of these officers, supplemented by the energy 
of Brigadier-General G. Egerton, C.B., who followed Major-General Monro as 
Commandant, promise to leave profound traces upon the fire action of the Infantry.388 
 
To this list should also be added Richard Pennington, Monro’s predecessor, who was almost 
certainly responsible for writing the 1902 Amendments, if not the 1903 Regulations as 
well.389 Together these four men were responsible for the creation of all musketry training 
between 1900 and 1909, effectively dictating the overall direction of training up to World 
War One, and arguably into the 1920s. An idea of what they hoped to achieve can be 
glimpsed in a statement made by Monro in the Commandant’s Report for 1904: 
 
                                                 
387
 [‘Our Military Correspondent’], Company Training. The Times, 5 May 1911, p. 6. 
388 [‘Our Military Correspondent’], Company Training. The Times, 5 May 1911, p. 6.  
389
 Gen. Sir G. Barrow, The Life of General Sir Charles Carmichael Monro, Bt. G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., 
(London, Hutchinson & Co., 1931), p. 32. 
172 
 
...success in war hinges on the fire of masses of men intelligently directed, in the 
attainment of which individual accuracy is only an elementary stage.390 
 
Superficially, this was not entirely different from the direction training had begun to 
take in the late 1890s. However, the elementary approach towards individual accuracy which 
was taken in 1898 relied too heavily on marksmanship being a low-maintenance skill, and the 
flaws of this approach were made evident in South Africa. From 1902, training was 
approached differently, with a far longer and more progressive syllabus for individuals 
providing the foundations for further training. However, this training was very much a means 
to an end, as Monro noted in 1905: 
 
A high standard of skill in shooting on the part of the men is necessarily of the first 
importance, and too much attention cannot be devoted to its realisation; but it can only be 
accepted as a very necessary preliminary to the process of modern musketry training.391 
 
As had been the case since the 1880s, it was the field practices where troops would be made 
‘thoroughly efficient according to modern requirements’.392 At the heart of these practices 
was the principle that fire and movement were inseparable: fire facilitated the advance, and 
the advance facilitated a stronger firing position. Alongside that, there are two other words 
which begin to be used more frequently in the training literature; ‘intelligence’, and 
‘progressive’. Training was very clearly no longer about the mechanical response of men to 
commands, but giving soldiers the tools with which to operate in a more independent manner. 
That is not to say that there was no element of overall fire control, but that the individual was 
given a level of independence that allowed him to best decide how to achieve the nominal 
objective. 
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Given how closely the resulting training is tied to these men, it is worth looking at 
their backgrounds to better understand their perspective on training. Both Monro and 
Pennington had passed the Instructor’s Course at Hythe in 1881, receiving the ‘First Class 
Extra’ certificate. Pennington was seconded to the Staff of the Indian Army as a musketry 
officer between 1890 and 1897,393 and almost certainly experienced many of the innovations 
introduced by Hamilton and Roberts in the previous decade. When he succeeded John 
Hopton as Chief Instructor in October 1900, it is unclear whether he also took up the role of 
Acting Commandant, but he was formally raised to that post the following February, with 
Monro as his second-in-command. Whilst Pennington had long experience of musketry 
training, he lacked recent combat experience, having last fought in the Hazara Campaign 
(1888).394 Monro was the opposite; he does not appear to have served as a musketry 
instructor other than during his period as an adjutant, but he had fought in both the Tirah and 
South African campaigns. He even went so far as to state that he felt unqualified for the role 
of Chief Instructor,395 but he and Pennington appear to have been well-matched. With Lord 
Roberts becoming Commander-in-Chief in January 1901, these three men would hold their 
respective posts until Monro succeeded Pennington in March 1903, during which time the 
first two ‘provisional’ sets of regulations were issued and those for 1904 were almost 
certainly underway. Pennington later commented that Monro was heavily involved in the 
whole process, personally reviewing every page of the new musketry regulations. As such, 
Hamilton may have underestimated Monro’s role in the process, if not where the original idea 
had come from. 
In terms of the influence of Lord Roberts, he retired as Commander-in-Chief when the 
post was abolished in February 1904. Given the breadth of experience shared between 
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Pennington and Monro, he may not have needed to involve himself directly in details, simply 
dictating the general direction. His role in the development of the SMLE, and his statement to 
the Army about the need to improve musketry training, carried far more authority than the 
Commandant of Hythe alone could exert. It does appear to have made an impact, as 
subsequent reports do suggest that there was a growing interest in the correct application of 
training. After Roberts’ retirement, he remained a keen supporter of improving musketry 
training, and continued to speak on the necessity of training the civilian population in basic 
marksmanship, as well as serving as President of the Society of Miniature Rifle Clubs. He 
also privately petitioned the Prime Minister of the day, A.J. Balfour, to provide more rifle 
ranges and encouragement for men to practice, in the hope that this would generate a wider 
interest in marksmanship.396 
After Pennington’s departure in 1903, Monro was aided by W.D. Bird as Chief 
Instructor, eventually producing the 1905 Regulations. The evolution of their approach to 
training is perhaps best demonstrated in that a practice incorporating fire and movement was 
both reintroduced and removed over the course of these four years. This meant that the focus 
of the training by 1905 was on perfection of the usage of cover and the various types of fire, 
in preparation for the field practices where elements like movement over ground could be 
practised in a more realistic manner. The exercises described in 1911 demonstrate a 
remarkable flexibility in comparison to those from the 1890s, adapting formations and 
advances to the terrain. There was also a much greater stress on fire support between 
sections, with rapid fire used by neighbouring sections to suppress the enemy and cover their 
comrades’ advance. The Times article described this as; 
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...the application of common sense to the infantry attack and the complete recognition 
of new conditions imposed by the character of modern arms.397  
 
However, as it also admits, it had taken the practical demonstration of Monro, now in 
command of 13th Brigade, to gain the interest of fellow officers. Monro had also written a 
paper for the Army Review on the topic of ‘Fire and Movement’ in 1911, so as to explain 
‘…the normal procedure which should be adopted in action in order that rifle fire may be 
applied in the most effective manner to meet tactical requirements…’398 A footnote, signed 
by the General Staff, comments that much of what Monro set out was included in Infantry 
Training, 1911, and that although he varied from official doctrine at some points, the article 
was ‘…worthy of the attention of all arms of the service’.399 
Monro and his contemporaries, responding to the experiences of South Africa, had 
sought to develop training that better combined fire, movement, and cover, and in this they 
appear to have been largely successful. In 1905, W.D. Bird was succeeded by N.R. 
McMahon. His qualifications for the role are unclear as, like Monro, he had not served as a 
musketry instructor since the mid-1890s. However, again like Monro, he proved highly suited 
to the task. Events between 1905 and 1908, particularly the Russo-Japanese War, were 
heavily analysed by European armies, either to validate their training, or to anticipate how 
warfare might develop. McMahon outlined some of these aspects in a lecture, entitled Fire 
Fighting, delivered to the Aldershot Military Society in December, 1907.400 His personal 
assessment of the direction training and arms were taking led him to become a key exponent 
of both machine guns and rapid rifle fire. Monro had previously noted in his 1905 Report that 
whilst soldiers could probably not achieve greater than ten rounds per minute at that time, 
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‘with practice there should be no difficulty in training them up to the standard rate of 15 
rounds per minute’. 401 It was up to McMahon, together with Monro’s successor, Granville 
Egerton, to build on the training as set out in MR 1905. They did so by focussing on that 
‘standard rate’, creating the rapid fire training which has become the best-known aspect of 
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Chapter 4: 1909-1914 – Creating the Human Machine Gun402 
The Army’s approach to training between 1909 and 1914 had begun to receive criticism 
before the war had even ended. Some of the most vocal critics were those who had formed 
the first cadre of machine gun instructors, most of whom had been musketry instructors 
during that period, and part of what one historian described as a ‘…small group of fire-power 
theorists’.403 Yet in terms of musketry training, this period is arguably the most stable of any 
covered by this thesis, as the manual issued in 1909 remained, in an amended form, the basis 
for training until 1924. This gives a strong suggestion that, at least in terms of musketry 
training, there was a lot that the British Army felt it got right. 
Perhaps this confidence should not be surprising; after four years of annually 
amended tables, the following four years had been spent assessing the impact of that training. 
No new musketry manuals were published, but minor adjustments were made where they 
were felt to be necessary, including lessons learnt from the experiences of other armies. There 
were reciprocal exchanges between European armies, with British officers observing German 
and French exercises, and officers from those nations visiting the School of Musketry. 
Officers were also sent as observers to conflicts in which the British Army were not involved. 
During the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), Ian Hamilton and other British officers were 
present as observers on both sides, alongside those of other European armies.404  Their reports 
were thoroughly examined for lessons to back one of the competing tactical schools, 
particularly regarding the relative importance of the rifle against that of the bayonet in 
deciding the outcome of the battle, and the relative effectiveness and correct deployment of 
machine guns. The variation in opinion as to what lessons could be drawn from that war, as 
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well as the approaches of different nations to fire tactics, was demonstrated in Norman 
McMahon’s presentation to the Aldershot Military Society in December 1907 under the title 
Fire Fighting.405 This was not only a comprehensive assessment by the Chief Instructor at 
Hythe of the state of fire training and tactics across Europe at that point, but also speculated 
on likely future developments. Perhaps most tellingly, it demonstrates how varied the 
opinions were across Europe, and even within the British Army, as to whether the 
experiences of the Russo-Japanese War were more demonstrative of the trends in modern 
warfare than those gained in South Africa. McMahon was to play a role in developing some 
of these ideas alongside Monro’s successor, Granville Egerton, who between them produced 
Musketry Regulations, Part I, 1909. Both left the School around the time of its introduction, 
bringing to an end the continuity that had existed since 1900, created by the overlapping 
cycle of Commandant and Chief Instructor.406 However, their work was to become a 
cornerstone of future development. 
At the same time, questions were again raised over the serviceability of the SMLE, 
with the Small Arms Committee directed to investigate the matter of a possible replacement 
in 1910. The requirements laid down to guide the process featured elements drawn from the 
Mauser rifle that the Army had faced in South Africa: 
  
Front locking bolt action, a rimless cartridge, aperture sights, one-piece stock, and 
heavier barrel.407 
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Alongside this, certain elements from the SMLE were retained, most notably the relative 
position of the bolt-handle and trigger, together with the bolt only cocking on the final 
forward motion. This design was eventually developed into the Pattern 1913 rifle, chambered 
in a specially designed .276 cartridge, and the Annual Reports from Hythe record instructors 
being sent to Enfield to undergo courses on the new rifle.408 However, significant problems 
were uncovered during the trials, and the outbreak of war meant that the rifle was never 
completed as originally intended. Instead, it was redesigned to accept the .303 cartridge and 
entered service as the Pattern 1914 rifle. To avoid complicating the supply chain, most of 
these were issued to those troops not serving in combat areas, although some were issued as 
sniper rifles, and fitted with either a fine-adjustment rearsight or telescopic-sight. 
After 1909, two amended sets of regulations were published, in 1912 and 1914 
respectively. These were both essentially the same text, but updated through the incorporation 
of the relevant interim amendments. That the majority of changes made were relatively small 
in scale demonstrates how little change the authorities felt was necessary to fine-tune the 
training system. The final edition, MR 1909 (14), was published in January 1914, eight 
months before it received its first practical test, outside the town of Mons. There the B.E.F. 
fought its first battle of the First World War, facing a much larger German force, in an 
engagement which has become a defining moment in British military history. 
 
Musketry Regulations, Part I, 1909 
Whereas the manuals issued between 1902 and 1905 were clearly the development of an idea, 
and drawing from the pre-South African War manuals, that issued in 1909 marked another 
step forward. Whilst training was still designed to be progressive, the method of achieving 
this had evolved. The most immediately noticeable change was the layout; in 1905 the 
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‘Classification’ practices formed the largest part of the table, as had been the case previously. 
In 1909 the majority of practices were designated ‘Instructional’, with a much shorter series 
of Classification practices at the end of the table. The reasoning behind this was not, as it 
might first appear, to allow soldiers to re-familiarise themselves with their rifles prior to 
qualifying. Instead, it had to do with the system of incentives and awards.  
In 1906 the Annual Report from Hythe included comments to the effect that the 
scores of some units seemed suspicious, and that ‘the introduction of Proficiency Pay has 
added further complications…[which] cannot fail to influence instructors for obvious 
reasons’.409 The solution was to ‘divorce competition from instruction’,410 by not allowing the 
results of the instructional practices to be published, preventing ‘suspicious marking’ by 
ensuring that both instructor and students had no knowledge of how anyone had fared. The 
practical tests would then be conducted ‘with all precautions to ensure accurate results’.411 
Originally, commanding officers were to have a free hand in designing the instructional 
practices, using a set amount of ammunition, and this provisional Table B was to be ‘tried 
and reported on by the 11th Infantry Brigade at Colchester and the 13th Infantry Brigade at 
Dublin’, during 1908.412 The need for this was reinforced in the Report for that same year, 
where it was noted that: 
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Squadron and company officers admittedly find it often impossible or impolitic to 
insist on a too strict observance of the conditions attached to timed firing, owing to the spirit 
of sympathetic toleration forced upon them by the prospect of unearned proficiency pay.413 
 
This was to be solved by the introduction of independent supervision for the classification 
practices, by men drawn from other units, to prevent any interference or sympathy 
influencing the scores. Thus, it appears that this was the guiding motivation behind the 
changes made to the classification tables in MR 1909. 
Within the tables themselves, whilst the insistence on progressive training and 
emphasis on practical examples had remained, the balance of training had been shifted 
slightly. The term ‘Timed Slow’ had been discontinued, as the time limit of twenty seconds 
was now mandatory on every ‘Slow’ practice.414 There were now also ‘Grouping’ and 
‘Application’ practices. The former was just that; the soldier was to fire five rounds, without 
alteration of the sights or point of aim. These were described as his ‘group’, and their relative 
dispersion or proximity (normally measured as the diameter of a circle which encompasses 
all five shots) was then used to assess his basic shooting ability: ‘The value of such a group is 
determined by the relative closeness of the shot marks’.415 These practices were only fired at 
100 yards, to ensure that the effect of external factors was minimised,416 allowing any issues 
with either the rifle or the firer to be assessed and addressed. Once the recruit had achieved 
the desired standard, they could then undertake the ‘Application’ practices, where it was 
permitted to make adjustments so as to hit a definite mark.417 In both tables, practices of both 
types can be found side-by-side, as referenced in the regulations: 
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Grouping standards are in some cases attached to application practices in order to 
emphasize the importance of care and consistency in shooting.418 
 
The types and design of targetry had also been revised in several ways. There had 
previously been three sizes of bull’s-eye targets, the overall design and dimensions of which 
had remained relatively unchanged since the introduction of the magazine rifle twenty years 
before. Of these, the First Class had seen only limited usage in MR 1905, where it was used 
by recruits for practices at 500 and 600 yards, and by trained soldiers for distances of 700 
yards and greater. As the furthest distance used for any individual practice in 1909 was 600 
yards, the design had essentially become redundant, and so it was discontinued. The two 
remaining targets were then renumbered accordingly, but the only physical change made was 
to the aiming mark on the Second Class target; the black disc of the aiming mark was reduced 
in diameter from twelve inches to eight, making it a smaller visual target, although the 
scoring area itself remained the same.  
The figure targets had been renumbered in line with the bull’s-eye targets, and had 
undergone more drastic changes. Whilst the rectangular ‘zones’ used in 1905 had reflected a 
level of realism, with scores reflecting those which would have the greatest effect, there 
appear to have been issues from a marking perspective. This may have been due to a 
perceived issue of ‘fairness’, as some groups might be more harshly marked than others, 
despite being the same distance from the centre. In 1907 the marking scheme had been 
altered to a series of concentric rings, similar to those applied to the bull’s-eye target. 
Although less realistic, these were far fairer as a scoring system, better reflecting the 
grouping size of the firer. The aiming marks had been redrawn, altering the silhouette by the 
incorporation of a cap, which gave the head a more angular profile. This had also altered the  
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Figures 25– 32: Targetry, as described in MR II 1910 
 Figure 25: Elementary Aiming Target
  
Figure 26: Second and First Class Figure Targets  
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 Figure 27: No. 1 Figure Target
 Figure 28: No. 2 Figure Target  
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 Figure No. 29: No. 3 Figure Target
 Figure No. 30: No. 4 Figure Target  
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 Figure No. 31: No. 5 Figure Target
 Figure No. 32: No. 6 Figure Target  
187 
 
Table 27: Comparison of target designs and scoring areas, MR 1905 and 1909 
Target Year Overall size  Aiming Mark Inner Outer 
3
rd
 Class Bull 1905 4ft. x 4ft. 12in. disc 24in. ring Remainder 
2
nd
 Class Bull 1909 4ft. x 4ft. 
8in. disc/ 
12in. scoring ring 




 Class Bull 1905 6ft. x 6ft. 24in. disc 48in. ring Remainder 
1
st
















 Class Figure 1909 6ft. x 6ft. 21in. wide x 18in. high 40in. ring 56in. ring 
 
*: There were two rectangles, each of these dimensions, either side of the aiming mark. 
†: The rectangle below the figure was awarded two points, and that above one point.  
 
overall dimensions slightly, making the Second Class figure two inches taller, but that for the 
First Class was reduced from twenty-four inches square to eighteen inches high by twenty-
one inches wide. These figures were also the basis for the silhouette targets, which were 
mounted on poles for use in snap-shooting practices. 
However, it was not the change of marking areas that marked the greatest visual 
change, but that of colour. In 1905, the figure was made from black paper, and placed on a 
background which was divided in half horizontally, the top half being white and the lower 
half being brown. Although an improvement from previous designs, it still gave a relatively 
distinct aiming mark against an unnaturally-coloured background. In 1909, white and black 
were not used anywhere on the targets. Instead, general officers commanding were given 
three colour options: green, brown, or grey. They were to nominate two of these for use as the 
background colours, laid out as before, whilst the aiming figure itself was now to be brown, 
drastically reducing the contrast between aiming mark and background. It was intended that 
the colour combination chosen would reflect the natural colours of the area in which a unit 
was stationed, making them the most realistic targets to date. 
In terms of the training itself, Table “A” had been reduced from thirty-six to twenty-




Figure 33: Illustration of the relative visibility of bull’s-eye and service targets at 100 and 
800 yards, as depicted in Qr-Mr-Sergt-Instr. J. Bostock, Visual Training and Judging 
Distance, (London, Gale & Polden, 1908), Plates II and III.  
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instructional, incorporating elements from both the “Elementary Instructional Practices” and 
Parts III and IV in MR 1905. This eliminated what was perhaps the only flaw of the 1905 
table; that whilst it could be considered as comprehensive a training system as ever 
introduced, it had continued the approach whereby recruits qualified before undergoing 
further training. By moving these sections ahead of the Classification practices, the recruit’s 
figure of merit provided a far more accurate assessment of what had been learnt both in the 
classroom and on the range.  
Part I, the ‘Elementary’ section, was now composed of four practices and focussed on 
building accuracy at short distances. The recruit was first taught to aim and fire from a prone 
supported position, before repeating the same practices unsupported. Unlike previous 
training, this was the only position used for these early practices; as the most stable, it 
allowed instructors to focus on perfecting basic marksmanship practices before introducing 
further complexities. To aid this, all of the practices were fired at the Second Class 
Elementary bull’s-eye target, providing a clear aiming mark upon which to judge the 
accuracy of the recruits.  
Part II was now subtitled ‘Repetition’, with ten practices following a similar layout to 
those of the first classification practices from 1905. The first seven all tested accuracy, by 
requiring that the firer be able to group his shots within a given area of the target. This 
approach, rather than a required pass score, required a much more consistent level of 
accuracy to pass, and ensured that recruits were prepared for the remainder of the table. The 
first practice was a test of their progress so far, requiring them to repeat practice 3, but with 
the added requirement that all five shots fall within the central 12-inch ring. This was also the 
final instructional practice to use the bull’s-eye target, unlike MR 1905, where it had seen far 
greater usage. The next three practices used the Second Class Figure target, and formed a 
distinct sequence, which would be repeated twice. There was also a progression within each 
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sequence, where the firer was first allowed to use a support from the prone position at 200 
yards, then made to fire unsupported, before moving back to 300 yards. The expected group 
size expanded with each move away from the 12-inch ring in practice 5: five hits, four of 
which were to be within the 24-inch ring; then all within the 36-inch ring; and finally simply 
expecting five hits on the target. This allowed for both the lack of support, and the increased 
distance from the target. Having completed this sequence, the recruit returned to 200 yards 
and began the sequence again, this time using the First Class Figure target. Practices 9 and 10 
also used the kneeling position, with the standard of accuracy expected being reduced to ‘at 
least’ four hits within the 40-inch ring. There was some assistance provided at 300 yards, 
where they were allowed to use a rest for support. The last four practices only included one 
with an accuracy standard, which simply required four hits at 400 yards. The final practice 
was fired at 600 yards, the greatest distance used in any individual practice in the table, and 
was to be conducted with just the side of the rifle rested, providing only a moderate level of 
support. 
Having thoroughly tested the recruit’s accuracy, Part III introduced further elements, 
under the heading ‘Timed’. As this suggested, the largest change was the addition of a time 
constraint, using elements from Parts III and IV of the 1905 table. Twenty seconds were 
allowed per shot during the four ‘Slow’ practices, reducing to eight seconds in the two 
‘Rapid’ practices, and six seconds per exposure for the two ‘Snapshooting’ practices.419 
Usage of cover was also incorporated into two practices, one of which used a fire trench for 
the first time. Although this could be seen as prescient, they were not universal, and only 
deep enough to be fired from whilst kneeling. This suggests that they were actually designed 
to replicate firing over a wall, as depicted in the manual, than from a true defensive 
entrenchment. As before, only the kneeling and lying positions were used, with firing  
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Table 28: Musketry Regulations, Part I, 1909, Table “A” 



















Instructions for Conduct of Practice 
Part I. – Instructional Practices (Elementary) 
1 Grouping 2nd Class Elementary 
(Bull’s-eye) 
100 5 Lying, with arm or rifle rested 
2 Application 2nd Class Elementary 
(Bull’s-eye) 
200 5 Lying, with arm or rifle rested 
3 Grouping 2nd Class Elementary 
(Bull’s-eye) 
100 5 Lying 
4 Application 2nd Class Elementary 
(Bull’s-eye) 
200 5 Lying 
  Total rounds 20  
Part II. – Instructional Practices (Repetition) 
5 Grouping 2nd Class Elementary 
(Bull’s-eye) 
100 5 Lying. All shots in 12-inch ring 
6 Application 2nd Class Figure 200 5 Lying, with arm or rifle rested. Five hits, including 4 within 
Inner (24-inch) ring 
7 Application 2nd Class Figure 200 5 Lying. Five hits within Magpie (36-inch) ring 
8 ”            ” 300 5 Lying. Five hits 
9 ” 1st Class Figure 200 5 Kneeling. Four hits at least within Inner (40-inch) ring 
10 ”            ” 300 5 Kneeling, with arm or rifle rested. Four hits at least within 
Inner (40-inch) ring 
11 ”            ” 400 5 Lying. Four hits at least 
12 ”            ” 500 5 Lying, with arm or rifle rested 
13 ”            ” 500 5 Lying 
14 ”            ” 600 5 Lying, with side of rifle only rested 
  Total rounds 50  
Part III. – Instructional Practices (Timed) 
15 Slow 2nd Class Figure 200 5 Lying 
16 ”            ” 200 5 Kneeling 
17 Rapid            ” 200 5 Lying. 40 seconds allowed 
18 Slow 1st Class Figure 400 5 Lying 
19 Rapid            ” 400 5 Lying. 40 seconds allowed 
20 Slow            ” 500 5 Lying. Taking cover behind stones or sandbags representing 
a parapet and firing over them, with arm or rifle rested 
21 Snapshooting 2nd Class Figure 200 5 Lying. Exposure, 6 seconds for each shot 
22 ”            ” 200 5 Kneeling. Taking cover in a trench, or behind a screen 
representing a wall, and firing over the parapet, with arm or 
rifle rested. Exposure, 6 seconds for each shot 
  Total rounds 40  
Part IV. – Classification Practices 
23 Grouping 2nd Class Elementary 
(Bull’s-eye) 
100 5 Lying 
24 Application 1st Class Figure 300 5 Kneeling 
25 Rapid           ” 300 5 Lying. 40 seconds allowed 
26 Snapshooting 2nd Class Figure 200 5 Lying. Taking cover as in 20. Exposure, 5 seconds for each 
shot 
27 Application 1st Class Figure 500 5 Lying 
  Total rounds 25  
Part V. – Individual Field Practices 
Twenty rounds will be expended in elementary practices, 10 rounds in an attack practice from 700 to 200 yards, and 10 
rounds in a defence practice against full-length figures representing an advancing enemy 
  Total rounds 20  
Part VI. – Collective Field Practices 
Twenty-five rounds will be expended, if ammunition is available 





conducted between 200 and 500 yards, although noticeably not from 300 yards. By doing so, 
it meant that no practice was exactly duplicated in the five Classification practices in Part IV, 
where two of the practices were fired from 300 yards. 
Of those five practices, the two most basic assessments, practices 23 and 27, were 
essentially identical to two Instructional practices (3 and 13 respectively), and the remaining 
three were all variations of Instructional practices, with subtle differences: 
 
 Practice 24 was shot from the same position and distance as practice 10, but the rifle
 was not to be supported. 
 Practice 25 was similar to both practices 17 and 19, but fired from 300 yards. 
 Practice 26 was similar to practice 21, but was fired from behind cover as for practice
 20, and with only five seconds allowed per shot. 
 
This made the Classification practices slightly more challenging than if they had been simply 
repeating previous work, requiring recruits to adjust their sights based upon their own 
judgement, rather than being able to refer back directly to their shooting record. 
Having completed the range training, there were then two sections of field practices. 
Whilst certain aspects of these had appeared in previous tables, this was the first time that 
recruits had both time and ammunition specifically dedicated to training over unmeasured 
distances. This included two individual practices, with a similar function and purpose to the 
‘Skirmishing’ practices which had been included in various tables since 1884, and, if there 
was ammunition available, a collective field practice. This moved recruit training forward 
from 1905, increasing their grounding in the practical application of musketry prior to 
undertaking Table “B”. Overall, where the 1905 table primarily tested the Recruits theoretical 
training before preparing them for Table “B”, MR 1909 utilised the same basic system but 
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included an assessment of the effectiveness of their practical training as well. This allowed 
any issues to be addressed prior to their undertaking Table “B”.  
Table “B” had also undergone significant reorganisation, in keeping with those 
changes made to recruit training. Part I was no longer simply ‘Preliminary’, but had become 
‘Qualifying Practices’. This was formed of six basic ‘Grouping’ and ‘Application’ practices, 
shot over various distances between 100 and 500 yards, which both checked the basic 
marksmanship skills of the firer and that the rifle was correctly sighted. To assist in this, as 
with Table “A”, they were all relatively simple in design, with some form of rest allowed in 
four of them, and with only one fired kneeling. Those who failed to achieve the required 
standard would either be put back for remedial instruction, or classified as third class. Once 
the standard was achieved, trained soldiers omitted the ‘Repetition’ phase of Table “A”, and 
instead faced a slightly longer series of eleven ‘Timed’ practices. Unlike those for recruits, 
these were more closely related to the 1905 ‘Classification’ practices, incorporating ‘Slow’, 
‘Rapid’, ‘Snapshooting’, and ‘Crossing target’ practices, but only the three most basic (10, 
12, and 14) remained unchanged. The remainder had undergone alterations, seemingly to 
allow the necessary training to be compressed into seven fewer practices. To this end, the 
table commenced with two ‘Snapshooting’ practices at 200 yards. These allowed six seconds 
per exposure; the same amount of time per shot as when firing the first two ‘Rapid’ practices. 
They also combined other elements, including use of cover, firing from the sitting or kneeling 
position, and with the bayonet attached. During an attack, the bayonet would have been fixed 
prior to launching the final assault, which would be done from about 200 yards. That this, and 
the first ‘Rapid’ practice, both included the bayonet and were both fired from the same 
distance, demonstrates how these details of practical assault tactics were being incorporated 





Table 29: Musketry Regulations, Part I, 1909, Table “B” 


















Instructions for Conduct of Practice 
Part I. – Qualifying Practices 
1 Grouping 2nd Class Elementary 
(Bull’s-eye) 
100 5 Lying, with arm or rifle rested 
2 Application            ” 200 5 As in 1 
3 ” 2nd Class Figure 300 5 Kneeling, with arm or rifle rested 
4 Grouping 2nd Class Elementary 
(Bull’s-eye) 
100 5 Lying 
5 Application 1st Class Figure 400 5 Lying 
6 ”            ” 500 5 Lying, with side of rifle only rested 
  Total rounds 30  
Part II. – Instructional Practices (Timed) 
7 Snapshooting 2nd Class Figure 200 5 Lying. Taking cover behind stones or sandbags 
representing a parapet and firing over them, with arm or 
rifle rested. Exposure, 6 seconds for each shot 
8 ”            ” 200 5 Sitting or kneeling. Bayonet fixed. Exposure, 6 seconds 
for each shot 
9 Rapid            ” 200 5 Lying. Bayonets fixed. 30 seconds allowed 
10 Slow            ” 300 5 Lying 
11 Rapid 2nd Class Figure 300 10 Lying. Rifle unloaded and magazine empty until the target 
appears. Loading from the pouch or bandolier by 5 rounds 
afterwards. One minute allowed 
12 Slow 1st Class Figure 500 5 Lying 
13 Rapid            ” 500 5 Lying. Taking cover as in 7. 45 seconds allowed 
14 Slow            ” 600 5 Lying. Taking cover behind stones or sandbags and firing 
round them, with side of rifle only rested 
15 Snapshooting Figure No. 3 
(silhouette) 
200 5 Lying. Taking cover as in 14. Exposure, 4 seconds for 
each shot 
16 ”            ” 200 5 Kneeling. Taking cover in a trench or behind a screen 
representing a wall and firing over the parapet, with arm or 
rifle rested. Exposure, 5 seconds for each shot 
17 Crossing target Figure No. 5 
(silhouette) 
200 5 Lying. One shot at each run of 30 feet. Pace of target – 
quick time 
  Total rounds 60  
Part III. – Classification Practices 
18 Grouping 2nd Class Elementary 
(Bull’s-eye) 
100 5 Lying 
19 Snapshooting Figure No. 3 
(silhouette) 
200 5 Lying. Taking cover as in 7. Bayonet fixed. Exposure, 4 
seconds for each shot 
20 Slow 2nd Class Figure 400 5 Lying. Taking cover as in 14 
21 ”            ” 300 5 Kneeling. Taking cover as in 16 
22 Rapid            ” 300 15 Lying. Rifle to be loaded and 4 rounds in the magazine 
before the target appears. Loading from the pouch or 
bandolier by 5 rounds afterwards. One minute allowed 
23 Slow 1st Class Figure 500 5 Lying 
24 Rapid            ” 500 5 Lying. 30 seconds allowed 
25 Slow            ” 600 5 Lying. Taking cover as in 7 
  Total rounds 50  
Part IV. – Individual Field Practices 
  Total rounds 35  
Part V. – Fire Direction Practices 
Short series of shots will be fired at distances beyond 600 yards by officers and non-commissioned officers for practice in 
observation of fire, estimating atmospheric influences, and verifying sighting by trial shots. Screens, or any visible object s 
such as might serve as range marks on service, will be used as targets. About 300 rounds, drawn from the surplus, should 
suffice. Special fire direction exercises should be substituted for these practices if range accommodation does not extend 
beyond 600 yards 
Part VI. – Collective Field Practices 




Having moved back to 300 yards, the initial ‘Slow’ practice appears designed to allow 
firers to reset their sights, in preparation for the second, more complicated, ‘Rapid’ practice. 
This was unlike anything that had come before, firing ten rounds in a minute, but with the 
rifle not being loaded until the target appeared. Whilst the firer was still allowed six seconds 
per shot, this was not used purely for manipulating the action and aiming. Instead, the rifle 
was to be loaded using chargers, drawn from pouches on the soldier’s belt equipment, a 
procedure he would have to complete twice to fire the ten rounds. This appears to have been 
specifically designed as preparation for practice 22 of the Classification section, which had 
the same reloading constraints but started with the rifle loaded, as the time allowed was 
reduced from six seconds to four. The soldiers then moved to 500 yards, where they fired the 
penultimate Slow’ practice before a second ‘Rapid’ practice, this time firing five rounds in 
forty-five seconds from behind cover. Again, this was preparation for a specific Classification 
practice, practice 24, which was fired in the open and allowed only thirty seconds. After 
firing a final ‘Slow’ practice at 600 yards, firing round cover rather than over it, the soldiers 
returned to 200 yards for the final three practices. 
Although the two ‘Snapshooting’ practices were similar to those at the beginning of 
Part II, two changes had made them more challenging. Firstly, the target was a silhouette of a 
kneeling man, represented from the waist up in realistic colours and mounted on a pole, 
rather than as the aiming mark on a larger frame.420 As such, only hits on the figure would be 
scored. Secondly, the exposure time had been reduced; the first practice only allowed four 
seconds whilst firing round cover, and the second, fired from the same position used in 
practice 22 of Table “A”, allowed only five seconds. The final instructional practice was the 
only ‘Crossing target’ practice in the entire table, and originally used a ‘Figure No. 5’ target. 
This was otherwise called the ‘Covered Figure’, and had the same dimensions as the aiming 
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mark of the ‘Second Class Figure’ target. It appears to have been mounted on a pole, rather 
than a trolley, and walked along the edge of the marker’s gallery at the required pace, 
possibly in preparation for the field practices to follow. Yet it is entirely possible that the 
selection of this target was a printing error, as it presents a remarkably small mark to hit, 
particularly moving at ‘quick time’ pace. The more likely, and logical, choice was ‘Figure 
No. 6’, otherwise known as the ‘Crossing figure’, and indeed this had replaced Figure No. 5 
for this practice by 1912 (see below). 
Having completed the first two parts, soldiers then moved onto the Classification 
Practices of Part III. As with Table “A”, this section was far shorter than it had ever been, due 
to the separation of the instructional and assessment aspects of the training. With the 
exception of practices 18 and 23, which were identical to practices 4 and 12 respectively, the 
six remaining practices mixed aspects of previous training with new elements to better test 
the soldier’s abilities: 
 
 Practice 19 combined elements of practices 7, 8, and 15. 
 Practice 20 was similar to practice 14, but fired from 400 yards. 
 Practice 21 was fired kneeling behind cover, as for practice 16, but from 300
  yards. 
 Practice 22 was based on practice 11, as described above. 
 Practice 24 was fired from the same position and distance as practice 13, but
  without cover and under a reduced time allowance.  
 Practice 25 was similar to practice 14, but the soldier fired over cover, rather
  than round it. 
 
Having completed the individual classification phase, there were three further 
sections. As in 1905, two of these were Individual and Collective Field Practices, but in 
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between them was a section dedicated to ‘Fire Direction Practices’, allowing ‘fire leaders’ to 
gain practical experience of their role, in preparation for the Collective practices.421 Where 
possible, ‘parties of officers and non-commissioned officers’ would fire together against 
semi-realistic targets and observe their results. This was to be done over unmeasured ground, 
although this did not necessarily have to be an area normally reserved for firing. If this was 
not possible, they could be replaced with theoretical practices instead. By the end of the 
practices: 
 
...all fire unit commanders should be familiar with the effects of winds and 
temperature in shooting at 500, 1,000, 1,500, and 2,000 yards. The range tables should be 
studied, and lectures given on the influence of ground, ranging errors, and other details of 
fire direction.422 
 
This is the first time that such exercises had explicitly formed part of the programme, and 
appears to answer a criticism made in the Hythe Annual Reports, that whilst the firers were 
being trained, there were rarely opportunities for the commanders to practise their role 
outside the Collective practices themselves. For the first time, both firer and commander were 
to be tested together, an approach which would hopefully improve the effectiveness of the 
fire unit as a whole. 
The new arrangement of both tables formed a logical extension of the progressive 
approach to training which had been introduced in 1902. Where it differed from MR 1905 
was in the move to separate instruction from assessment, focussing on building the necessary 
principles, which also had the benefit of removing the repetitive nature of those earlier tables. 
In doing so, they broke with an approach that had persisted since the 1880s, as had been 
suggested in the Annual Report for 1906. The success of this approach can be judged by it 
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having remained the basic layout, with minor alterations, for all musketry training up to 
World War Two.  
 
Amendments to Musketry Regulations, Part I, 1909 
MR 1909 itself remained the basis for all training until 1924, although it underwent various 
amendments over the intervening fifteen years as new technology and tactics were 
introduced. Those issued prior to the outbreak of war were collated in two amended editions, 
published in 1912 and 1914 respectively. The changes to the text added eighty-four pages to 
the 1912 edition, which can be grouped broadly into one of the following six categories: 
 
 Changes due to the introduction of the Mark VII bullet, with a higher velocity
  and flatter trajectory423 
 Alterations to how orders/drills were to be conducted 
 Expansion of eligibility/requirement to participate in training 
 Adjustment of marksmanship standards for both Regular support units, and of
  those for Territorial and Special Reserve units 
 Revised scoring or procedures for training practices, both individual and field
  firing 
 Enhanced training and assessment for machine gunners 
 
Of these, the largest individual category was that for training machine gunners, which 
had grown from being five pages in 1909 to twenty-two pages in 1912. This included a much 
expanded training table, as machine gun usage was beginning to receive a far greater focus 
around this time. The majority which related directly to rifle training were relatively minor,  
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Figure 34: “A Recruit shall receive daily instruction in musketry until he…can handle his 
rifle with skill and confidence under all conditions and in all positions.” The above untitled 
cartoon, printed in Punch on the 8th of November 1911, gave its interpretation of these 
instructions for rifle training, published in Infantry Training that year. 
 
changing the word of command, or passing autonomy in areas such as reloading from the fire 
commander to the individual soldier. There had also been a slight adjustment of the 
classification scores, with a reduction of five points from every grade, although this may have 
been connected to changes in the scoring of Practice 22 (see below). The greatest change was 
in the expansion of who was required to demonstrate a level of accuracy, and the level of 
accuracy required, to include units who were not previously mentioned specifically, most 
notably medical and veterinary personnel.  
In terms of the tables themselves, relatively little was altered between the three 
editions. In the version of Table “A” issued in 1912, there were two main changes. Firstly, 
Part IV was now classed as an instructional section for Regular recruits, although it was still  
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Table 30: Musketry Regulations, Part I, 1909 (With Amendments, 1912), Table “A” 



















Instructions for Conduct of Practice 
Part I. – Instructional Practices (Elementary) 
1 Grouping 2nd Class Elementary 
(Bull’s-eye) 
100 5 Lying, with arm or rifle rested 
2 Application 2nd Class Elementary 
(Bull’s-eye) 
200 5 Lying, with arm or rifle rested 
3 Grouping 2nd Class Elementary 
(Bull’s-eye) 
100 5 Lying 
4 Application 2nd Class Elementary 
(Bull’s-eye) 
200 5 Lying 
  Total rounds 20  
Part II. – Instructional Practices (Repetition) 
5 Grouping 2nd Class Elementary 
(Bull’s-eye) 
100 5 Lying. All shots in 12-inch ring 
6 Application 2nd Class Figure 200 5 Lying, with arm or rifle rested. Five hits, including 4 within 
Inner (24-inch) ring 
7 ”            ” 200 5 Lying. Five hits within Magpie (36-inch) ring 
8 ”            ” 300 5 Lying. Five hits 
9 ” 1st Class Figure 200 5 Kneeling. Four hits at least within Inner (40-inch) ring 
10 ”            ” 300 5 Kneeling with arm or rifle rested. Four hits at least within 
Inner (40-inch) ring 
11 ”            ” 400 5 Lying. Four hits at least 
12 ”            ” 500 5 Lying, with arm or rifle rested 
13 ”            ” 500 5 Lying 
14 ”            ” 600 5 Lying, with side of rifle only rested 
  Total rounds 50  
Part III. – Instructional Practices (Timed) 
15 Slow 2nd Class Figure 200 5 Lying 
16 ”            ” 200 5 Kneeling 
17 Rapid            ” 200 5 Lying. 40 seconds allowed 
18 Slow 1st Class Figure 400 5 Lying 
19 Rapid            ” 400 5 Lying. 40 seconds allowed 
20 Slow            ” 500 5 Lying. Taking cover behind stones or sandbags representing 
a parapet and firing over them 
21 Snapshooting 2nd Class Figure 200 5 Lying. Exposure, 6 seconds for each shot 
22 ”            ” 200 5 Kneeling. Taking cover in a trench, or behind a screen 
representing a wall, and firing over the parapet. Exposure, 6 
seconds for each shot 
  Total rounds 40  
Part IV. – Instructional Practices (Classification for Special Reserve) 
23 Grouping 2nd Class Elementary 
(Bull’s-eye) 
100 5 Lying 
24 Application 1st Class Figure 300 5 Kneeling 
25 Rapid            ” 300 5 Lying. 40 seconds allowed 
26 Snapshooting 2nd Class Figure 200 5 Lying. Taking cover as in 20. Exposure, 5 seconds for each 
shot 
27 Application 1st Class Figure 500 5 Lying 
  Total rounds 25  
Part V. – Individual Field Practices 
Twenty rounds will be expended in elementary practices, 10 rounds in an attack practice from 700 to 200 yards, and 10 
rounds in a defence practice against full-length figures representing an advancing enemy 
  Total rounds 20  
Part VI. – Collective Field Practices 
Twenty-five rounds will be expended, if ammunition is available 






Table 31: Musketry Regulations, Part I, 1909 (With Amendments, 1912), Table “B” 



















Instructions for Conduct of Practice 
Part I. – Qualifying Practices 
1 Grouping 2nd Class Elementary 
(Bull’s-eye) 
100 5 Lying, with arm or rifle rested 
2 Application            ” 200 5 As in 1 
3 ” 2nd Class Figure 300 5 Kneeling, with arm or rifle rested 
4 Grouping 2nd Class Elementary 
(Bull’s-eye) 
100 5 Lying 
5 Application 1st Class Figure 400 5 Lying 
6 ”            ” 500 5 Lying, with side of rifle only rested 
  Total rounds 30  
Part II. – Instructional Practice (Timed) 
7 Snapshooting 2nd Class Figure 200 5 Lying. Taking cover behind stones or sandbags representing 
a parapet and firing over them. Exposure, 6 seconds for each 
shot 
8 ”            ” 200 5 Sitting or kneeling. Bayonet fixed. Exposure, 6 seconds for 
each shot 
9 Rapid            ” 200 5 Lying. Bayonets fixed. 30 seconds allowed 
10 Slow            ” 300 5 Lying 
11 Rapid            ” 300 10 Lying. Rifle unloaded and magazine empty until the target 
appears. Loading from the pouch or bandolier by 5 rounds 
afterwards. One minute allowed 
12 Slow 1st Class Figure 500 5 Lying 
13 Rapid            ” 500 5 Lying. Taking cover as in 7. 45 seconds allowed 
14 Slow            ” 600 5 Lying. Taking cover behind stones or sandbags and firing 
round them, with side of rifle only rested 
15 Snapshooting Figure No. 3 
(silhouette) 
200 5 Lying. Taking cover as in 14. Exposure, 4 seconds for each 
shot 
16 ”            ” 200 5 Kneeling. Taking cover in a trench or behind a screen 
representing a wall and firing over the parapet. Exposure, 5 
seconds for each shot 
17 Crossing shot Figure No. 6 
(silhouette) 
200 5 Lying. One shot at each run of 30 feet. Pace of target – 
quick time 
  Total rounds 60  
Part III. – Classification Practices 
18 Grouping 2nd Class Elementary 
(Bull’s-eye) 
100 5 Lying 
19 Snapshooting Figure No. 3 
(silhouette) 
200 5 Lying. Taking cover as in 7. Bayonet fixed. Exposure, 4 
seconds for each shot 
20 Slow 2nd Class Figure 400 5 Lying. Taking cover as in 14 
21 ”            ” 300 5 Kneeling. Taking cover as in 16 
22 Rapid            ” 300 15 Lying. Rifle to be loaded and 4 rounds in the magazine 
before the target appears. Loading from the pouch or 
bandolier by 5 rounds afterwards. One minute allowed 
23 Slow 1st Class Figure 500 5 Lying 
24 Rapid            ” 500 5 Lying. 30 seconds allowed 
25 Slow            ” 600 5 Lying. Taking cover as in 7 
  Total rounds 50  
Part IV. – Individual Field Practices 
  Total rounds 35  
Part V. – Fire Direction Practices 
Short series of shots will be fired at distances beyond 600 yards by officers and non-commissioned officers for practice in 
observation of fire, estimating atmospheric influences, and verifying sighting by trial shots. Screens, or any visible object s 
such as might serve as range marks on service, will be used as targets. About 300 rounds, drawn from the surplus, should 
suffice. Special fire direction exercises should be substituted for these practices if range accommodation does not extend 
beyond 600 yards. 
Part VI. – Collective Field Practices 




used as the classification section for Special Reservists. There is no direct reference to this 
change in the regulations, but it appears to have been intended to ensure that recruit training 
did not have an undue focus upon unrealistic levels of accuracy. It may also have drawn from 
the desire to get as many recruits through both tables in a single year, and the removal of the 
need to classify twice could have assisted this process, as it removed the need to obtain 
external supervision for these practices. Secondly, the wording of several practices had been 
changed, with the phrase ‘with arm or rifle rested’ removed from practices 20, 22, and 26. 
This was also the case for practices 7, 13, and 16 of Table “B”, and appears designed to 
ensure that soldiers were relying upon the strength of their firing positions, rather than being 
supported by cover. There was one further change for trained soldiers, with the ‘Figure No. 5’ 
target used in practice 17 (‘Crossing Shot’) practice replaced by the ‘Crossing figure’ target, 
as discussed above. In all other practices, the conditions remained unchanged, and there were 
no further amendments made to the tables themselves up to 1914.  
At the same time, the photographic plates depicting loading and firing positions, 
which had been in use since 1904, had been replaced. Individually, the most noticeable 
difference is aesthetic, with the new photographs depicting the uniform and equipment which 
would be used throughout the First World War. This is perhaps to be expected, as the firing 
positions were designed to confer as much stability as possible, and so had remained 
relatively unchanged when the individual images are compared. When viewed as a body, 
there were changes to how the images were framed and used. Whilst there had been only 
eight photographs in 1909, this was increased to fifteen in 1912, all of which now had ‘points 
to note’ beneath. Of the original eight positions, half were re-photographed without change, 
but the other half incorporated slight alterations, as laid out in the table below. Of the seven 
new images, four depicted the same position from a different angle, reinforcing particular 




 How to load whilst kneeling behind cover,  
 The waiting position whilst sitting, 
 Firing across a valley from the seated position.  
 
These positions were not described in any great detail in the text, instead being 
addressed in two paragraphs, which then directed readers to the relevant plates.424 As the 
main details of loading and aiming had already been covered for both the standing and prone 
positions, and elements of both were transferrable, it was logical that these were not repeated. 
Where there were differences, such as the position of the firer’s arms or the orientation of the 
rifle, these could be shown more clearly using the photographs, with the notes below used to  
 







Standing (loading) XIX XIX Firer looks at target rather than magazine 
Standing (firing) XX XX Firer’s weight now on his front foot 
Lying behind cover 
(face on) 
XXII XXVI 




Alternative angle used to better show position of left 
forearm resting on thigh 
 
draw attention to those elements. When the regulations were reissued in 1914, the only 
change to the photographs was to consolidate them, rather than having them dispersed 
through the text as had been the case previously. This not only made them much easier to 
reference, it removed the possibility of missing the individual pages of text that were 
originally interleafed between the images. 
Between 1912 and 1914, the amendments only accounted for a total addition of eight 
extra pages, with the most major changes focussed on four areas: 
 
 Night Firing 
 Usage of range finders 
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 Classification badges 
 Machine gun training 
Of these, that for machine guns is not directly related to musketry training, as it was part of 
the separation and expansion of training for that arm. The training for night firing was 
changed from using mechanical rests, setting rifles to cover areas of ground at night, to 
instinctive alignment of the rifle in the shoulder. This may also have been of benefit in snap 
shooting practices, by giving further practice in instinctive alignment of the rifle. The training 
concerning range finders, and the numbers qualified to use them, had been slightly altered 
and tabulated to allow for the introduction of a new model and to make reference easier. The 
change most directly related to musketry training was the revision of classification badges. 
Whilst the text included in 1914 was significantly longer than that produced in 1912, this is 
primarily attributable to a reinforcement of the conditions under which awards were to be 
made; most specifically, that such prizes were only to be awarded for the highest score 
achieved whilst completing Table “B”. Although this had been the case since 1909, the 
stipulation had originally been placed at the top of each section, rather than against each 
individual prize. This appears to have led some commanding officers to make awards for 
scores that were shot in competition, rather than classification, which went against the 
intention of the changes that had taken place over the previous twelve years. 
These changes refined the overall training, increasing the musketry standard expected 
of second-line troops and expanding to incorporate new technology. In terms of the musketry 
itself though, they remained relatively stable. The greater focus appears to have been on 
machine gun training, an area which had been relatively neglected in the period immediately 
after the South African War. It was this void which the rapid practice in Table “B” – Practice 
22 – was reputedly designed to compensate for, and which has formed a large part of the 
historiography relating to pre-war training. 
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Rapid Fire: The growth of the ‘Mad Minute’ 
The development of rapid fire training in the period between 1902 and 1914 forms a distinct 
case study, as it has been the source of much commentary in First World War historiography 
on various aspects of pre-war preparations. In particular, this has drawn on the connection 
between the British approach to machine guns and rifle training in the years prior to the First 
World War.425 Perhaps the earliest comment on this relationship was printed as a footnote in 
the second volume of the official history of the First World War, printed in 1924: 
 
The rapid fire of the British infantry was introduced as a substitute for additional 
machine guns that were refused to it. In 1909 the School of Musketry urged that each 
battalion should have six guns instead of two; the suggestion was declined for financial 
reasons, and subsequent reductions of the Army Estimates and Vote made any such addition 
impossible. It was therefore decided to increase the rate of fire of each rifle by the special 
training of the men.426 
 
The basic facts are reflective of the state of affairs at the outbreak of war; the British 
Army still had only two machine guns per battalion, although this figure was comparable 
with that of other nations.427 Together with the prominence given to the effectiveness of 
British rapid aimed rifle fire in accounts of the first phase of the war, it has served to 
reinforce the belief that musketry was used to fill a deficiency caused by political and fiscal 
considerations. However, that would imply that rapid fire was introduced post-1909, whereas 
it was clearly developed before that date. 
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Rapid fire, in the modern sense, evolved out of the twelve years before World War 
One. In his 1907 Fire Fighting lecture, Norman McMahon put forward the following 
suggestion whilst responding to debates over the best distance between firers to ensure their 
relative safety from enemy fire whilst retaining a command structure: 
 
...there can be no better course than to provide superior training in rapid and 
accurate fire, which, with good fire discipline, may enable a firing line at slightly greater 
intervals, and therefore with less vulnerability, to produce a more effective volume of fire 
than a dense line of the enemy.428 
 
This connection between rapid fire and the spacing of the firing line had been demonstrated 
during an experiment at Hythe, where 100 marksmen and 150 average shots fired at different 
dispersions of enemy. The average shots overwhelmed the marksmen, suggesting that it was 
volume that mattered more than accuracy, although this conclusion was a matter of some 
debate.429 McMahon also noted that rapid fire provided a method of fire suppression, which 
was why the practices focussed on firing long bursts at ‘decisive’ distances (600 yards or 
less), when it would be used at critical moments in an assault. At longer ranges, particularly if 
the firing line had the wider intervals which were recommended for advancing, there would 
not be the density of firers required to achieve the greatest shock value from this tactic. The 
eventual outcome of this discussion was Practice 22, laid out in MR 1909’s Table “B”, and 
more commonly referred to by another name; the ‘Mad Minute’.430 This focussed on firing a 
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maximum of fifteen rounds in a minute, a figure that was far higher than that of any other 
European army.431 
The drill practices required to attain this level of efficiency were not without historical 
precedent. In the Eighteenth Century, Frederick the Great had used a similar approach as a 
method of force multiplication, responding to the technical limitations of the arms available 
at the time. The muzzle-loading musket was relatively inaccurate, and was most effective 
when fired in volleys by massed formations at close range. The side that could fire more 
volleys in a given time could, potentially, control the battle by gaining superiority of fire. 
This led to three factors being seen as interlinked: Rapidity of loading/firing; volume of fire; 
and superiority of fire. The introduction of rifled muskets in the 1850s, followed by the first 
breech-loading rifles in the 1860s, increased the accuracy and range of the individual soldier, 
but they remained single-shot designs, and therefore the rapidity of fire was still dictated by 
the dexterity of the firer in reloading his rifle. 
The development of the magazine rifle during the 1880s carried with it the potential to 
significantly increase the volume of fire achievable by the average soldier, by providing a 
‘reserve of fire’ which allowed them to vary their rate of fire in a more predictable and 
controllable manner.432 However, this development was met with caution, particularly over 
the logistical challenges that might be presented. Even the progressively-minded Ian 
Hamilton expressed reservations as to the desirability of introducing the new rifle, although 
his concerns stemmed from what he perceived as flaws in the approach to individual training. 
Most notably, these were the British Army’s desire to retain ‘unreasoning obedience’ to 
                                                 
431
 For a fuller discussion of the development of the ‘Mad Minute’ from a technical standpoint,  together with the 
identity of the record holder, see Nicholas A. Harlow, ‘The ‘Mad Minute’: Rapid Rifle Fire, and its place in the 
Edwardian Army’, in A Long, Long Trail A-Winding; Centenary Perspectives on the Great War, Special 
Publication No. 18, 2018, pp. 9-32. 
432
 This feature had previously been noted as an attribute of machine guns by ‘The Special Committee on 
Mitrailleurs’, a War Office committee which investigated early machine guns at the beginning of the 1870s. See 
T.H.E. Travers, ‘The Offensive and the Problem of Innovation in British Military Thought, 1870-1915’, Journal 
of Contemporary History, 13, 3, (July 1978), p. 532. 
208 
 
words of command.433 He suggested that a new approach was needed: ‘reasoning 
obedience’,434 increasing the latitude allowed to individual soldiers in the field,435 something 
which at least one member of staff at Sandhurst was still arguing against in 1891.436  
The ‘Magazine Rifle’, when it finally entered service in 1889, incorporated a design 
feature which handicapped use of the magazine. The eight-round magazine, although larger 
in capacity than many of its contemporaries, could only be loaded with individual rounds 
whilst attached to the rifle. This meant that, once the magazine was emptied, it was time 
consuming to refill, and this was exacerbated by the magazine’s capacity being increased to 
ten rounds from the introduction of the Lee-Metford Mark II rifle. In battle, this could reduce 
a soldier’s rate of fire to no faster than that of the Martini-Henry it replaced.437 However, as 
the magazine was seen solely as a method of providing a reserve of fire, this was not 
considered a particular problem until reports from both the Tirah Campaign (1898) and the 
South African War (1899-1902) were analysed.438 Both campaigns had seen British forces 
facing opponents armed with modern European rifles, and had highlighted several issues with 
the Long Lee-Enfield, including the need for greater rapidity in reloading. Whilst rapid 
loading and magazine practices had both been incorporated into individual practices 
throughout the 1890s, these were primarily intended as preparation for the sectional practices. 
It was these which trained soldiers in the manner of how they would operate as a unit in 
battle, firing in volleys as their predecessors had done. Whilst this appears anachronistic in 
retrospect, the theory was not entirely flawed, as the intention was to create a firing line 
capable of producing a great enough weight of fire to achieve fire superiority. The underlying 
question, as to the specific number and concentration of men required in a firing line to 
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achieve superiority of fire, remained a point of debate up to the First World War, as noted 
above.439 The chief failings of volley fire were that it relied upon a form of fire control which 
was too rigid for the modern battlefield, as Ian Hamilton had noted, resulting in the men 
being grouped relatively closely together. This presenting a massed target for their 
opponent’s forces, and made them particularly susceptible to artillery fire. However, his 
suggestions were ignored by the Army, and sectional practices took precedence over those for 
individuals in the Musketry Regulations of 1898, although the South African War quickly 
demonstrated the flaws in this approach. The volley sights, allowing a section to fire at 
targets out to 3,500 yards, remained on the Lee-Enfield rifles until the introduction of the 
SMLE Mark III* rifle in 1916, when they were omitted as a wartime economy,440  but they 
had also been superseded in such a role by the Vickers machine gun.  
Table 33: Rates of rapid fire in Table “B”, 1891-1909 
 








1891 7 60 8.5 
1892 7 60 8.5 
1894 7 60 8.5 
1896 7 60 8.5 
1898 7 60 8.5 
1902 7 45 6.5 
1903 7 35 5 
1904 5 25 / 30 5 / 6 
1905 5 30 / 35 6 / 7 
1909 10 / 15 60 6 / 4 
 
Following a comprehensive examination of the Army’s performance, which sought 
the opinions and suggestions of all of the main commanders who had been involved, major 
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changes were made to both equipment and training. Arguably the most important of these in 
terms of rapid fire was the development of the shortened Lee-Enfield rifle. Although early 
models had been trialled at Hythe in 1898,441 it also responded to the suggestions of those 
who had fought in South Africa. This particularly related to its overall length, which placed it 
between the infantry’s ‘Long’ rifle, and the cavalry’s carbine. Amongst the rifle’s other 
features was a fitting to facilitate loading using chargers; disposable metal clips, each holding 
five rounds, which could be used to refill the magazine in a single motion. The first version 
of this fitting was a two-piece design, which was relatively weak, and was replaced in 1907 
with a unified ‘charger bridge’ which would remain in use on all successive iterations of the 
Lee-Enfield. The introduction of chargers not only drastically increased the speed of 
reloading, but totally changed the function of the magazine. It was no longer an ammunition 
reserve, but instead became the only manner by which the rifle was to be loaded. This tied in 
with several unintended consequences of the rifle’s design, where the changes dovetailed 
with innate features, such as the relative placement of the bolt-handle and trigger, creating a 
rifle which was ideally suited to rapid manipulation, allowing the Army to look at ways to 
increase the rate of individual fire. However, issuing the new rifles took several years, which 
meant that the rate of fire in the classification practices was relatively consistent between 
1902 and 1905, and there were no practices that required the firer to reload. This allowed the 
tables to be used for soldiers still equipped with the older Long Lee-Enfield rifles without the 
charger-loading feature. 
The longevity of MR 1905 appears to have had a positive benefit for training, as it 
allowed soldiers to become familiar with both the new type of practices and the new rifle. 
This was reflected in the steady rise of the average scores achieved over that period. Yet 
whilst the training itself was more comprehensive than any previous attempt, there was a flaw 
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in how they were carried out. The tables retained the pre-existing concept of combining 
instruction with competition, with the classification tests overseen by the officers of the unit 
that was firing. This created a conflict of interest, as was noted in the Annual Report for 
1906, because a soldier’s pay was linked to his performance.442 The Commandant also noted 
that, whilst it required ‘several months’ daily practice to achieve the highest rates of fire, 
some units were only practising with their rifles during the classification period.443 This was 
due to the demands placed upon units to complete all of the required training as quickly as 
possible, to provide men to fill the drafts for units in India, and exacerbated by restrictions on 
range space, but the report was quick to point out that ‘snapping’ practice in barracks would 
help reinforce the mechanical skills necessary to achieve the highest rate of fire. It is perhaps 
due to these complaints that the Commandant’s opinion was that soldiers were not capable of 
achieving the regulation figure of fifteen rounds a minute,444 which he contrasted with the 
‘abnormal’ figures of 30 and greater achieved by the instructors at Hythe.  
By 1908 these concerns appear to have been addressed with some success, as that 
year the Commandant reported that the British Army had ‘a considerable advantage over 
foreign soldiers in regard to skill in snapshooting and rapid firing’, although with the caveat 
that the Army generally remained too obsessed with an unrealistic level of accuracy.445 
However, the issue of officers failing to enforce time limits remained, with the Commandant 
more explicit in linking the pressure applied to the invigilating officers with the possibility of 
denying a soldier the extra pay of a higher classification.446 This could have had a particular 
impact on rapid practices, where time limits were most important. He also raised another 
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concern, that ‘a very large number’ of both serving and retired officers still believed ‘that 
rapid firing is inevitably associated with an increased expenditure of ammunition’,447 a 
viewpoint he attributed to the failure of officers to study developments in fire tactics. The 
drive to address these concerns, particularly those relating to the classification practices, 
guided the development of the new regulations which were introduced in 1909. 
Amongst the perceived benefits in the approach of these new tables was that the 
introduction of independent supervision of the Classification practices, which were now 
significantly reduced in number, would ensure that time restrictions in practices were 
observed.448 The Commandant also expected to see a corresponding drop in the numbers of 
those classifying as Marksmen, as men who had focussed their skills on success in ‘Bisley’ 
competitive shooting would lose their advantage under the more practical conditions. The 
poor results noted in the Annual Report for 1909 suggested that the Commandant’s 
assessment had been correct, and he also felt that it demonstrated the previous neglect of 
preliminary training, as so many had failed to qualify out of Part I of Table ‘B’.449 The 
following year saw a remarkable rise in scores, which was seen as the Army rectifying this 
neglect, and particularly attributed to ‘vastly increased practice throughout the year in rapid 
loading...’450  
This expansion of musketry training, from being restricted to two weeks on the ranges 
to being practised throughout the year, was necessary to develop the skills required to perfect 
rapid fire, and a point which Hythe had been struggling to enforce for decades. The same 
Report also noted that there was a general feeling that too much of the classification score 
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depended on Practice 22, as it had the most rounds of any of the practices. The Commandant 
agreed with this assessment, and had devised a potential solution should the same comments 
be made in the 1911 returns.451 Whilst there was no direct reference to this in the following 
report, the scoring was amended in such a way as to lower the practice’s maximum possible 
score. The system of independent marking was also not without controversy, and formed a 
point of discussion at the 1911 General Staff Conference.452 Some officers were of the 
opinion that it failed to prevent the greatest abuse, that of ‘impersonation’, although the 
current Commandant at Hythe, Colonel Congreve, stated that he had never seen any evidence 
of such a practice.453 The conclusion of the conference was that the system was effective, 
producing an accurate assessment of the state of musketry efficiency for the Army Council, 
and that it was to be retained.454 
By 1912, there was a growing drive to make sure that as many recruits as possible 
were completing both tables in a single year, to ensure that the greatest number of men were 
available for active service.455 Recruits of 6 months standing were to have completed Table 
“A”, and those who had passed through both tables could be considered able to undertake 
field practices, ‘now that musketry training is systematic and progressive...’456 In the final full 
year of training, 1913, there had been an improvement in the numbers relating to both of 
these points. It was also decided that the wind-gauge on the rear-sight was no longer to be 
used, to ensure that training was more practical.457 In its place, the solution was to ‘aim off’; 
adjusting the point of aim to one side, to account for the effect of wind on the bullet, as had 
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previously been the case. So the Army of 1914, whilst not considered perfect by those 
entrusted with training it, were certainly felt to be far better trained than they had been in 
1909, and in a more practical manner. In terms of rapid rifle fire, they were far more 
intensively trained than their European contemporaries, but can this be explained as purely 
intended to cover a lack of machine-guns? 
To understand the context of these discussions, it is necessary to examine 
contemporary machine gun training and development, which was beginning to receive 
renewed attention around 1909/10.458 Although the Maxim Gun had been in service since 
1890, not every unit had received them by 1897,459 with Hythe pointing out that same year 
that the guns could not be properly used without the crews being properly trained.460 This 
may well have been a contributory factor in their lacklustre performance during the South 
African War, where they suffered from the extremes of temperature and poor handling, as 
well as being mounted on unsuitable artillery-style carriages.461 They were undervalued to the 
point where the committee tasked with examining their usage alongside quick-firing guns 
originally ignored machine-guns entirely, and had to be recalled.462 
Whilst the committee did eventually make some recommendations, discussion as to 
how best to use machine-guns continued. A demonstration of the relative state of training was 
witnessed by R.V.K. Applin, a contemporary of Norman McMahon. In a test undertaken at 
the South African School of Musketry in Bloemfontein in 1904, a single Maxim gun, manned 
by two sergeant-instructors, fired against forty-two First Class student riflemen over an 
unknown distance for a minute.463 All were allowed unlimited ammunition, firing at the 
‘Rapid’ rate, at targets representing infantry spaced two paces apart. The machine-gun 
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achieved greater success yet fired only half the number of rounds used by the riflemen, 
demonstrating its superiority under the conditions of the trial. However, as he himself 
admitted, such comparisons were subject to a number of variables.464 On this occasion, the 
measured distance was 1,000 yards, a range at which Hythe defined rifle fire as only 
‘Effective’,465 and during a period where the chief instructor at Hythe at that time, Wilkinson 
Bird, was noted as not being ‘an enthusiast’ when it came to machine-guns.466 This 
demonstration was undertaken before the Regulations of 1905 and 1909 had been 
implemented. As such, whilst it does demonstrate the relative effectiveness of the machine-
gun at that time, it predates the largest efforts to improve the standards of both musketry and 
machine-gun fire. 
In 1905 the ‘war establishment’ of the stores to be taken on campaign was raised to 
two guns per infantry battalion,467 a figure which appears to have been felt the most 
convenient number for use at short ranges,468 although there were still major issues in terms 
of training. Despite the inherent variations between individual weapons in both sighting and 
operation, the two guns were issued to stations rather than individual units, with one being 
designated ‘mobilisation stores’, and not allowed to be used for training purposes until 
1910.469 This meant that a unit could potentially go to war having no practical experience of 
either one or both guns, something which the Commandant criticised in his Report for 
1909.470  
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1905 was also the first year that machine gun training was taught as a separate course 
at Hythe,471 allowing for a far greater focus upon what had become a distinct discipline. This 
training faced several challenges, referred to repeatedly in the Hythe reports throughout this 
period. The largest of these were a lack of ammunition to train with, and high turnover 
amongst the crews, due to the need to supply men to units in India. Both of these had been 
addressed by 1913, together with a push to raise the level of training of the machine-gun 
detachments. These improvements were assisted by the additional training, which had 
provided the bulk of the amendments when the Musketry Regulations were reissued in 1912. 
Whilst this was apparently the period in which Hythe asked for an increase in the number of 
machine-guns issued, no comments to this effect can be found in the Hythe Annual Reports 
of this period, the closest being that the guns then in hand were ‘obsolete’ in 1909.472 Indeed, 
after authorisation was given to use both machine-guns for training in 1910, the main focus 
appears to have been in ensuring that the crews were properly trained to handle them. By 
1913, the Commandant was looking to ensure that machine gun crews were only comprised 
of First Class gunners.473 Overall, the Reports certainly suggest that the situation at the 
outbreak of war was a vast improvement even over that which had prevailed in 1909, and that 
both riflemen and machine-gunners were as well trained as it had been possible to achieve, 
although this was not yet perfection either. 
A related issue which has often been overlooked is the matter of how the number of 
guns on issue might have been augmented. In 1908, in response to a suggestion by the 
Financial Secretary at the War Office that they would support an increase in machine-guns, 
the Master General of the Ordnance replied that two guns were felt to be sufficient.474 This 
was still the case two years later, when he stated that ‘no new machine gun is to be 
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considered at present’.475 The reasoning behind this decision was that, about this time, trials 
were being undertaken for both a new rifle,476  chambered in a new calibre, and an automatic 
rifle. In that light, the desire to retain compatibility of calibre between the infantry’s weapons 
appears to have stayed the decision until the new cartridge had been developed.477 It was not 
until 1911 that the Master General finally relented, and the Vickers ‘Light’ Gun was sent for 
testing, so as to supply ‘immediate requirements with this gun’.478 This phrasing again seems 
to suggest that it was initially intended as a stopgap rather than a permanent solution when it 
was introduced in 1912. Apart from various refinements over the original design, the Vickers 
gun weighed only 40lbs against the Maxim Gun’s 60lbs,479 but the complexity of the design 
meant that, of the initial order of 1,792 guns to be delivered by July 1915, only 1,022 had 
been delivered by that date.480 Given the difficulty of increasing the production capacity of 
the Vickers factory when war broke out, it is hard to conceive how a higher rate of production 
could have been achieved in peacetime. It is also worth noting that, contrary to the 
conventional argument, the German Army issued only two machine-guns per battalion as 
well. Where they differed was in terms of organisation, with the guns formed into a separate 
company, allowing the regimental commander to group them in greater numbers if he 
desired, rather than distributed through his battalions on the British model. The funding to 
provide the Germans Army with six guns per regiment was not approved until 1912, in the 
wake of the Moroccan Crisis.481 
There is then the question of whether another gun could have supplemented either the 
Maxim or the Vickers. McMahon was a champion of the automatic rifle, echoing a comment 
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that appeared in the Annual Report for 1907, which suggested that one might be adopted in 
the ‘next few years’.482 The Small Arms Committee had been examining various designs 
since the 1890s, although it was given a renewed sense of purpose in 1900, when examining 
whether there was a need to replace the Lee-Enfield. By 1906 five designs had been trialled, 
one of which, the ‘Hallé’, was reported widely that year after Jesse Wallingford gave a 
remarkable performance during the trials in terms of both speed and accuracy.483 This was 
also the year that the Committee set out the basic criteria by which future designs would be 
judged. However, of the twenty-seven designs tried before 1914, none were found to be 
entirely satisfactory, although one design remained under trial throughout the war.484  
Reading contemporary publications, it appears that the term ‘automatic rifle’ was used 
in a broader sense during this period, as what might now be considered a light machine-gun 
could, when fired from the shoulder without a rest, be considered more akin to a rifle. Guns 
of this type had appeared at about the same time, and one in particular, the ‘Rexer’ (otherwise 
known as the ‘Madsen’), had been tested at Hythe in 1904, and was felt by at least one 
witness to have been very successful.485 However, it does not appear to have been viewed 
favourably by the authorities, and a legal dispute over licensing eventually led to the Rexer 
Company being wound up. As such, although McMahon had pressed for the British Army to 
‘lead the way’ in perfecting and adopting such a design at the 1910 Staff Conference,486 
particularly given the tactical benefits he envisaged for them, the Army needed to stimulate 
as well as perfect the designs. The level of specialisation which McMahon himself envisaged 
can be seen in the list of accoutrements he expected to be fitted to these guns: ‘silencers, and 
                                                 
482
 H.M.S.O., Report…for the year 1907, p. 56. 
483
 D.S. Beebe, ‘Three Hundred Shots a Minute’. The Technical World Magazine, Vol. VI, 1906, pp. 12-14. 
484
 See T. Edwards, Early British Automatic Rifle Trials. (2009). http://www.slideshare.net/tcattermole/early-
british-automatic-rifle-trials-a-lecture-to-the-hbsa-of-gb [Viewed 13 Sep 2016]. 
485
 Sleeman, ‘Prince of Riflemen’, p. 506. 
486
 McMahon, ‘The Principle that the Object of Fire’, p. 26. 
219 
 
perhaps hyposcopes and detachable shields’.487 Although none of these were ever used by the 
British Army in combat, it does suggest how wide the possibilities were felt to be at that time. 
He also appears to have been ahead of his time, as the design which was eventually to meet 
this demand, the Lewis Gun, did not come onto the market until 1912, and entered service 
with the infantry in 1915. 
In light of these issues, a call for more machine-guns, whether it was an increase in 
Maxim guns or the introduction of light machine-guns,488 was essentially moot. The capacity 
to build more of the former did not exist until the creation of a new factory in 1915, and no 
viable automatic rifle or light machine-gun had been found by the outbreak of war that was 
felt up to the task. The Lewis gun was far from perfect, but represented the best of what was 
readily to hand, and would become integral to British offensive tactics during the latter half 
of the war, along with the grenade. It has been argued that marksmanship suffered from this 
process, as there was no longer the same requirement for accuracy, nor the time or space to 
permit of the training to perfect such skills. Yet, in spite of these drastic changes, Practice 22 
remained part of musketry training throughout the war, although it was changed to be fired 
from a trench in 1917.489 In fact, similar practices were to remain as part of a soldier’s 
training with the bolt-action rifle into the 1950s.490 
Practice 22, as introduced in 1909, was a highly unusual practice. For the first time, 
firers were required to demonstrate a level of skill and dexterity that had previously only been 
required in principle. However, that it was clearly a development of previous tests makes it 
highly unlikely that it was developed as a response to a single refusal to provide additional 
machine guns. Given the poor performance of machine-guns in South Africa, and the focus 
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on snap-shooting which is evident in the training issued between 1902 and 1905, it is just as 
possible that such training had been developed to provide infantry with the ability to apply 
that reserve of fire when needed, without relying on machine-guns. That the practice survived 
the introduction of the Lewis Gun in 1915, and continued in a similar form into the 1950s, 
seems to confirm this approach. Whatever the reasoning, the ‘Mad Minute’ was unparalleled 
in contemporary European training, and is a product of the unique conditions and experiences 
of the British Army at the start of the Twentieth Century. 
 
Summary:  
Whilst the period between 1909 and 1914 was one of relative stability in musketry training, 
as demonstrated by the longevity of the regulations as a body, it was very much a product of 
the previous decade. MR 1909 would not have been possible without the experiences of the 
South African War, and the results of the experiments conducted between 1902 and 1908. Its 
long service life also suggests that the broad principles grouped under ‘Monro Doctrine’, 
most notably the progressive arrangement of training, had proved much more effective for 
training purposes than the more rigid drill approach that it replaced. MR 1909 built upon the 
practical experience of applying MR 1905 over four years, refining the training to ensure that 
it had the greatest impact, was reflective of battlefield scenarios, and was properly assessed. 
It was this last concern that led to the most fundamental shift in the approach to 
training tables since the introduction of the magazine rifle, separating instruction from 
assessment in what could be described as a ‘modern’ examination system, and setting the 
pattern that continues to be used today. This approach, coupled with a pay incentive, also 
ensured that troops were engaging with the training, rather than seeing it as something to be 
suffered, with that interest driving their desire to participate in additional competitions, which 
in turn raised their overall efficiency. In turn, the military hierarchy were finally able to 
accurately assess the battlefield efficiency (as opposed to mechanical accuracy) of the troops 
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under their command, arguably for the first time since such training had been implemented in 
the 1850s.  
This assessment is reinforced by the way MR 1909 evolved through subsequent 
reissues, with minor adjustments to the conditions or scoring of practices to ensure the 
requirements were reasonable. As noted above, the largest source of amendments in both 
1912 and 1914 reissues was not related to musketry, but an expansion of machine-gun 
training, which came into focus from about 1910. That the army hierarchy in general was 
committed to maintaining and improving the high standard of musketry can also be seen at 
the Staff Conference in 1911, when the question of proficiency pay was raised, and every 
officer who spoke supported the retention of a musketry standard as part of such a system.491 
The ‘Mad Minute’ provides a study of not only the development of musketry training 
between 1905 and 1909, but the complicated system of design and procurement which 
influenced the development of training as well. It had its foundations in the experiments 
conducted under Monro, using a rate of fire that had been discussed as early as 1904, and 
which was incorporated into the regulations the following year. Given the universality 
required of training, it is possible that the delay in including this as a practice was tied to both 
a need to ensure enough charger-loading rifles had been issued, and giving time for troops to 
become familiar with the charger system. Its successful application also relied upon repeated 
practice of loading drills; mechanical repetition of the loading actions to allow the basic 
elements to become automatic. Whilst the application of the training in the field was to be 
conducted intelligently – ‘reasoning obedience’,492 as Ian Hamilton had described it – at its 
heart were forms of drills which were not dissimilar to those applied to every previous form 
of firearm. It was in their operation that they differed, relying on the autonomy of the 
individual, rather than the orders of a fire commander. This form of training, as Hamilton had 
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also suggested, relied upon the basic nature of the Army; volunteers, with a relatively long 
period of service. The success of this training can be seen in the opening stages of the war, 
when the British forces operated with relatively little artillery support, and therefore relied 
almost entirely upon small arms fire as the basis of their combat efficiency. Whilst it may 
well have been desirable to supplement this firepower with a greater number of machine 
guns, it would appear that this was in many ways a moot point, as neither the desire nor the 
technology appears to have been present at the necessary points to make such an outcome 
possible. Given the experience of machine-guns in South Africa, it appears highly likely that 
rapid aimed fire training would have been included in the musketry regulations anyway. The 
fire effect it created was much more mobile, and much harder to silence, than the heavy 
Maxim gun, and was particularly useful in an offensive capacity, where it was felt the 
machine-gun would be at a disadvantage. 
The British Expeditionary Force that went to France in August 1914 was, at least in 
the assessment of the Commandant at Hythe, as well trained as any that had gone before it. It 
was not perfect, and had war come later many things might have been different about that 
force, both in terms of armaments and training. But this does not mean that they were felt to 
be underequipped or poorly trained by the majority of officers. On the contrary, the 
comments from Hythe suggest that they were improving on an already good standard, and 
one which they felt was equal if not superior to any European army. If described in modern 
terms of ‘force multipliers’, the training allowed a relatively small force to operate 
successfully in the face of numerically superior opposition, and gave the country time to 
begin the long and arduous process of equipping for the entrenched warfare that followed. 
Although this approach has been criticised, the training had succeeded in creating a 
successful expeditionary force, but those behind it understood that it was not designed to 
operate in the field for extended periods of time. Once the new realities of warfare took hold, 
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and tactics adapted from open to entrenched warfare, the training was changed to allow for 
the greater usage of new attack plans and weapons, including machine-guns and grenades. 
Whilst these formed the basic construction of an infantry section as used today, at the heart of 
every soldiers training remained MR 1909; abbreviated, due to the demands of time and the 
requirements of a smaller battlefield than had previously been imagined, but retaining most of 
the basic elements. As such, whilst many have argued that lessons from the South African 
War had been forgotten, the work done in musketry provided a solid experimental foundation 





As outlined in the introduction, the British Army’s approach to musketry training underwent 
significant changes during the period between 1884 and 1914. The forces driving this process 
were the result of a complicated interaction between various influences, which can be broadly 
grouped under three headings: technological; tactical; and political. No one factor was 
consistently more influential, and their inter-relationship is best described as triangular, each 
interlinked with the other two and feeding into the centre point of musketry training, but with 
the importance of each factor rising and waning at various times. This fluidity also resulted in 
further complications, as it was entirely possible for two factors to pull against each other, 
and the School of Musketry then determined the best balance between the two. 
Technological changes were the impetus for the most basic changes in training, as this 
covered the evolution in both rifle and ammunition designs. In 1884 the Army were using the 
Martini-Henry; a single-shot rifle which was not particularly advanced in terms of cartridge 
design or mechanical operation from the Snider-Enfield it had replaced, and only two short 
steps from the rifle-musket which had first entered service in 1851. In practical terms, there 
were many similarities between the training issued for the Martini-Henry and that for the 
Long Land Pattern musket of the Napoleonic War, most notably in the relatively rigid 
methods of instruction that were employed. This is perhaps best exemplified by the use of 
rote training to teach marksmanship, instilling the skill by mechanical repetition and 
automatic responses to a fire commander’s orders. In battle, commanders still relied on 
massed volleys to gain superiority of fire over the opposing forces, and the smoke from the 
black powder-filled ammunition covering the battlefield meant that the concept of 
concealment was practically unheard of. 
The introduction of the magazine rifle in 1889 marked the culmination of ten years of 
experimentation, and the start of a series of changes which would lead to the development of 
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the ‘modern’ battlefield’. In the face of the conservatism of the Army, a rifle and ammunition 
entered service that was not simply evolutionary, but revolutionary. Combined together, the 
magazine rifle and its new ammunition gave the individual soldier both greater range and a 
reserve of fire that was not limited by his dexterity of feeding individual rounds into his rifle. 
An individual soldier was now dangerous at distances over 1,000 yards, and out to over 2,000 
yards as part of his section. The move to smokeless propellant, with the introduction of 
Cordite, was the final step away from the rifles of old, and the new rifling designed to suit it 
was the final major change of the nineteenth century.  
The changes that took place between 1900 and 1907 were more a matter of 
refinement, creating the ‘Short’ rifle which was to become a feature of the twentieth century 
battlefield. The adoption of a charger-loading system at the same time created a rifle design 
which went on to earn a reputation as a remarkably robust and successful battlefield rifle, 
contradicting those who had wanted something more akin to the Mauser rifle the Boers had 
used in South Africa. The Army had started development of such a design, in the form of the 
Pattern 1913 rifle, but its introduction had been delayed by issues with its ammunition and it 
was not ready when war was declared. This can be viewed as serendipitous – had those issues 
not occurred, the British Army could have been in the midst of re-equipping just as war broke 
out, which might have had disastrous consequences from both a training and a logistical 
standpoint. As it was, the soldiers of the B.E.F. were well-versed with the foibles of their 
rifles, and able to use them to full effect. 
Whilst technology provided the tools for a soldier to use on the battlefield, it was 
tactics that dictated how both soldiers and arms were coordinated. As the decision of how 
both were to be best utilised was often a matter of opinion, tactics were much more subject to 
changes in the prevailing school of thought. This can be most clearly seen between 1884 and 
1899, when the targets used for individual training were altered from bull’s eye to silhouette 
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and back again, as the Army learnt from the lessons of the First Boer War, then reversed 
them when the new rifle was adopted. It also restricted what technology was adopted, 
particularly in the decisions made regarding how the magazine rifle was to be loaded and 
used. Whilst these decisions were not illogical when explained to a contemporary audience 
(most notably that detachable magazines would lead to wasted ammunition when half-used 
magazines were discarded),493 the final rifle had to be serviceable anywhere in the world, and 
so certain choices were made that appear short-sighted in retrospect. The benefit of lighter 
ammunition was not lost on those in charge of selecting the design, as this allowed for ‘115 
rounds [to be carried] for the same weight as [the soldier] now carries 70’.494 This meant that 
soldiers could fight for longer before needing to be resupplied, and fewer wagons would be 
required to transport the same quantity of ammunition. Yet concerns as to whether soldiers 
would be able to control their fire, rather than expending their ammunition wastefully and 
stretching the supply chain, led to the retention of strict fire control procedures and the fitting 
of the magazine cut-off as preventative measures.  
This also explains why the targetry used for individual practices in the 1890s 
apparently took a retrograde path; the focus was upon making sure soldiers were individually 
as accurate as possible over known distances, as this was felt to ensure the best results when 
they fired as a section. As the section was felt to be the smallest effective unit on the 
battlefield, the targets for those practices were more realistic, whereas bull’s-eye targets could 
be used to better assess and correct individual marksmanship skills. In combat, it was 
intended that the fire commander would designate the target and range, which is why 
sectional practices in MR 1898 received a greater emphasis than ever before. But the two 
campaigns of that period, in the Tirah and South Africa, demonstrated the failings of such a 
system. At a tactical level, retaining fire control under a single fire commander was no longer 
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possible, as the increased lethality of both modern small arms and artillery meant that it was 
necessary to increase the spacing between soldiers to limit the damage a single shell could 
inflict, and combined with the increased noise of combat the modern battlefield was too loud 
to permit the necessary words of command to be transmitted successfully and rapidly. At a 
training level, the School of Musketry had always stressed that Sectional and Field practices 
were often poorly executed, either lacking in realism or not being practised at all. This meant 
that the British Army at the turn of the century was not necessarily particularly well-practised 
in their main method of fighting. It was problems like these that faced Field-Marshal Lord 
Roberts when he took overall command, both in South Africa and then as Commander-in-
Chief of the Army as a whole. 
Roberts’ General Order of 1902,495 concerning musketry training in the Army, makes 
it clear that he viewed marksmanship training as having equal importance to battlefield 
manoeuvres, which relied upon gaining superiority of fire at the decisive moment. He also 
noted that the Army as a whole appeared to think of musketry as a distraction, rather than 
central to its effectiveness. His drive to change that approach meant that he formally ordered 
General Officers Commanding to investigate and comment on training. If Ian Hamilton’s 
comments were correct, he also sought to ensure that the training was far more practical 
through his choice of commanders at Hythe. Although it is not clear whether this was actually 
the case, the work of Richard Pennington and Charles Monro, later assisted by Norman 
McMahon, laid most of the foundations of the Army’s training, as well as demonstrating how 
effective small arms could be when applied correctly. Their work was not conducted in 
isolation, and required a shift in the role of the individual soldier on the battlefield to be fully 
effective. Although a section was still the smallest effective unit, soldiers were now allowed a 
certain amount of latitude in their actions, operating within a wider plan. The focus of 
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musketry training expanded to encompass all of the skills that a soldier would need to operate 
successfully as part of his unit. Roberts’ emphasis upon short-range accuracy, particularly in 
snap shooting, as well as progressive training, were clearly reflected in the new manuals, and 
would remain at the heart of all training up to World War One. The debates surrounding the 
best method of achieving superiority of fire also demonstrate that tactical opinions remained 
divided, with certain elements pushing to retain greater unit control, a slightly conservative 
approach which was gaining ground in the years immediately before the war, although this is 
less apparent in individual musketry training for obvious reasons.  
These debates also demonstrate the political elements of musketry training, which can 
be considered under two different descriptions: personal and interpretational. Politics within 
the Army were often subject to patronage and by personalities; the ability of an individual to 
affect change, or resist it. In the case of Ian Hamilton, the patronage of Lord Roberts not only 
assisted the publication of his early work on improvements to musketry training, but allowed 
him to experiment with the training of the Native Army in India. He was so successful that 
elements of the British press used it as a goad when they felt that Hythe were failing to 
improve the training standards of the British Army. The instructors at Hythe were certainly 
not incapable, with many of the finest marksmen of the British Army amongst their number, 
and a keen technical understanding of the capabilities and application of their arms. The 
delays were often caused by the different scope of training; Hythe was required to create 
training that could be applied anywhere the British Army was stationed, rather than just in 
India. It was also forced to operate within the tactical plans of the British Army, and lacked 
the support of any senior officers to affect anything more than gradual change. This is another 
reason why Lord Roberts was so important; as Commander-in-Chief, he was the most senior 
officer, and used his position to the benefit of musketry training. It is worth noting that he did 
not support Hythe in the same way that he had done Hamilton, but the circumstances were 
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very different. Whilst Hamilton was experimenting with new ideas, Hythe had to formulate 
solutions to the failings seen during the South African War. Roberts’ approach was to set the 
direction for the Army as a whole, which Hythe then followed. As noted above, he also 
benefitted from finding officers, most notably Charles Monro, who were particularly suited to 
creating a training system upon a more modern progressive approach, which could then be 
refined into the system which remained at the heart of training throughout World War One. 
As with any attempt to define themes throughout this period, there are those which 
cross between multiple approaches. This is true for many of the debates surrounding how to 
win battles in the era of the ‘empty battlefield’. The late Victorian era had seen the formation 
of two distinct groups of military patronage: The ‘India Ring’ under Field-Marshal Roberts; 
and the ‘Ashanti’ or ‘Wolseley Ring’ under Field-Marshal Wolseley in Britain (the Ashanti 
being ‘their’ most famous campaign in Africa).496 The acolytes of both seem to have been 
unable to form their own circles of patronage, or at least not to the same extent, and so the 
rings dispersed as the followers became too senior to simply follow. Instead, the challenges 
raised to military orthodoxy set up new divisions, based upon how best to meet them. The 
most notable was the Cavalry school, who sought to preserve the traditional elite role of that 
arm on the battlefield, and who provided both of the commanders of the B.E.F., John French 
and Douglas Haig. Whilst they succeeded in preventing cavalry becoming mounted infantry, 
in the style of those deployed in the South African War, they were not able to avoid the 
advances in musketry training. The ‘Short’ rifle, in replacing both carbine and long rifle, 
meant that for the first time both Cavalry and Infantry were armed with the same weapon, 
and subject to the same proficiency standards. In terms of classification scores, the Cavalry 
proved to be the equals of the Infantry in the years between 1910 and 1913, which was 
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perhaps just as well: the first shot fired by a British soldier on the Western Front was by a 
corporal of the 4th (Royal Irish) Dragoon Guards.497  
At the same time, discussions of how best to use this new firepower also became a 
political struggle. One example of this is the debate caused by McMahon’s contention that 
the rifle was now equal in importance to the bayonet as a motivating force in the attack.498 
Although this was in line with lessons learnt during both the South African and Russo-
Japanese wars, senior officers worried that soldiers would depend upon their firepower to 
overwhelm the opposition, remaining at a distance rather than advancing to take the position 
in close combat. This position was taken most forcefully by Brigadier-General Launcelot 
Kiggell, Director of Staff Duties and protégé of Douglas Haig.499 Similar views were 
expressed at lower levels, and the Commandant at Hythe continued to comment on the 
resilience of entrenched opinion. That resistance had a strong influence upon tactical change, 
and upon the choices as to what equipment was required and how it was to be used.  
This can also be seen in discussions around the machine gun, where a small group of 
relatively junior officers lobbied for its greater usage in the face of resistance from older 
officers who thought of them as an ineffective distraction. They were also hindered by the 
development of the Pattern 1913 rifle, and its new ammunition, in the years immediately 
prior to the First World War. Due to the desire to retain a single calibre for both rifles and 
machine guns, selection of a new machine gun was delayed until that process was 
completed.500 The Vickers gun was initially only taken on to replace those Maxim guns 
which had come to the end of their service lives, although the decision to do so can be seen as 
fortunate in retrospect. Whilst the junior officers’ theories regarding the potential of machine 
guns were eventually proven correct, and several were very prominent in announcing this 
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fact, there is every chance that they might have been more successful had the change to a 
smaller calibre already been implemented, although this may have created further issues to be 
overcome.  
Too many variables exist within that debate to truly vindicate one side or the other, 
but the lack of machine guns certainly placed additional emphasis upon the ability of riflemen 
to generate rapid and accurate fire in volume. Cartridge development had also had an impact 
on tactics in the late 1890s. With the introduction of smokeless propellant in 1895, the cover 
given by black powder was gone, and with it the need for brightly coloured uniforms. Both 
the Tirah Campaign and the South African War demonstrated the need for better usage of 
cover, including both entrenchments and early forms of camouflage. The development of 
concealment as a tactical concept required immediate changes to training, to ensure that both 
were used correctly, and which is reflected in the illustrations that accompanied Musketry 
Regulations after 1903. 
Whilst the experiences of various wars, filtered through these three channels, drove 
the largest changes, there was also a much more continuous process of assessment and 
adjustment of training that ran in parallel. This was driven by the need to not only ensure that 
the manuals were in line with current practices and theories, but also that they were teaching 
in the most effective manner. This is why so many manuals were issued between 1890 and 
1900 – the training was constantly being altered to enhance the potential of the new rifle, in a 
way that meshed with current tactical theory. Although the changes were frequent, they were 
also more evolutionary than revolutionary, retaining a sense of continuity back to the first 
manuals of the 1850s. The basic approach to training prior to the South African War, where 
rote instruction was used to inculcate obedience and standardise reactions, was one which had 
its roots in much older systems of instruction. Although it involved an assessment cycle not 
dissimilar to that later described by Kolb, the autonomy of the process was as restricted as 
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possible, with each individual only making observations and alterations within parameters set 
by his commander.  
From 1902 onwards, although commanders retained overall control on the battlefield, 
the approach to training was something more recognisably modern. The contemporary 
description of ‘Monro’s Doctrine’ as ‘progressive’ is true in several ways. Not only was it a 
progression from the training it replaced, with each section of the training expanding upon 
the previous one until the classification phase was reached, but its approach to individual 
training was more open to allowing soldiers to make informed decisions on the battlefield. 
This was anticipated by the work of Ian Hamilton in the mid-1880s, who had suggested the 
approach such training might take, if not its final form. However, it was only after the South 
African War that such training could have been successfully introduced to the British Army, 
and even then it was far from universally popular amongst commanding officers. The speed 
with which these changes were made, and without requiring large changes in personnel at any 
particular point in the training system, suggests that the existing training mechanisms were 
basically sound, and simply needed reinforcement rather than replacement to be effective. 
The impact of the South African wars during this period is hard to overlook. The First 
Boer War (1880-1) led to a more practical approach to individual marksmanship, with the 
introduction of humanoid targets for individual training and ‘fire with movement’ practices. 
It is ironic that what appears to have reversed these changes was the introduction of the new 
magazine rifle, which would potentially have benefitted from that style of training. Instead, 
the manuals reverted to ensuring that soldiers were even more accurate, and this was twinned 
with a focus on sectional training over that for individuals, which grew throughout the 
decade. This led to a system whereby individual training purely taught accuracy in the most 
sterile sense, rather than the other skills necessary for the battlefield, which would only be 
taught at a sectional level. The Hythe reports are generally consistent in their frustration at 
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how poorly sectional training, including field exercises, were conducted during this period, 
giving the impression that the desire to only teach battlefield practices to sections was 
idealistic rather than practical, and somewhat misguided. The School of Musketry was aware 
of both its own shortcomings and advances overseas, but often felt handicapped by a lack of 
interest amongst all ranks, as well as a limited amount of money and space for training. Their 
relative success in making do with what little was available, whilst the majority of the 
available funds were being channelled into retaining naval superiority, allowed the British 
Army to cover those shortcomings until faced with the challenge of an opponent equipped to 
an equal level, in the South African War. The resulting investigations were even more wide-
ranging than those of twenty years previously, and had a longer-lasting effect. The relevance 
of that experience was still being debated ten years later, often with the feeling that it was 
anomalous rather than indicative of the pattern of wars to come. However true that may have 
been, it was the inspiration for much of the work done prior to World War One, and placed 
the Army on a far better footing than might otherwise have been the case. 
In summary then, it is the contention of this thesis that the musketry training of the 
British Army between 1884 and 1914 was built upon a foundation of analysing and adjusting 
training to suit the tactical and technological requirements of the time. Under the 
administration of the School of Musketry, these mechanisms were strong enough that, even in 
the face of radical changes post-1902, they remained relatively unchanged in terms of 
operation. The training that was placed on top of this underwent two major changes during 
this period: the introduction of the magazine rifle in 1889, and the introduction of progressive 
training post-1902. The first was a technological leap forward, and how best to incorporate it 
within tactical thinking challenged the British Army for the next ten years. The progressive 
approach to training produced a system which is recognisably ‘modern’, using realistic 
scenarios to give individual soldiers a far stronger grounding in battlefield skills. It was these 
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skills that would come to define the Regular soldiers who went to war in 1914, and about 
whom so much has been written in the last century. 
 
Areas of further research 
This thesis has focussed on the years 1884 to 1914, as it was felt that a better understanding 
of the changes that occurred during that period would contribute to current debates regarding 
the creation of the B.E.F. However, this work having been undertaken, the next logical steps 
would be to examine what occurred both before and afterwards. Particularly, this could focus 
on the First World War, and how the system was modified to meet the changing requirements 
of wartime, and then how those lessons were interpreted and adopted or ignored in peacetime. 
Similar studies could be conducted up until the early 1950s, when the Army and the NRA 
finally parted ways in terms of the arms used, and seemingly public opinion and knowledge 
of military arms began to wane. A similar study could also be conducted back to 1851, with 
the first introduction of a rifle-musket as a standard arm, or indeed back to the work of Sir 
John Moore with the Rifle Brigade at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The work on 
earlier periods may also prove to have greater relevance than simply researching lineage: the 
resurgence of interest in Light Infantry tactics in the aftermath of the South African War 
suggests that this topic could also provide information to further expand understanding as to 
what those pioneers were creating.501 
Due to a lack of previous research in this field, this thesis has focussed on drawing 
from primary sources, to build a picture of what the Army were attempting to achieve and 
how they went about fulfilling that ambition. This has meant that certain groups of 
publications, most notably those produced by Gale & Polden as secondary training material, 
have had to be omitted. As the majority of these were written by serving members of the 
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Army, including members of the Hythe Staff,502 these could expand our understanding of the 
practical application and implications of the various Musketry Regulations. This is 
particularly true of the body of literature that appeared in the first two years of the First 
World War, prior to conscription, to allow those volunteering to bring themselves up to 
service standards as quickly as possible, including authors such as Sir Robert Baden-
Powell.503 They may also reflect contemporary opinions as to how musketry training could be 
better improved, in a similar vein to the proposals made by Ian Hamilton in 1885. There are 
also various examples of training aids, some issued by the Army and some sold by private 
inventors/entrepreneurs, which would also add further understanding of the methods used to 
teach certain basic principles, particularly correct aim picture. These will also allow for a 
better understanding of the training of the Territorial Army, whose training was based upon 
that of Regular soldiers, but in a reduced format due to their part-time service. Whilst this 
work covers much of the basic details, a separate work focussed solely upon the training of 
the Territorial soldiers could also be considered 
In all of these directions, I hope that they will be able to provide an understanding of 
the Army which still allows for the individuals, but focuses upon what the Army expected 
them to be able to do, rather than their individual experiences of war. Whilst the latter helps 
us to understand the trials and suffering which the First World War inflicted upon both 
combatants and their families, it often means that we lose sight of what and how they were 
being trained and prepared to do. No man was sent to the front totally untrained, and perhaps 
in the future we will be able to see inside the machine, rather than looking at how it was 
operated, or at the men crushed underneath it. 
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Appendix 1: The Staff of the School of Musketry, Hythe 
The following tables have been compiled from sources including Miller’s history of the 
School,504 and the ‘List of Succession’ preserved in the National Archives.505 Later details 
have also been taken from the centenary history of the School.506 Where necessary and/or 
possible, dates have been confirmed through the London Gazette.507 
Inspector-General of Musketry and Commandant 
Name From To 
Charles Craufurd Hay June 1853 30
th





 October 1867 1
st
 January 1873 
William Pollexfen Radcliffe 1
st
 January 1873 1
st





 May 1878 31
st
 January 1880 




 January 1880 31
st




John Moore Gurnell Tongue 31
st
 January 1885 31
st
 January 1890 
Charles George Slade 31st January 1890 17
th
 July 1894 
George Paton 17
th
 July 1894 11
th
 May 1898 
Ian Standish Monteith Hamilton 11
th
 May 1898 15
th
 September 1899 




 September 1899 1
st
 October 1900 
Richard Lionel Arthur Pennington 14
th
 February 1901 27
th
 March 1903 
Charles Carmichael Monro 27
th
 March 1903 28
th
 March 1907 
Granville George Algernon Egerton 28
th
 March 1907 5
th
 September 1909 
Walter Norris Congreve 5
th
 September 1909 6
th
 December 1911 
Harold Goodeve Ruggles-Brise 6
th
 December 1911 15
th
 September 1914 




 January 1915 22
nd





 July 1918 22
nd





 July 1919 1
st
 August 1923 
   
NOTES: 
1
Halliday had previously served as the Commandant and Chief Instructor of the School of Musketry, Fleetwood, 
from 1
st
 September 1864 until its closure in September 1867, after which he became Commandant at Hythe  
2
Travers died during his period of service, and the Travers Library (now at Warminster) was founded in his 
memory. 
3
Trench was the last to be both Inspector-General and Commandant, with the posts being separated thereafter. 
4A memorial over the fireplace of the Army Rifle Association states: ‘Colonel Hopton was Commandant of the 
School of Musketry, Hythe, 1899-1900…’, confirmed by his being the signatory on the Hythe Annual Report for 
that year. He was only Acting Commandant, never being formally appointed, and the dates given are based 
upon Hamilton’s departure for South Africa, and Hopton’s appointment as Chief Inspec tor, Small Arms. It is 
also believed that Pennington may have served as acting Commandant whilst Chief Instructor, until formally 
appointed on the date given. 
5The School was ‘dispersed’ for the duration of the war, although it appears from the London Gazette that 
McMahon was temporarily appointed as Chief Instructor (Acting Commandant) in 1915, which was only 
formalised as of 1
st
 August 1917. He was also Norman McMahon’s cousin (see under Chief Instructors, below)  
6
Dalby was appointed Commandant of the School of Musketry (Bisley) on the former date. He became ‘Rifle, 
Bayonet and Revolver Wing Commander’ as of the latter date, and went on to serve as Assistant Commandant 
between 31
st
 August 1920 and 1
st
 February 1923. 
7
Stansfield was the first overall Commandant of the Small Arms School, Hythe. 
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Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General 
Name From To 
John McKay 1
st
 April 1856 1
st
 October 1867 
Drury Richard Barnes 1
st
 October 1867 1
st
 May 1875 
J.P. Campbell 1
st
 May 1875 1
st
 January 1880 
William Marsden 1
st
 January 1880 1
st
 February 1884 
Francis MacKenzie Salmond 1
st
 February 1884 11
th
 March 1889 
G.E. Harley 11
th
 March 1889 12
th





 August 1891 22
nd
 January 1893 
Sir James de Hoghton 22
nd
 January 1893 31
st
 May 1893 
Thomas Nock Bagnall 31
st
 May 1893 31
st
 May 1896 




 May 1896 28
th
 July 1899 
   
NOTES: 
1
The post was then combined with that of Chief Instructor, to create the post of Chief Instructor & Staff Officer.  
                                                 
508
 Hew Strachan, From Waterloo to Balaclava, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 51. For 
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First Instructor 
Name From To 
Augustus Lane Fox
1 
June 1853 March 1854 
John Clark Kennedy
2 
March 1854 April 1855 
Ernest Christian Wilford 25
th
 April 1855 17
th




Ernest Christian Wilford 17
th
 June 1856 10
th
 June 1862 
Wyndham Edward Bewes 10
th
 June 1862 1
st
 April 1868 
Henry Francis Bythesea 1
st
 April 1868 1
st
 November 1873 
Henry Edward Hillman Burnside 1
st
 November 1873 1
st
 August 1875 
Drury Richard Barnes 1
st
 August 1875 9
th
 March 1880 
James Kiero Watson 9
th
 March 1880 9
th
 March 1885 
Walter Carr Mackinnon 9
th
 March 1885 28
th
 July 1889 
William Blakeway Burton 27
th
 July 1889 28
th
 July 1894 
Francis George Archibald Wiehe 27
th
 July 1894 28
th
 July 1899 
 
Chief Instructor & Staff Officer 
 
John Dutton Hopton (née Hunt) 28
th
 July 1899 1
st
 October 1900 
Richard Lionel Arthur Pennington 1
st
 October 1900 14
th
 February 1901 
Charles Carmichael Monro 14
th
 February 1901 27
th
 March 1903 
Wilkinson Dent Bird 27
th
 April 1903 9
th
 June 1905 
Norman Reginald McMahon 10
th
 June 1905 10
th
 June 1909 
John Campbell 9
th
 June 1909 9
th





 June 1913 4
th
 January 1915 




 January 1915 1
st
 August 1917 




 July 1919 25
th
 January 1921 
   
NOTES: 
1
Later known as Augustus Lane Fox Pitt Rivers, founder of the Pitt Rivers Collection in Oxford. 




Gogarty was appointed to the General Staff in January 1915. He went on to be Chief Instructor at the Machine 
Gun Training Centre, Grantham, before becoming Superintendent of Training there  
4Norman McMahon’s cousin. For his role as Commandant, see above. 
5
Knox-Gore was the first Chief Instructor, Rifle Wing, Small Arms School 
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Appendix 2: Officer Biographies 
General Sir Ian Standish Monteith Hamilton GCB GCMG DSO 
Born 16th January 1853 
Eldest son of Lieutenant-Colonel Christian Monteith Hamilton and Maria Vereker 
Educated at Cheam and Wellington College 
Entered Sandhurst by examination in August 1870  
Spent six months studying with General I.S. Drammers in Dresden, 1870-71 
Posted to the 12th (Suffolk) Regiment as a Lieutenant, 24th April 1873 
Transferred to the 92nd (Gordon Highlanders) Regiment, 1875 
In England, 21st April 1877 to 15th February 1878 
 (Believed he underwent a Musketry Instructors course at this point) 
Served in the Second Anglo-Afghan War, 1879-80 
 Participated in the march to Kabul 
Served in the First Boer War, 1881 
 Wounded in the left wrist at Majuba Hill, February 1881 
Recuperated in England, 7th July 1881 to 12th May 1882  
Promoted to Captain, 25th February 1882 
Returned to India, 3rd June 1882, to serve as ADC to Lord Roberts 
Served with the Nile Expeditionary Field Force, 23rd October 1884 to 1st May 1885 
Published The Fighting of the Future, October 1885 
Promoted to Major, 7th November 1885 
Returned to India, 16th February 1886, to resume post with Roberts 
Served in Burmese Expedition, 1886-87 
Married Jean Muir, 22nd February 1887 
Promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel, 1st July 1887 
Appointed AAG for Musketry, Bengal, 1st July 1890 (to 7th April 1893) 
Promoted to Colonel, 25th November 1891 
Appointed Military Secretary to Sir George White, 8th April 1893 (to 10th October 1895) 
Served in Chitral Relief Expedition, 1895 
Served as AAG and AQMG to General Stedman 
 Temporarily took command in Stedman’s place 
Returned to Simla, September 1895 
Awarded CB, 1895 
Appointed DQMG, 11th October 1895 (to 22nd April 1898) 
Served with the Tirah Field Force, 3rd October 1897 to 8th April 1898 
Returned to England, 9th May 1898 
Appointed Commandant, School of Musketry, 11th May 1898 to 15th September 1899 
Served in Second Boer War, 1899-1902 
 Left for South Africa, 16th September 1899, as AAG to Sir George White 
 Participated in operations in Natal, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, as well as
 the defence of Ladysmith 
 Post 29th November 1900, Chief of Staff 
Promoted to Major-General, 12th October 1899 
Raised to KCB, 1900 
Promoted to Acting Lieutenant-General, 10th April 1900 
Returned to England as military secretary to Lord Roberts, December 1900 
Re-assigned to South Africa as Chief of Staff under Kitchener, 9th November 1901 
Conducted operations in western Transvaal, Orange River Colony and Cape Colony 
Appointed Honorary Colonel, Gordon Highlanders, 31st August 1901 
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Returns to London to resume role as Lord Roberts’ Military Secretary, 12th September 1902 
Promoted to Lieutenant-General, 22nd August 1902 
Appointed Quartermaster-General, 27th April 1903 to 1st February 1904 
Serves as an observer during the Russo-Japanese War, 2nd March 1904 to 22nd April 1905 
Returned to England, April 1905 
Appointed to GOC, Southern District, 1st June 1905 to 31st May 1909 
Appointed Honorary Colonel, Army Service Corps (Territorial Force), 1st January 1906 
Promoted to General, 24th October 1907 
Appointed Honorary Colonel, Manchester Regiment, 9th August 1908 
Appointed Adjutant-General, 1st June 1909 to 31st July 1910 
Raised to GCB, 1910 
Appointed GOC Mediterranean and Inspector of Overseas Forces, 1st August 1910 
Returned to England, July 1914 
Served in the First World War, 1914-18 
 At the outbreak of war, given command of Central Force (Home defence) 
 Given command of the Dardanelles expedition, 12th March 1915 
 Replaced by General Charles Monro, October 1915 
Appointed Lieutenant of the Tower of London, 1918 
Awarded GCMG, 1919 
Retired from the Army, 1920 
Lord Rector of Edinburgh University, 1932-1935 
Died 12th October 1947. Buried in Doune, Perthshire 
 
 
General Sir Charles Carmichael Monro Bt. GCB GCSI GCMG 
Born 15th June 1860 
Educated at Sherborne School 
Entered Sandhurst, 1st September 1878 
Posted to the 2nd Foot [Queen’s (Royal West Surrey Regiment)] as a Second Lieutenant, 13 th 
August 1879 
Promoted to Lieutenant, 15th May 1881 
Posted to the 1st Battalion at Colchester as Adjutant, 27th July 1881 to 26th July 1886 
Promoted to Captain, 24th July 1889 
Passed Staff College, 1890 
Served with his battalion in Malta, first as the Governor’s ADC, then as Brigade Major 
Battalion moved to India in 1897. Served with the Malakand Field Force and the Tirah 
Expeditionary Force, 1897-8 
Promoted Major, 23rd February 1898 
Appointed Brigade Major, Gibraltar, 20th October 1898 to 24th March 1899 
Appointed DAAG, Guernsey, 15th April 1899 to 15th October 1899 
Appointed temporary DAAG, Aldershot, 16th October 1899 to 3rd December 1899 
Served in the South African War, 1899-1900: 
 DAAG, 6th Division under General Thomas Kelly-Kenny 
Participated in the march to Pretoria, Siege of Paardeburg and the battles of Poplar 
Grove and Driefontein 
Promoted to Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel, 29th November 1900 
Mentioned in Despatches (London Gazette, 8th February 1901) 
Returned to England, appointed Chief Instructor and Staff Officer, School of Musketry, 19 th 
February 1901 to 27th March 1903 
Appointed Commandant, School of Musketry, 28th March 1903 to 27th March 1907 
Promoted to Colonel, 29th November 1903 
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Awarded CB, 1906 
Promoted to Brigadier-General and appointed to command 13th Infantry Brigade, Dublin, 12th 
May 1907 to 31st January 1911 
Promoted to Major-General, 31st October 1910 
Transferred to command 2nd London Division, 1911 
Served in the First World War, 1914-18: 
 Commanded 2nd Division from the start of the war through to the end of 1914 
Escaped being killed by a shell that killed 1st Division’s CO (Major-General S.H. 
Lomax) 
After the BEF became two armies, he is given command of I Corps with the 
temporary rank of Lieutenant-General 
Raised to KCB, 1915 
Given command of Third Army, July 1915, with the temporary rank of General 
 Succeeded General Sir Ian Hamilton in command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary
 Force, October 1915, to assess and command the withdrawal from Gallipoli 
 Returned to France, January 1916, to assume command of First Army 
Made GCMG, 1916 
Appointed C-i-C, Indian Army, October 1916 
Made ADC General to the King, 1918 to 1922 
Participated in the Third and Fourth Afghan Wars 
Made GCSI and GCB, 1919 
Resigned his post, August 1920, to return to London on half pay 
Created a Baronet and Bath King of Arms, 1921 
Appointed Governor of Gibraltar, replacing General Smith-Dorrien, 1923-28 
Returned to London, succeeding Douglas Haig as Trustee of the Imperial War Museum 
Died of cancer, 7th December 1929. His funeral was held at Westminster Abbey, and he was 
buried at Brompton Cemetery, 11th December 1929 
 
 
Brigadier-General Norman Reginald McMahon DSO 
Born 24th January 1866 
Fourth Son of General Sir Thomas Westropp McMahon CB, 3rd Baronet 
Educated at Eton 
Enlists as a Lieutenant in the Royal Fusiliers, 23rd May 1885 
Served with the Burma Expedition, 1885-87, as a Special Service Officer 
Battalion Adjutant, 28th February 1890 to 27th February 1894 
Promoted to Captain, 27th November 1896 
Served in the South African War, 1899-1902: 
 ADC to Major-General Geoffrey Barton, 9th October 1899 to 18th April 1900 
 Participated in Relief of Ladysmith, Colenso, Tugela Heights, Pieters Hill and Natal 
 Brigade-Major, 29th April to 3rd August 1900 
 Severely wounded during operations in Cape Colony 
 Mentioned in Despatches (London Gazette, 8th February 1901) 
 DAAG, 26th February 1901 to 28th June 1902 
Awarded the DSO “In recognition of services during the recent operations in South 
Africa” (London Gazette, 19th April 1901) 
Operations in Orange River Colony, April 1901 to February 1902 
Promoted to Major, 28th November 1901 
Chief-Instructor and Staff Officer, School of Musketry, 9th June 1905 to 8th June 1909 
“Fire-Fighting” lecture presented to the Aldershot Military Society, 18th December 1907 
Lectures and demonstrations of rapid fire, 1908 
241 
 
“Specially employed at the Headquarters of the Army”, 9th June 1909 to 21st January 1910 
Passed Staff College, December 1910 
Promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel, May 1911 
Served in the First World War: 
 Commanded 4th Battalion, Royal Fusiliers 
 Present at Battle of Mons (23rd/24th August 1914) 
 Commands the rearguard of the 3rd Division during the retreat from Le Cateau (26th
 August to 4th September 1914) 
 Received Sir John French’s compliments, 21st September 1914 
 Promoted to Brigadier-General (to succeed Aylmer Haldane in command of 10th
 Brigade), but unable to be spared to take up his new role. 
 Present at First Battle of Ypres (19th October 1914 – 22nd November 1914) 
On the 11th November, whilst attempting to rally his battalion, was killed by shellfire. Having 
no known grave, he is commemorated on the Ploegsteert Memorial (Panel 1) 
 
 
Colonel Charles Blair Mayne 
Born 1855 
Entered Woolwich, January 1875 
Commissioned as a Lieutenant, Royal Engineers, 15th January 1878 (antedated to January
 28th, 1875 
Promoted to Captain, 28th January 1886 
Granted local rank of Major whilst serving as a Professor at the Royal Military College,
 Kingston, Canada, 7th October 1886 
Promoted to Major, 12th December 1894 
First son born: Second Lieutenant Jasper Moore Mayne, Royal Field Artillery  
(1895 – 9th May 1915) 
Second son born: Lieutenant Victor Charles Moore Mayne, South Wales Borderers  
(1896 – 19th February 1916) 
Promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel, 31st December 1901 
Appointed Assistant Inspector General of Fortifications at Head-Quarters, 2nd February 1903 
Promoted to Brevet Colonel, 31st December 1904 
Appointed Assistant Director at Headquarters with substantive rank of Colonel, 1st April
 1904 
Retires upon completion of his posting, 12th February 1907 
Retired to Camberley, Surrey, with his wife, V.A. Mayne 
Died 1914  
 
Lieutenant-Colonel George Alban Lewes 
Ensign in 16th Foot, 23 Dec 1864 
Transferred to 48th Foot, 7th March 1865 
Promoted to Lieutenant by purchase, 14th March 1868  
Captain, 2nd February 1880  
Raised from Supernumerary Major to Major, 1st February 1886  
Made Instructor at Royal Military College, 1st September 1886, confirmed a week later 
Lieutenant-Colonel, moved from Half-Pay to be an Instructor, RMC, 16th December 1889  
To be a Professor, 1st September 1892 
Period of service expired, 1st September 1896 
No further Gazette references found prior to 1900 
Died 14th October 1917. A memorial was erected to him in First Trinity Church, Heol Y 





Major Charles Edward Etches CB OBE 
Born in Derby, 1st October 1872 
Member of the RMC Sandhurst Rifle Team for the Winter Term of 1891  
Member of the RMS Sandhurst Rifle Team for the Summer Term of 1892, and of the
 Revolver Team 
Competed in the first Challenge Shield Match against RMA Woolwich 
Commission in the 1st Bn, Royal Warwickshire Regiment, 19th November 1892 
Passed Hythe, Extra Certificate, 1893 
Mentioned in Hythe Annual Report for that year as highest scoring officer firing Individual
 Practices with Lee-Metford  
Bronze Jewel Winner, Army Sixty, 1895 
Bronze Jewel Winner, Army Sixty, 1896 
Promoted to Lieutenant, 3rd May 1897  
Received a slight bullet wound to the forearm at the Battle of ‘Khartum’ (Omdurman), 2nd
 September 1898  
Also received a Mention in Despatches for ‘good services’  
Served as Assistant Adjutant, 21st March – 15th October 1899 
Bronze Jewel Winner, Army Sixty, 1899 
Appointed Assistant Instructor, Hythe, 16th October 1899 
Posted to South Africa, 20th November 1899 – 19th December 1900 
Promoted to Captain, 3rd February 1900 
Listed returning to England aboard the Chicago, 27th November 1900 
Appointed temporary Assistant Instructor, Hythe, as of 1st January 1901  
Gold Jewel Winner, Army Sixty, 1901 
Gold Jewel Winner, Army Sixty, 1902 
First marriage, to Julia Adderley, in Tewkesbury Abbey, 16th July 1902 
Promoted to Instructor, 27th November 1902  
Referred to in accuracy tests conducted with the SMLE submitted by Hythe, 7 th June 1905
 for which he had selected the eight firers, and where he was described as ‘one of the
 most accomplished rifle shots in England.’  
Ended term at Hythe, and was posted to regimental duties, 16th December 1905 
Appears to have resigned his commission, 4th April 1906  
Divorced his first wife in 1915 
Attached to the General Staff, graded for pay as an Assistant Instructor, SoM, and to be a
 Temp. Major (brought up from the Reserve of Officers)  
Made an Instructor  
Second marriage, to Annie Hall, circa December 1917  
Appointed Temporary Chief Instructor, 22nd July 1918  
Awarded the O.B.E., 10th January 1919  
Relinquished both the position and rank, 21st November 1919  
Formally promoted to Major, 21st November 1919  
Served as Secretary of the NRA, 1921 – 1938 
Having reached the age limit of liability for recall, relinquished his commission but retained
 the rank of Major, 8th November 1922  
Appointed Companion of the Bath, 1st January 1935  
Killed by enemy action, aged 71, 30th May 1944. One of three civilians to die in the 
Pentargan Hotel, Cliff Road, during a bombing raid on Falmouth. Buried at St. Michael and 






Colonel John Dutton Hopton (Previously Dutton-Hunt) 
Born in Stroud, Gloucestershire, 30th December 1858 
Son of Captain Dutton Hunt 
(Of Farm Hill Park, Stroud. Appears to have been a clothier, and active Volunteer 
officer in Stroud, before his death at 41 in 1865) 
Stood 6ft. 5in. tall 
Educated at Harrow School 
Passed out of Royal Military College, Sandhurst, 1879 
Commissioned in Highland Light Infantry (71st Foot), 13th August 1879 
Served in Gibraltar, October 1879 to March 1880 
At Home, March 1880 to March 1896 
Qualified for a Hythe Certificate in 1881 
Married Harriet Mary Rudd Stevenson (?) in Edinburgh, 31st January 1883 
Qualified for a Hythe “Extra” Certifica te, 5th August 1885 
Seconded to Hythe as a Lieutenant-Instructor, 16th May 1886 
Promoted to Captain-Instructor, 13th February 1890 
Appointed District Inspector of Musketry, 1st August 1891 
Captain of the Army Eight, 1891-1907 
Present at demonstration of Dowe’s Bulletproof Cuirass at the Alhambra, May 1894509 
Served in Malta, March to May 1896 
Appointed D.A.A.G., Hythe, 31st May 1896 
Married Sybil Maude Hopton, 29th April 1899 
Assumed the surname of ‘Hopton’ by Royal Licence to take possession of wife’s 
estates at Canon Frome (Granted authority under W.O. 77716/12, 30th May 1899) 
Appointed Chief Instructor and Staff Officer, Hythe, 28th July 1899 
This combined the roles of D.A.A.G. and Chief Instructor 
Given temporary rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, 4th November 1899 
Appointed Chief Inspector, Small Arms, Army Ordnance Department, 1st October 1900 
Promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel, half pay 
Promoted to Brevet Colonel, 29th October 1905 
Replaced as Chief Inspector, 29th October 1907.  
This appears to be related to his retirement, although confirmation of this cannot be 
found. 
Led the NRA tour of Australia, 1907 
Competed in 1908 Olympics, in the 1,000 yard Free Rifle category. He placed 24 th, with a
 score of 84 ex. 100 
Shot for England in the Elcho Shield match on 36 occasions. One of the NRA competitions
 remains the “Hopton Aggregate”, the winner receiving the “Hopton Challenge Cup”. 
Served as High Sheriff of Herefordshire in 1917 
Had a private rifle range at Meephill, which he extended to 1,500 yards in 1928 
Cellist, songwriter and Director of the Royal Academy of Music.  
Composer of ‘Ceylon Whispers’ 
Died at Canon Frome Court, Herefordshire, 1st June 1934. Buried in a mausoleum, placed on 
the site of his firing point (referred to as Meephill Coppice Mausoleum) 
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The Saga of the Lewes Rifle Sights 
 
Perhaps the best statement on the nature of the service rifle as a system comes from a writer 
who had practical competitive experience with all British breech-loading service rifles, and 
formed part of the Committee which oversaw the introduction of the ‘Short’ rifle after the 
South African War – T.F. Fremantle, later Lord Cottesloe: 
 
The soldier’s rifle is of necessity a compromise. He has to carry it for long spells; if it 
is too heavy he will feel it a burden; if too light he will suffer from the kick. It must be handy 
to use in fencing with the bayonet, yet strong enough to bear the strains imposed by thrusting, 
and even capable of withstanding the effect of firing a grenade from its muzzle.510 
 
Whilst his discussion here is on the more obvious points of a rifle’s design, an area which is 
often overlooked is that of the rifle’s sights. These had also to be robust and relatively simple 
from the perspectives of training and usage, yet incorporating enough refinement to ensure 
the mechanical accuracy of the rifle could be translated into fire effect on the battlefield. 
When the first rifles were introduced into the British Army, the method of sighting was a 
vertical post of metal as a foresight, and a block of metal with a notch cut into the top edge as 
the backsight. Aligning the post within the notch at the correct point would give an accurate 
point of aim over a given distance. Allowance for the effect of the wind, or incorrect 
estimation of the distance, had to be made by ‘aiming off’ – either by altering the position of 
the foresight relative to the backsight, or aiming at a point to one side of the target. This was 
as much a matter of luck as judgement, and in a battlefield scenario was far from ideal, 
causing the authorities to look at ways of refining the design. 
                                                 
510
 Colonel Lord Cottesloe, The Englishman and the Rifle, (London, Herbert Jenkins, 1945), p. 38. 
245 
 
Over time the top of the foresight became slightly tapered, eventually leading to the 
‘barleycorn’ shape used on the Martini-Henry which, from the firer’s perspective, appeared 
as a triangle inside the ‘V’-shaped notch of the backsight. The backsight had also evolved 
from the fixed leaf to the more complex ‘ladder’ – a graduated frame, hinged to lie along the 
barrel on a stepped bed for shorter distances, or raised vertically for longer distances. The top 
of the ‘ladder’ was capped by the short-range back-sight, with a relatively shallow ‘V’, used 
for distances up to 400 yards. The frame of the backsight was fitted with a sliding bar which, 
in the horizontal position, engaged with the steps on the bed to alter the elevation of the short-
range back-sight, and when raised became the back-sight itself. On the face of the bar were 
three vertical white lines, the middle of which ran up to the base of the ‘V’. The lower edge 
had a wide, flat notch, and the slide could be reversed so that this might be used for 
competitive shooting, with temporary marks permitted to compensate for variations in 
windage.  
In 1876, at a conference called to discuss changes to be made to the Martini-Henry, 
the comments of commanding officers led to the recommendation that the notch on both the 
cap and slide be deepened in future manufacture, a move which was approved that February, 
and incorporated into the Mark II rifle when it was formally approved fourteen months later. 
This method of sighting remained in service until the Magazine Rifle Trials a decade later.511 
The instructions for a service aim, as described in the Musketry Regulations for 1887, were 
thus: 
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Aim, which must be an exactly true one, must be taken along the bottom of the notch, 
of the top of the centre white line of the back-sight, and the tip of the fore-sight to the centre 
of the mark aimed at.512 
 
This was what was described as a ‘fine’ sight: it left very little of the foresight visible 
to the firer, but allowed for adjustment of elevation by taking a ‘fuller’ sight; bringing the tip 
level with the top edge of the slide. However, this did not provide a consistent adjustment due 
to the ballistic curve, with the regulations warning that,  
 
...firing with a full sight at 500 and 600 yards will send the bullet 3 or 4 feet higher 
than the ordinary fine sight, whereas at short distances, such as 150 and 200 yards, the 
difference would be only a few inches.513  
 
In visual terms this variation was miniscule, with the slightest mistake automatically tending 
towards a ‘fuller’ sight, and a correspondingly higher point of impact. 
Whilst trialling new rifle designs in the mid-1880s, the sights used were the same as 
fitted to the Martini-Henry, partially due to the work already done on developing the .402 
Enfield-Martini rifle and cartridge. The first Lee actions tested by the British were also 
chambered for this round, until it was eventually abandoned in 1887 after successful tests 
with smaller calibres. These led to the .303 cartridge, which was then paired to the Lee action 
as the most successful of those previously trialled. The Martini-Henry pattern sights were 
depicted in the drawing of the 1888 Trials Rifle attached to the Small Arms Committee 
Memorandum on how the Troop Trials were to be conducted, issued in June 1888.514 
However, in January 1888 a new system of sighting had been proposed by Major G.A. 
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Lewes.515 It was a complete inversion of previous designs, and its method of usage was later 
described in the List of Changes thus: 
 
The foresight is a square block, with a vertical cut through it, showing a fine line of 
sight. Aim is taken by fitting this square in a corresponding square notch in the backsight, so 
that lines of light of equal width may be seen on each side of it, and aligning the central line 
of light on the point to be hit.516 
 
Experiments were conducted with this design whilst the troop trials were underway,517 
possibly on the twelve additional rifles authorised to be manufactured for the committee's use 
in May 1888.518  No record of the tests conducted has been found, but the results appear to 
have been positive, with only minor alterations to the size of the foresight and the width of 
the backsight notch recommended.519 Lewes was granted a patent for his design in October 
1888,520 and the Committee recommended its adoption on the new rifle the following 
month.521 The design seems to have been popular initially, with Fremantle writing favourably 
of the design several years later:  
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For picking up an aim in a hurry, without any tendency to shoot high, these sights are 
much superior to the ordinary barleycorn foresight used with either the V or the bar.522 
 
The Navy, whose representative had left the Committee in August 1888 believing that 
the rifle was all but complete,523 were not convinced. A series of trials conducted on H.M.S. 
‘Excellent’ had resulted in a negative report, and formal objections to the system's adoption 
were raised in the first half of 1889.524 Given the numerical disparity between the Army and 
Navy’s requirements for rifles, and with the Prime Minister having directed that as much 
equipment as possible should be interchangeable between the two services, the Army pressed 
its case in favour of the new design. In June, following correspondence between the Secretary 
of State and the First Lord of the Admiralty, a compromise was reached: The Navy would 
withdraw their complaint, on the condition that the matter was reconsidered when the 
question of the Mark II rifle was raised.525 With this agreement, the sights were formally 
incorporated into the final design for the ‘Rifle, Magazine (Mark I)’, promulgated in the List 
of Changes in December 1889.526 By this time, 13,000 rifles had been completed and were 
being issued, first to the Infantry of 1st Army Corps, with the Brigade of Guards receiving 
theirs the following February. The first instructions on sighting were issued that same month, 
in a pamphlet covering aiming drill, firing exercises and care of the new rifle.527 The 
instructions for sighting with the new sights were brief, and make no comment on the novelty 
of the sight: 
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Align the upper edge of the front-sight with the shoulders of the notch of the back-
sight, centre the former in the latter so that a line of light of equal breadth is seen on either 
side; then direct the top of the centre line of the front-sight on the mark aimed at.528 
 
After several months in service, 7,402 rifles underwent a thorough examination for 
issues and flaws.529 Although alterations to the sighting were suggested following these 
inspections, in addition to independent reports on the rifle from various units, it was decided 
to leave the matter until the Mark II was considered. In April 1890, the Secretary of State 
directed that that process should commence in the early autumn. This allowed formal reports 
to be called for from General Officers Commanding Districts at Home on the new rifle, with 
general comments and questions focussing on certain aspects.530 The new Committee first 
met on 5th August 1890,531 and upon examining the reports found the views on the Lewes 
sights were mixed, with some remarking that it was more difficult to teach or to learn.532 
Overall, the new sights did not seem to have a marked benefit over the previous design. The 
alterations made to the sights by the Committee were also facing criticism from its inventor. 
In February 1889, Major Lewes had written to the Superintendent of the Royal Small Arms 
Factory, Enfield, asking to be allowed to inspect the first thousand rifles, an offer which was 
declined on the orders of the Adjutant-General.533 In October he wrote again, having handled 
and fired one of the rifles, expressing dissatisfaction with how the sights had been finished, 
and repeating his request to be allowed to set up some rifles and inspect future production. He 
also wished to see the instructions for their use, or to be allowed to provide some, to explain 
the system’s benefits. As the inventor, his comments were felt worthy of attention, and a rifle 
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was provided for him to inspect and alter the backsight as he saw fit before certifying it as 
correct. This would then be used as a pattern for future manufacture. This was done at Enfield 
on 4th December 1889, and became the reference point for future discussions between Lewes 
and the Committee.534 
In May 1890, Lewes submitted further complaints about the sights, this time related to 
the angle of the inclined plane in front of the foresight.535 However, the alteration he 
suggested would have made the foresight block even more vulnerable, so a compromise was 
reached by reducing the depth of the backsight notch instead. A month later, the 
Commandant of the School of Musketry reported that the foresight-notch was susceptible to 
damage, and had a tendency to produce a blurred sight picture. This led to the 
recommendation at the first meeting of the new Committee in August 1890, that fifty rifles be 
fitted with Martini-Henry sights and issued to the School of Musketry for comparative 
trials.536 These were delayed due to having to hand-fit the sights, and were eventually ready 
to be issued on 20th September.537 Whilst the Committee delayed their decision on the Mark I 
rifle until the report was received, reversion to the ‘Martini-Henry pattern’ sights for the 
Mark II rifle had already been approved.538 The report of the trials was submitted in October, 
with the conclusion that the sights, ‘…do not possess any decided superiority…’ in regards to 
shooting. Coupled with their liability to damage, the difficulty of repair, and the Navy’s 
original disapproval, the Committee’s decision was, ‘…[to] recommend that the Lewes 
system of sighting be abandoned, and that the forms of sights used with the Martini-Henry 
rifle be reverted to…’539  
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However, in November the Director of Artillery notified the Committee that he had 
received a file of correspondence from Colonel Lewes via the Adjutant-General, to the effect 
that his design was not being treated fairly. As such, he was suspending their 
recommendation until they had provided the Adjutant-General with a memorandum 
answering Lewes’ complaints. Whilst the Committee felt that the issues Lewes raised did not 
affect their recommendations, having based their decision on experience of the rifle in 
service, they decided to postpone any final comments until they had interviewed him.540 
The Committee’s interview with Lewes took place in December, with the 
Superintendents of both of the Royal Small Arms Factories, the Inspector of Small-Arms, and 
the Assistant to the Director-General of Ordnance Factories in attendance, alongside the five 
Committee members. At Lewes’ request, the President enumerated the main complaints 
against the design:  
 
...it is very difficult to teach, it is more liable to injury, and it has not the same 
capabilities of regulating the aim. Furthermore, there is no wind gauge to it, which some 
people complain of. Then again, some regiments report that it is slower in taking aim, 
whereas others report that it is quicker.541 
 
The President emphasised that the main issue which concerned the Committee was 
that the sight was easy to damage and difficult to repair. Lewes began by describing how he 
had designed his sight to overcome the variation in sight picture which the barleycorn sight 
could cause, and so ensure uniformity of elevation, particularly when firing volleys, which 
would in turn increase fire effect by removing the tendency to fire high. He also maintained 
that it was a simple system to teach, and had been so successful in the trials that Lord 
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Wolseley had told him, “we are determined to have your sight and no other”.542 However, 
Lewes admitted that the sights had been personally fitted and marked under his direction, and 
he had also been involved in instructing the firers. There also appeared to be a lack of 
understanding within the service as to how to use the sight, with some thinking that the target 
had to be seen through the foresight, rather than placing the line underneath the point of aim. 
However, no diagrams for their use had been created for training purposes, despite Lewes 
offering to draw them, and this further compounded the issues that had been raised. 
He then went on to discuss the manufacturing flaws, stating that the alterations made 
by the Committee had caused the foresight to be more liable to blur and susceptible to 
damage, and he felt certain that he could refine it so that it was impervious to injury as well 
as less reflective. The graduations on the backsight were a separate issue, as they were 
graduated for ammunition with a higher velocity than that which was issued. As such, he felt 
that his design was being blamed for the mistakes of others, and that he had not received a 
fair test. To illustrate his points further, he displayed a rifle which he felt demonstrated that 
the sights were not being correctly finished, although the Committee maintained that the 
discrepancy was so minor that it could only be detected by use of a gauge. As the 
Superintendent of Enfield pointed out, the level of detail in inspection required to detect such 
a flaw would severely restrict the scale of production that could be obtained. At the end of the 
meeting, the Committee assured him that they had not decided to abandon his design without 
good reason, and would wait until the rifle Lewes had displayed was reported on by the 
Inspection Department before making a final decision.543  
This report was received at the following meeting; having been inspected, it was 
decided that the ‘flaw’ on the sights was within manufacturing tolerances. This actually 
provided another reason to discontinue their usage – the tolerances which were required for 
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their best usage were so fine as to make them unsuitable for mass manufacture. As such, the 
Committee resubmitted their recommendation that the sights be replaced.544 At the same 
meeting, they also discussed the recommendation of the Commandant of the School of 
Musketry that all Mark I rifles should have their backsights altered to Mark II standard 
(although there is no note of any alteration to the foresights at this time).545 The Committee 
received final vindication of their stance in two additional reports, submitted at their last 
meeting, of responses from the Navy units which had previously tested the sights, confirming 
their continued opposition to the design.546  
The inclusion of the modified Martini-Henry sights on the Mark II rifle was 
confirmed in January 1891,547 although the rifle was not formally adopted until a year later.548 
That same month, an order was issued to retrofit those same sights onto the Mark I rifles, 
which were then designated as the “Mark I*” standard.549 This meant that these sights would 
be used for rifles of new manufacture, and ones already issued would be altered by pinning a 
barleycorn to the existing foresight block. The backsight slide was altered, with only a single 
white line, the depth of the notch reduced, and the sight bed altered to a continuous ramp 
rather than a stepped one. The sights of the Mark II rifle were also calibrated for a ‘full’ aim 
picture as the service sight, a practice that would remain the standard through the transition 
from the ladder to the tangent sight fitted to the ‘Short’ rifle, continuing until the introduction 
of the peep-sight in the late 1930s. 
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The Hamilton letter 
 
To mark the centenary of the South African War, Spink Auctioneers held a dedicated 
sale of related memorabilia in London. One of the lots was a letter,550 sent from Hythe by Ian 
Hamilton two weeks before he left for Natal, recommending the issue of additional 
ammunition for the further training of those troops being sent to South Africa. Digital records 
were in their infancy at this time, and it is not known if the letter was sold at this auction. It 
subsequently resurfaced on ebay in 2010, but due to the site’s data policy, neither the seller 
nor the successful buyer have been identified, and as such the current whereabouts of the 
letter remains unknown. 
Photographs taken of the letter when it was offered for sale, combined with some 
interpretation based upon the research conducted for this thesis, have allowed the following 




My dear Congreve – 
I found I had to run down here after all for the purpose of extricating my fishing 
tackle, guns gear etc about which no servant knows anything. I go north tonight but before I 
start I write you this line for favour of submission to your Chief. 
What I have to say is this:– Sir Redvers Buller  is going to command our forces in S. 
Africa and the bulk of these forces are now under his orders. May I suggest then that he 
applies for a free issue of 100 rounds for each rifle in the command, & that he commences 
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forthwith a special additional course at moving and vanishing targets etc. Also that he 
carries out a real(?) field firing with 50 rounds of ball in pouch. 
The only serious objection I see to this is that the news, if spread to the Boers, might 
frighten them into premature submission * 
*[Marginal note: You must be almost sure to get some good ideas for our revise of 
the M. Regns. in the process.] 
You may be tempted to make the ammunition over to Brigadiers or C.O.s but don’t do 
this. I know the clap trap cry just now is give everybody a free hand – abolish regulations etc. 
& that orders from superiors are apt to be classed as interference. A distinguished Brigadier 
for instance stated the other day at a lecture at the U.S.I. [United Service Institution] that if  
he had had a free hand when he commanded a Battn. instead of being bound down hand & 
foot by red tape, the musketry efficiency of his Battalion would have been improved cent per 
cent(?). This is all very fine but we have only to go a short step further & the N.C.O. will be 
talking about the free hand and resenting the interference of Captains. 
 








The cataloguer for Spink in 1999 did not discuss the possible identity of the recipient, 
although there is enough circumstantial evidence to suggest that the most likely candidate is 
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Captain Walter Congreve,551 a Rifle Brigade officer who would go on to win a Victoria Cross 
at the Battle of Colenso (15 December 1899) whilst serving on the staff of Sir Redvers 
Buller. According to a brief biography written by his regimental museum,552 Congreve was 
serving as the District Inspector of Musketry at Aldershot at the outbreak of war, a post he 
had held since the beginning of 1898,553 which would partially explain Hamilton’s 
postscript.554 It also made him the perfect candidate to put forward Hamilton’s proposals; as a 
musketry instructor serving on Buller’s staff, he could both explain and oversee the proposed 
supplementary training. 
The main suggestion of the letter ties into ideas that Hamilton had set out in 1885, as 
part of the musketry scheme he proposed in The Fighting of the Future.555 Although he had 
proposed the usage of a type of vanishing target called ‘Jumping Jemmies’, there appears to 
have only had been limited usage of moving and vanishing targets throughout the 1890s. This 
was due both to a lack of available range space, and the complexity of the necessary 
apparatus for operating those practices. It was only in 1896 that a new, simplified mechanism 
was introduced which made the training more widely practicable. The 1898 Regulations 
focussed on sectional practices, and as such this form of individual training had been left out 
to a certain extent. Given that Hamilton’s treatise had been published in the light of his own 
experiences during the First Boer War, he could be claimed to have had as much 
understanding as any officer of the style of fighting that the British Army would face in 1899. 
However, the opinion of the abilities of the Boers appears to have been relatively low in some 
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quarters,556 and there is no evidence that his suggestions were carried out. When Hamilton 
arrived in South Africa that October, he was placed in command of Seventh Brigade, which 
he then spent three days retraining to use much more open formations than was common at 
that time.557 He returned to England in December 1900 as Lord Roberts military secretary, 
but was sent back out the following November to serve as Lord Kitchener’s Chief of Staff. 
Whilst on his way there, he sent a letter to his wife, which included the following passage: 
 
Another, very different point, I am going to press is the question of rifle shooting. Our 
men have had no practice now for a couple of years. To fire at a Boer on the veldt & not 
know where your bullet goes, can no more be called practice than to fire a blank cartridge. 
Before leaving S. Africa I got Lord Bobs to sanction a scheme which I had myself drawn up 
for rifle practice. I hear however this has never been acted upon. The fellows will not 
understand that, especially in S. Africa, one man who can shoot is worth (in certain circles 
and usually critical ones) half a dozen who cannot. Several of our recent actions have shown 
me very clearly that the Boers are learning how, against our indifferent, unpractised 
shooting, they can gallop in upon our fellows without much risk & I have always maintained 
that once the Dutch are within 80 yards of us (where they can clearly see a head pop over a 
stone) they are our masters with their style of snap shooting without aligning their sights. But 
steady practice, which can easily be arranged for upon the veldt will not only make our men 
as good; but will give them morale and self-confidence.558 
 
This clearly demonstrates his concerns that the standard of individual accuracy within 
the British Army was affected by having little chance for soldiers to check the sighting of 
their rifles, amplifying existing problems. This was something that both he and Lord Roberts 
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would raise again, and appears to be reflected in the provisional musketry courses of 1902 
and 1903, which had a heavy emphasis on snap-shooting and the use of cover during training 
practices. The postscript in Hamilton’s letter to Congreve also included a marginal note that 
the additional training might be used as an experiment for future revisions of the Musketry 
Regulations, echoing a comment made by Hamilton’s successor, John Hopton, in the Hythe 
Annual Report for 1899.559 Certainly, some of the ideas that Hamilton was proposing are 
reflected in that training, although he himself later stated that it was Lord Roberts who 
created the reforms and initiated that implementation.560 It is also interesting to note that 
Congreve himself was later to serve as Commandant at Hythe, between September 1909 and 
December 1911, during another period of change for the British Army. 
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Musketry Training in the Public Domain 
Towards the end of the South-African War, with British pride severely dented by the 
protracted nature of the conflict, every aspect of the military was under public scrutiny. The 
level of interest was such that, when the provisional course of musketry for 1902 was 
published, it received a detailed review in The Times of London. The Times was repeatedly 
critical of the Army’s choice of rifle throughout this period: two articles published in 1890,561 
concerning the Lee-Metford rifle, had led the Director of Artillery to reconvene the Small 
Arms Committee for their comments.562 In 1905, it published another article about the new 
‘Short’ rifle, sparking further articles and letters discussing its suitability.563 However, whilst 
openly critical of the technology, the following article appears to be aimed at the military 
hierarchy rather than the new training itself. 
 
Musketry Training, 1902 
(From a Military Correspondent) 
As an appendage to the December Army Orders the “Provisional Course of Musketry 
for the year 1902” has just been issued, the authorities apparently finding it impossible to 
extricate “Musketry Regulations,” 1901, from the state of preparation in which, according to 
the official announcements, they have been lingering for months past. As even the present 
edition of King’s Regulations is “provisional,” one can hardly be surprised at the reluctance 
of the War Office to commit itself to anything definite as regards musketry training. Yet there 
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seem to be no very substantial reason why some degree of finality should not have been 
arrived at in the time that has elapsed since the war ceased to have, from a musketry 
standpoint, a distinctive and epoch-making character. It is idle to suggest that any fresh 
musketry lessons of importance will be derived from the operations now in progress, and the 
experiences already gained, as tested by last year’s training, should have sufficed to preclude 
the course for 1902 from being merely provisional – a word of which the military side of the 
War Office appears to be becoming unduly fond. 
“Table A–Recruits–Cavalry and Infantry”–in the 1902 course consists of four parts, 
of which the first three count for classification. Part I. includes 11 practices a 200, 300, and 
400 yards, seven rounds, “independent,” in each practice. The targets for the various 
distances are as laid down in the 1898 Regulations, but in practices Nos. 5 and 8, at 200 and 
300 yards respectively, the position is “sitting,” and throughout the 11 practices any kind of 
natural or artificial rest may be used by a recruit if found necessary. Parts II. and III. remain 
unchanged except for the substitution of the terms “independent” and “magazine 
independent” for “deliberate” and “rapid individual,” and the reduction of the time allowed 
in “magazine independent” from a minute to 45 seconds from the command “Commence.” 
Part IV. consists of four “independent” practices, the first three at 100, the fourth at 150 
yards, one at a vanishing target, one at a fixed head and shoulders, and two at a moving 
figure. In the practice at the fixed head and shoulders the firer, crouching behind cover, 
momentarily exposes himself sufficiently to fire a rapid shot, recruits being allowed four 
seconds for exposure, fire, and complete return to cover from “Commence” or signal. In the 
above-mentioned practices 168 rounds are expended, leaving 32 for three field practices to 
be directed by the assistant adjutant and carried out under conditions as practical as 
possible. The points required for classification as a first-class shot are, as at present, 300 for 
cavalry and 330 for infantry. 
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“Table B–Trained Infantry”–now consists of three parts–independent, miscellaneous 
practices, and practices for which rounds are allotted to commanding officers and company 
commanders. Part I. includes 12 practices, of which the first six are as in the 1898 
Regulations, with the exception that the position in No. 4 at 500 yards is “sitting” instead of 
“kneeling.” No. 7 is “any position,” 100 yards, at a vanishing head and shoulders exposed 
four seconds, No. 8 at a fixed head and shoulders, 100 yards, the firer crouching behind 
cover and momentarily exposing himself as in the similar practice in Table A. Trained men, 
however, are allowed only three seconds for exposure, fire, and complete return to cover. 
Nos. 9, 10, and 11 are at vanishing head and shoulders, fixed head and shoulders, and 
vanishing second-class targets respectively, the distances being in the first two cases 200, 
and in the third 500 yards. No. 12 practice is any position, magazine independent, 600 yards, 
at a second-class vanishing target exposed 45 seconds. Part II. embraces three practices–No. 
13, independent, about 150 yards at a moving figure; No. 14, magazine independent, about 
200 yards, any position, behind cover, two shots at each backward and forward run of a 
moving figure, eight rounds in all; No. 15, magazine independent, about 200 yards, any 
position, behind cover, at a vanishing figure. A target to appear at intervals of five seconds, 
each time at a different place, and to remain exposed four seconds. Horizontal space for each 
man’s target not less that 28ft. In the first two parts 106 rounds are expended, leaving 94 for 
Part III., of which 41 are allotted to the commanding officer and 53 to the captain, who 
formerly had only 40 rounds per man at his disposal. In addition to these 96 rounds per man, 
general officers are authorized to draw 4,000 rounds per battalion of infantry. Attention is 
directed to special instructions for moving and vanishing targets and range appliances, 
which will assist in framing schemes and in selection of suitable targets. 
To speak broadly, the main changes in Tables A and B introduced since the 1898 
Regulations, which have been in force only up to the present year, are the abolition of 
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volleys, the system of firing behind cover, and the permission accorded to recruits to use any 
kind of natural or artificial rest in their independent practices at 200, 300, and 400 yards. 
The increased encouragement of individuality in the preparation of special schemes by 
captains of companies, the closer attention paid to the use of vanishing and moving targets, 
and the introduction of the “sitting” position are other matters in which progress is 
indicated, and the hope justified that the British Army may shortly emerge from the 
“provisional” stage of up-to-date musketry training.564 
 
Whilst the training course itself has been considered in Chapter 3, it was found that 
this article, with certain amendments, was syndicated as far away as Australia.565 Associated 
articles, including speeches by Field-Marshal Roberts, can also be found in the New Zealand 
press. This suggests that it was not only readers within the British Isles who were interested 
in this field, but throughout the Empire as a whole. The following tables have been drawn up 
by incorporating the details above into the MR 1898 tables. What becomes obvious, when 
compared with the true 1902 tables,566 is that there is far more information than was 
contained in MR 1898, together with a far greater focus on individual training. The 
information contained within this article is so detailed that the general public were provided 
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 PART  I.     
1 Independent 2nd 200 7 Lying 
2 ” 2nd 200 7 Kneeling 
3 ” 2nd 200 7 Standing 
4 ” 3rd 200 7 Lying 
5 ” 3rd 200 7 Sitting 
6 ” 3rd 200 7 Standing 
7 ” 2nd 300 7 Lying 
8 ” 2nd 300 7 Sitting 
9 ” 2nd 300 7 Standing 
10 ” 2nd 400 7 Lying 
11 ” 2nd 400 7 Kneeling 
 PART  II.     
12 Independent 1st 500 7 Lying 
13 ” 1st 500 7 Kneeling 
14 ” 1st 600 7 Lying 
15 ” 1st 700 7 ” 
16 ” 1st 800 7 ” 
 PART  III.     
17 Magazine Independent 2nd 200 7 Kneeling 
18   ”                   ” 2nd 200 7 Standing 
19   ”                   ” 1st 500 7 Lying 
20   ”                   ” 1st 500 7 Kneeling 
 PART  IV.     
21 Independent Vanishing 100 7 ? 
22 ” Fixed Head & Shoulders 100 7 Crouching behind cover 
23 ” Moving Figure 100 7 ? 
24 ” Moving Figure 150 7 ? 
 
 









































 PART  I.- Independent     
1 Independent 3rd 200 7 Kneeling 
2 ” 3rd 200 7 Standing 
3 ” 2nd 500 7 Lying 
4 ” 2nd 500 7 Sitting 
5 ” 2nd 600 7 Lying 
6 ” 1st 800 7 ” 
7 ” Vanishing Head & Shoulders 100 7 Any Position 
8 ” Fixed Head & Shoulders 100 7 Crouching behind cover 
9 ” Vanishing Head & Shoulders 200 7 ? 
10 ” Fixed Head & Shoulders 200 7 ? 
11 ” Vanishing 2nd Class 500 7 ? 
12 Magazine Independent Vanishing 2nd Class 600 7 ? 
 PART 2.- Miscellaneous     
13 Independent Moving figure 150 7 ? 
14 Magazine Independent Moving figure 200 8 Any position 
15 Magazine Independent Vanishing figure 200 7 ”         ” 
 PART 3.- Discretionary     
Of the remaining 94 rounds, 41 are allotted to the commanding officer, and 53 to the captain, to be fired in 




Lord Roberts’ General Order of 1902 
 [Army Order 237, October, 1902 – issued as a Special Army Order, dated 19th September 
1902]567 
Musketry Training – Regular and Auxiliary Forces. 
‒Considerable as has been the improvement in the shooting of the Army during the last few 
years, our experience in South Africa has brought home to us the fact that our soldiers cannot 
as yet take the fullest advantage of the admirable weapon which has been placed in their 
hands, or use it with that skill and precision which are so essential to success in war. 
While I deeply regret that this should be the case, I am not surprised, for I know from 
many years’ anxious watching over the progress of rifle shooting in our Army, how 
comparatively few officers take any real interest in this‒by far the most important part of the 
soldiers’ training‒particularly to those who belong to the Cavalry and Infantry branches of 
the Service. Too frequently the musketry course is still looked upon as a somewhat irksome 
business which has to be got through as quickly as possible, and sufficient consideration is 
seldom given as to whether the results achieved are satisfactory or not. 
Success or failure in rifle shooting depends entirely upon the officers, and I now most 
earnestly desire to impress upon them the imperative necessity for their becoming experts in 
the use of the rifle themselves, and for assisting me in carrying out a far more complete and 
finished system of instruction than exists at present. 
As a first step in this direction it is essential that young soldiers should be more 
carefully prepared to profit by the lessons of the rifle range, and that they may be able so to 
profit, they must be taught everything which concerns the rifle, and how to handle it with 
ease and confidence before they are introduced to the ranges. 
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As an aid to musketry training, the following points should be carefully considered 
and given effect to:‒ 
 
1. Instruction.‒The value of the instruction imparted to the men is entirely 
dependent on the ability of the officers to teach, and on the zeal with which they enter on a 
task which demands careful preparation, patience, and energy. 
I expect therefore that all officers will do their best to become competent instructors, 
and that commanding officers will ensure themselves of the fitness of their officers to teach, 
by watching them when at work with their non-commissioned officers and men, and will 
impress upon them that keenness in musketry, and good results, will be the first claim for 
advancement. 
In the same way subordinate officers will be held responsible that the non-
commissioned officers under their command are capable instructors, and will not recommend 
any for promotion whom they do not consider as such. It is to be borne in mind that, after the 
first broad principles of instruction have been communicated, nothing but constant practice in 
teaching can make the perfect instructor; all non-commissioned officers should therefore be 
frequently practised as instructors, and the plan of depending upon a few of the most capable, 
which is detrimental to the rest of the non-commissioned officers of the battalion, should be 
discontinued. 
2. Elementary training of recruits.‒ I consider it essential to every man’s 
efficiency as a soldier, that his elementary education as a recruit should be conducted with the 
greatest patience, sympathy, and judgement, and that it should be of the most thorough and 
finished description. I regard the present short period of recruit training in musketry as 
insufficient, and I direct that a system of training be established, which will ensure that no 
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recruit is pronounced qualified until he has acquired a thorough knowledge of musketry, and 
can handle his rifle with skill and confidence under all conditions, and in all positions.568 
The recruit’s training in musketry should commence 14 days after his arrival at the 
depot, and should be continued daily until he leaves to join his corps. During this time the 
instruction will be limited to care of arms, aiming, and the firing exercises. 
When recruits join their corps daily instruction will at once be resumed. 
The following will be the course:‒ 
 
(a.)  Care of arms. 
(b.)  Instruction in aiming. 
(c.) The firing exercises, both in drill order and field service order‒one exercise at
  least to be performed daily. 
(d.) Instruction in practice in judging distance. A short exercise daily. 
(e.) Instruction in firing from behind cover, and in snap shooting. 
(f.) Instruction in the theory, powers, and mechanism of the rifle and its 
  ammunition. 
(g.) A course of lectures and examinations on the whole of the above subjects. 
 
N.B.‒Squads are not to consist of more than ten men, but eight would be better. 
3. Elementary instruction of trained soldiers.‒When a proper system of recruit 
training is established, the soldier may be expected to be so expert with his rifle that 
repetition of elementary lessons will seldom be necessary. As yet this has not been achieved, 
and until it has been, all soldiers now in the ranks must be exercised as frequently as possible 
in the same course as that laid down for the recruit. 
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4. Range practices.‒The sole object of the range practice is to produce good 
marksmen, and this cannot be arrived at hurriedly, or without due deliberation. The aim 
should not be to expend a certain quantity of ammunition, but to make every shot fired a 
practical lesson; this can only be done by careful marking of each shot, and explaining to the 
men the causes of failure. In cases, therefore, where time has to be considered, it will be 
better to do a part of the course thoroughly, than to try to get through the whole in a hurried 
and perfunctory manner. In such cases General Officers Commanding will sanction the 
omission of shooting at the longer ranges, when they consider that the whole course cannot 
be advantageously carried out. 
Exercise with blank ammunition, miniature cartridges, or merely “snapping,” on the 
lines of the rapid magazine and snap-shooting practices of the regulation course, should be 
frequently practised in quarters throughout the year. It is by snap shooting at short ranges that 
battles in the future will probably be decided, and the few rounds, which can be fired on the 
rifle range, are not sufficient to enable a soldier to attain that high standard of shooting which 
will henceforth be needed. 
5. Auxiliary Forces.‒These instructions apply to the Auxiliary Forces so far as it 
may be possible to carry them out under the different conditions of service. Officers 
commanding regimental districts must at once take up the question as to how they can be 
applied. They must in the first instance especially concern themselves with the training of the 
permanent staff, and must satisfy themselves that they are kept up to a high standard of 
instructional ability under the direction of the adjutants of the Auxiliary Forces, of whose 
qualifications they must make themselves cognizant. It is only by district commanders’ 




Officers commanding regimental districts must also give their special attention to the 
musketry training of Militia recruits, including that of officers. This is at present most 
unsatisfactory. 
6. Course of Musketry Practice for 1903.‒The official instructions for the 
musketry practices for 1903 will embody, as far as possible, the principle that skill at short 
ranges is of the utmost importance, and that it is useless to allow a man to shoot at the longer 
ranges, or in advanced practices, until he has become a reliable shot at the shorter distances. 
Commanding officers are hereby empowered to keep back such men as they consider 
require further instruction, in order that they may expend their ammunition at the shorter 
ranges. 
I am convinced that straight shooting, which is the result of careful training, is at least 
as important on the modern battlefield as tactical combinations, to the practice of which so 
much time and trouble are now devoted. It will be well for all to recollect that the best tactics 
may fail if, when the climax of the struggle is reached, a superiority of fire cannot be 
established. 
I cannot, therefore, too strongly impress on every General Officer Commanding that it 
is his most important duty to attain and maintain a high standard of efficiency in musketry 
throughout all ranks in his command, and, being convinced that this can only be attained by 
the exercise of constant personal interest and supervision on the part of the senior officers, I 
shall hold every General Officer Commanding personally responsible that he, by whatever 
means he may consider best, will endeavour to attain a standard which can only be 
considered satisfactory when it has attained the highest efficiency. With this view he should 
satisfy himself by frequent and close observation, that a well-ordered and progressive system 
of elementary instruction in musketry is established in all corps in his command on the lines 
here indicated, and should specially endeavour to stimulate the interest of officers in their 
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men’s shooting and in recruit training. He should endeavour to overcome any difficulties 
which may arise in complying with the spirit of this order, and in regard to such as he may be 
unable to cope with, he should at once bring them to the notice of the Adjutant-General. 
7. Report to be made to the Adjutant-General.‒On the 1st January, 1903, General 
Officers Commanding will report to the Adjutant-General, in detail, the steps which they 
have taken to introduce a better system of training, and will explain the progress made up to 
date, while putting forward any suggestions which may occur to them as being likely to be of 
use. They will, at the same time, furnish the result of their observations as to the action taken 





The Introduction of Charger Loading, and the Mechanics of Rapid Rifle Fire  
 
When the Magazine Rifle Trials were being held in the 1880s, the method of loading the 
magazine was one of the points under consideration. James Paris Lee’s original design, when 
first submitted to the British Army in 1879,569 was loaded using detachable magazines. The 
Small Arms Committee were not in favour of this, stating:  
 
…it is not advisable to introduce into the Army a rifle with a detachable magazine, as 
it adds to the number of articles already carried by the soldier, and is liable to be lost.570 
 
Despite this concern, the ‘Magazine Rifle, Mark I’ was initially issued with two magazines, 
although the second magazine was quickly withdrawn. The remaining magazine was 
connected to the action-body by a linkage, and was only to be removed for cleaning purposes. 
It had also been altered so that it could be loaded whilst fitted to the rifle. This meant that, for 
its first fourteen years in service, the rifle was loaded either by feeding individual rounds into 
the magazine or, with the cut-off plate closed, directly into the breech. It was in this second 
manner that soldiers were primarily to load, with the magazine held in reserve for ‘critical 
moments’.571 However, once the magazine was empty, reloading was a relatively slow 
process, and it was simpler to use the rifle as a single-loader, although this reduced the rate of 
fire to that of the Martini-Henry.572 
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During both the Tirah Campaign and the South African War, the slowness of 
reloading was a particular source of complaint.573 There was also a tendency for loose 
ammunition to be dropped whilst reloading, particularly by cavalry, which had allowed the 
Boers to resupply themselves during the latter stages of the war by following British units.574 
To address these issues, it was decided to introduce some form of charger or clip-loading.575 
The distinction between the two was set out in the contemporary Text Book of Small Arms: 
 
Cartridges are carried in chargers and clips in order to accelerate the rapid loading 
of the magazine. Chargers are used by being placed in grooves in the body over the 
magazine, the cartridges are swept out of them by the thumb into the magazine, the empty 
charger being thrown away. 
Clips with their cartridges are placed in the magazine, the clip being held down by a 
catch... The cartridges are fed up by the magazine lever, or platform, which is made 
sufficiently narrow to pass between the sides of the clip. When the cartridges are expended, 
the clip falls out through an opening in the bottom of the magazine.576 
 
Although Lord Roberts referred to using ‘clips’ during a Parliamentary debate on the 
‘Short’ rifle in 1905,577 this appears to have been due to the two terms being considered 
interchangeable in common usage. Clip-loading would have required a complete re-design of 
at least the magazine of the Lee-Enfield, but the receiver could be adapted for charger-
loading with relatively little trouble. The matter was made slightly more complicated by the 
design of the ammunition. The .303 (British) cartridge is a ‘flanged’, or ‘rimmed’, design, 
over which the extractor claw of the bolt hooks, controlling the cartridge’s passage into and 
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out of the breech. This rim presents a complication when loading, in that the cartridges must 
be arranged so that they do not overlap, otherwise the bolt will carry two cartridges from the 
magazine, causing an obstruction which would then have to be cleared before firing could 
continue. For this reason, the chargers had to be filled in a particular pattern to ensure the 
cartridges entered the magazine in the correct arrangement. 
When the SMLE Mark I was introduced in 1903,578 charger loading was initially 
accomplished by using a two-piece guide. The receiver wall was redesigned to incorporate 
one of the grooves mentioned above, with the other incorporated into a sliding bar attached to 
the bolt-head. When the bolt was brought fully to the rear, the bar was pushed forward, 
aligning the two grooves to receive the charger. This was not a particularly sturdy 
arrangement, and when the SMLE Mark III was introduced in 1907,579 this was replaced with 
a ‘charger bridge’, which contained both grooves within a single rigid fitting. The chargers 
themselves were constructed from a single piece of stamped steel, with high sides and a 
spring tab at either end to retain the cartridges. The first pattern does not appear to have been 
totally satisfactory, and after trials with three alternative designs were conducted between 
January 1905 and March 1906, an improved pattern was adopted.580 Experiments relating to 
the charger bridge, undertaken around the same time, found that the forward motion of the 
bolt dislodged the empty charger, rather than needing to remove it manually.581 Although this 
appears to have been an unintentional feature, it did make loading slightly faster, and was 
incorporated into future training.  
                                                 
578
 Formally designated the ‘Rifle, short, magazine, Lee-Enfield. (Mark I)’. List of Changes no. 11947 (dated 6 
Nov 1903). See Skennerton, List of Changes, Vol. III, pp. 70-76. 
579
 Formally designated the ‘Rifle, short, magazine, Lee-Enfield. (Mark III)’. List of Changes no. 13853 (dated 
26 Jan 1907). See Skennerton, List of Changes, Vol. III, pp. 148-155. 
580
 These were the ‘Kings Norton’, ‘Webb’, and ‘Improved Enfield’ patterns, the last of which was the 
successful design. See letters 180 (21 Jan 1905), 180/5 (1 Aug 1905), 180/6 (9 Mar 1906), and 207/2 (15 Jun 
1905), contained in TNA WO 140/9. 
581
 Letter from the School Experimental Officer, ref. 260/2 (3 Apr 1906), contained in TNA WO 140/9. 
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The SMLE, through both luck and design, incorporated several features alongside the 
charger bridge that made it ideal for rapid fire. The large capacity of the magazine meant 
there was less spring resistance when loading the first charger.582 The bolt-handle was sited 
behind the trigger, placing them in the best arrangement for rapid manipulation. The bolt was 
also cocked as it closed, meaning that spring resistance was not encountered until the final 
motion, when the firer had the greatest mechanical advantage. None of these features were 
specifically noted or looked for during either the original trials or subsequent development, 
and they appeared individually on other contemporary rifles. However, the combination of all 
four created a design uniquely suited to modern warfare. When combined with rapid fire 
drills, of the type that were introduced in 1909, the rifle was capable of a rate of aimed fire of 
fifteen rounds per minute in the hands of a trained soldier, in what came to be known as the 
‘Mad Minute’.583 Such pride was placed in the execution of this practice that it was included 
in a recruitment film produced by the British Army in early 1914, where ‘a soldier was 
shown on the firing range “scoring with twenty-eight rounds a minute eighteen bulls and ten 
inners”’.584 The SMLE, so very nearly replaced in 1914, proved its worth during the First 




                                                 
582
 During trials it was noted that there was great difficulty in emptying the second charger into the magazine, 
particularly the tenth round. As such, the loading instructions throughout the period had the following footnote: 
The magazine will hold two chargers of five cartridges each, but should, in ordinary circumstances, be loaded 
with one only, as the soldier will thus retain the power of adding another charger, at any time, should necessity 
demand. See ATM 1905, p. 81 (footnote).  
583
 It became so inextricably linked to the B.E.F. that it was even used as the title for an account of one 
regiment’s experiences during the opening phase of the First World War. See J.M. Craster (ed.), ‘Fifteen Rounds 
a Minute’ – The Grenadiers at War, August to December 1914 , (London, Macmillan London, 1976). 
584
 Quoted in N.P. Hiley, ‘'The British Army Film', 'You!' and 'For the Empire': reconstructed propaganda films, 
1914-1916’, in Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television. 5 (2), 1985, 165-182, p.167. From a 
programme apparently presented at the Royal Premiere, it is believed that the firing was conducted at the School 
of Musketry, but no details of the firer are known, and no surviving prints of the film had been identified as of 
June 2014. 
585
 Cottesloe, The Englishman and the Rifle, p. 136. 
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Appendix 9: Reference Images 
 
Figure 35: Royal Engineers, with Martini-Enfield carbines, taken at Aldershot, c.1907. 
 
Figure 36: A group of trainee N.C.O. instructors, with their instructor seated in the centre. 




Figure 37: A group of trainee N.C.O. Instructors, circa 1914, surrounded by various 
teaching aids including landscape and figure targets, and aiming rests. 
 
Figure 38: Part of a group photograph of the Staff of the School of Musketry, taken 
circa1905. It includes Charles Monro and Norman McMahon, seated in the front row, right 
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